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This	 dissertation	 investigates	 the	 so-called	 periphrastic	 causative	 verbs	 in	English	 –	 verbs	 such	 as	 cause,	make,	 have,	 force,	 and	 let	 –	 and	distinguishes	 them	with	respect	to	their	selectional	behavior	and	inferential	properties.	 	I	suggest	that	these	 verbs	 are	 primarily	 differentiated	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 evaluative	 and	 affective	dispositions	 of	 participants	 in	 the	 speech	 act	 and	 the	 caused	 eventuality.	 	 The	empirical	 basis	 for	 this	 claim	 incorporates	 corpora	 as	 well	 as	 experimental	elicitation	 and	 judgment	 tasks.	 	 Based	 on	 these	 findings,	 it	 is	 proposed	 that	 the	selection	 of	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	 in	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 directive	 causative	event	 is	 governed	by	 the	 evaluative	 stance	 of	 the	 patient	 of	 the	 causative	 verb.	 	 I	argue	 that	 the	English	verb	cause	 in	particular	 is	 less	 general	 than	has	previously	been	assumed,	that	it	has	at	least	two	different	senses,	and	that	its	primary	sense	is	restricted	to	cases	of	negative	speaker	sentiment.			
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Chapter	1:			 Introduction	
	
	 This	 thesis	 is	 an	examination	of	 the	periphrastic	 causative	verbs	 in	English	and	 their	 behavior	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 evaluative	 and	 affective	 dispositions	 of	participants	 in	 the	 speech	 act	 and	 encoded	 causal	 relation.	 	 The	 sources	 of	 data	include	 corpora	 and	 controlled	 elicitation	 and	 judgment	 tasks,	 as	 well	 as	 a	sentiment-encoded	 lexicon.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 selection	 of	 periphrastic	 verb	 in	 the	expression	of	a	directive	causative	event	is	governed	by	the	evaluative	stance	of	the	patient	of	the	causative	verb	and	that	the	English	verb	cause	in	particular	has	a	more	restricted	meaning	than	has	previously	been	appreciated,	that	it	is	polysemous,	and	that	its	primary	sense	is	sensitive	to	the	affective	state	of	the	speaker.				 The	domain	of	interest	is	the	collection	of	words	like	cause,	make,	have,	force,	and	let	–	the	periphrastic	causatives	–	which	differ	in	meaning	except	insofar	as	they	all	seem	to	encode	causative	semantics	of	some	sort.		In	general,	causative	meaning	has	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 expressions	 in	 natural	 language,	 as	well	 as	 a	 number	 of	effects	on	grammar	and	lexicalization.		While	often	intuitively	present,	however,	it	is	not	always	clear	how	to	diagnose	causation.		In	English,	the	presence	of	causation	is	sometimes	signaled	by	 the	ability	 to	 take	a	progressive	by-phrase,	which	specifies	something	 about	 the	 causative	 event,	 such	 as	 the	 means	 of	 causation	 (see	 e.g.	Neelman	and	van	de	Koot	2010,	81):		
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(1)	 a.	 John	killed	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 b.	 John	wounded	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 c.	 John	radicalized	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 d.	 John	made	Bill	run	away	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 e.						??	John	hit	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.1	However,	 this	 simple	 test	 is	 not	 always	 felicitous	 with	 non-agentive	 causative	constructions	and	depictive	by-phrases:	(2)	 a.								?	The	painting	frghtened	the	children	by	being	unusual.		 b.						??	The	storm	made	the	dog	nervous	by	being	so	loud.		Furthermore,	 progressive	 by-phrases	 can	 occur	 with	 unaccusative	 verbs	 to	introduce	 causation,	 rather	 than	 as	 an	 indicator	of	 its	 presence	 in	 the	unmodified	version:	(3)	 a.	 Little	Orson	grew	into	a	big	man.		 b.	 Little	Orson	grew	into	a	big	man	by	eating	John	McCann’s	Steel	Cut		Irish	Oats.	 	 	 (Neelman	and	van	de	Koot,	2010,	81)		In	 general,	 reliable	 and	universal	 syntactic	 criteria	 for	 causative	 constructions	are	difficult	to	come	by.		Although	the	periphrastic	constructions	with	agentive	subjects	are	generally	acceptable	with	progressive	by-phrases	–	e.g.	 John	made	Bill	 leave	by	
pushing	him	through	the	door	–	in	this	thesis,	more	reliable	semantic	criteria	will	be	examined	and	adopted.	Even	 beyond	 the	 periphrastic	 causative	 verbs,	 causation	 seems	 to	 be	 an	important	 component	 of	 lexical	 meaning	 with	 several	 grammatical	 consequences	that	 will	 be	 explored	 in	 detail	 herein.	 	 In	 Charles	 Fillmore’s	 1970	 paper	 “The	Grammar	of	Hitting	 and	Breaking”,	 for	example,	 a	 comparative	examination	of	 the	behavior	 of	 two	 verbs	 that	 initially	 appear	 to	 be	 grammatically	 identical	 reveals																																																									1	Note	 that	 this	sentence	 is	not	 intended	 to	 include	a	parenthetical	by-phrase.	 	 In	other	words,	 the	relevant	reading	is	not	the	same	as	John	hit	Bill	with	an	arrow	by	shooting	it	at	him,	but	the	felicity	of	that	sentence	reveals	complications	with	the	diagnostic.	
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interesting	 differences	 rooted	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 and	meaning	 associated	with	 their	arguments.		The	verbs	hit	and	break	are	both	transitive	and	both	allow	instrumental	prepositional	phrases	(Fillmore	1970,	123ff,	exx.	6,9):	(4)	 a.	 John	hit	the	vase	with	a	stick.		 b.	 John	broke	the	vase	with	a	stick.	 	Both	can	occur	with	an	instrumental	subject	(Fillmore	1970,	exx.	7,10):	(5)	 a.	 A	stick	hit	the	vase.		 b.	 A	stick	broke	the	vase.	But	only	break	can	occur	intransitively	(Fillmore	1970,	exx.	5,12):	(6)	 a.								*	The	vase	hit.		 b.	 The	vase	broke.	One	important	difference	is	that	break,	but	not	hit,	in	the	intransitive	sentence	(6b)	entails	a	change	of	state	(Fillmore	1970	120ff).		Consequently,	break,	but	not	hit,	in	the	transitive	sentence	(4b)	is	causative.			Intransitive	change	of	state	verbs	can	generally	be	used	as	causatives	(unless	blocked	 by	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 morphologically	 unrelated	 variant,	 or	 “suppletion”:	
die/kill,	learn/teach),	and	alternations	of	this	kind,	between	homophonous	change	of	state	 and	 causative	 verbs,	 are	 often	 called	 Causative/Inchoative	 alternations	 and	they	 are	 remarkably	 productive	 among	 change-of-state	 verbs	 (Levin	 1993),	extending	easily	to	novel	inchoatives:		(7)	 a.	 The	right-wing	Trumpified	during	the	presidential	primaries.		 b.	 The	presidential	primaries	Trumpified	the	right-wing.	
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There	 exist	 some	 intransitive	 verbs	 that	 have	 neither	 morphologically	 identical	zero-causatives	nor	suppletive	causatives	and	require	periphrasis:2	(8)	 a.	 John	sauntered	across	the	room.		 b.								*	Bill/happiness	sauntered	John	across	the	room.		 c.	 The	children	laughed.		 d.								*	The	clown	laughed	the	children.		Even	some	change	of	state	verbs	tend	to	resist	causativization:		(9)	 a.	 The	flower	blossomed.		 b.								*	The	gardener	blossomed	the	flower.3		Most	 intransitive	verbs	 in	English,	however,	have	a	 causative	variant.	 	 Indeed,	 the	Causative/Inchoative	 alternation	 is	 just	 one	 of	 several	 systematic	 causative	alternation	seen	 in	English.	 	Another	causative	alternation	 involves	 the	expression	of	induced	action	by	the	transitivization	of	a	motion	verb:	(10)	 a.	 The	horse	jumped	over	the	fence.		 b.	 Sylvia	jumped	the	horse	over	the	fence.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Levin	1993,	31)		There	 are	 similar	 alternations	 involving	 verbs	 of	 emission	 (bang,	 shine,	 squirt),	verbs	 of	 spatial	 configuration	 (dangle,	 hang,	 perch),	 so-called	 “suffocation	 verbs”	(choke,	drown,	suffocate)	and	others	(Levin	1993,	31-32):	(11)	 a.	 The	baby	burped.		 b.	 I	burped	the	baby.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Levin	1993,	32)		The	 addition	 of	 causal	 semantics,	 then,	 has	 the	 consequence	 of	 altering	 verbal	adicity	in	English.																																																									2	 This	 is	 an	 instance	 of	 Baker’s	 Paradox:	 (i)	 there	 is	 a	 productive	 generalization,	 (ii)	 there	 are	(apparently)	 arbitrary	 exceptions,	 and	 (iii)	 there	 is	 no	negative	 evidence	 available	 to	 the	 language	learner	(see	Coppock	2008).		There	are	various	attempts	to	explain	the	gaps	(e.g.	Levin	&	Rappaport-Hovav	1991,	1995,	Koontz-Garboden	2009).	3	There	are	exceptions	to	this	restriction	on	blossom	for	subjects	of	natural	forces,	as	noted	by	Wright	(2002).	
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As	 suggested,	 natural	 language	 provides	 a	 number	 of	 resources	 for	 the	expression	of	causation.	 	In	many	languages,	 including	English	as	described,	causal	semantics	can	be	encoded	as	a	part	of	otherwise	idiosyncratic	verb	meaning.		Verbs	that	 directly	 encode	 causative	 meaning	 in	 this	 way	 are	 typically	 called	 “lexical	causatives”	and	they	include	words	like	kill,	melt,	and	break,	as	well	as	the	causative	variants	 of	 the	 alternating	 verbs	 mentioned	 above.	 	 These	 verbs	 can	 be	 roughly	paraphrased	 by	 means	 of	 explicit	 reference	 to	 the	 causative	 component	 of	 their	denotation	(see	e.g.	Lakoff	1965,	Talmy	1975,	Shibatani	1976,	Comrie	1976):	(12)	 a.	 John	killed	Bill.		 	 ‘John	CAUSED	Bill	to	become	dead’.			 b.	 John	melted	the	ice.			 	 ‘John	CAUSED	the	ice	to	become	liquid’.			 c.	 John	broke	the	window.		 	 ‘John	CAUSED	the	window	to	become	broken’.		These	 are	 in	 contrast	with	 transitive	 verbs	 like	kick,	watch,	 and	hit	which	 do	 not	include	causation	as	a	part	of	 their	meaning.4	 	English	also	provides	several	 semi-productive	suffixes	that	introduce	inchoative	meaning	to	otherwise	non-inchoative	forms	 –	 especially	 adjectives	 and	 nouns	 –	 producing	 change-of-state	 intransitive	verbs,	 thereby	 forming	 the	 “morphological	 causatives”	 in	 their	 transitive	 variant	(see	Keyser	and	Roeper	1984	for	discussion	of	-ize):		(13)	 a.	 John	blackened	his	boots.		 	 ‘John	CAUSED	his	boots	to	become	black.’			 b.	 John	vaporized	the	liquid.		 	 ‘John	CAUSED	the	liquid	to	become	vapor.’																																																									4	Ignoring	here	the	trivial	sense	common	to	agentive	predicates	for	which	kick	might	be	paraphrased	as	?cause	to	be	kicked,	which	lacks	a	necessary	result	state.	
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		Additionally,	 English	 and	many	 other	 languages	make	 available	 specialized	words	that	function	solely	(or	primarily,	as	will	be	claimed)	to	introduce	causation.		These	words	are	variously	called	“analytic,”	“syntactic,”	or	“periphrastic	causatives:”		(14)	 a.	 John	caused	Bill	to	mail	the	letter.		 b.	 John	made	Bill	mail	the	letter.		 c.	 John	had	Bill	mail	the	letter.		 d.	 John	forced	Bill	to	mail	the	letter.		 e.	 John	let	Bill	mail	the	letter.		I	 adopt	 the	 term	 “periphrastic	 causatives”	 here.	 	 These	 verbs	 serve	 to	 isolate	 and	make	 explicit	 the	 causative	 component	 of	 meaning	 that	 is	 common	 among	 the	sentences	 in	 (12)	and	 (13)	and,	 as	 such,	 represent	an	abstraction	of	 an	 important	class	of	predicate	meaning.	Lexical	 causatives	 and	 their	 corresponding	periphrastic	 forms	 are	 not	 fully	synonymous,	however.		In	particular,	the	appropriate	range	of	denotations	of	lexical	causatives	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 subset	 of	 the	 denotations	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 variants.		This	is	revealed	by	the	asymmetry	of	acceptability	for	conjunction	with	the	negated	verb	(Shibatani	1976):		(15)	 a.	 John	didn’t	break	the	vase,	but	he	caused	it	to	break.		 b.							#	John	broke	the	vase,	but	he	didn’t	cause	it	to	break.		The	 possibility	 of	 a	 felicitous	 conjunction	 of	 the	 type	 in	 (15a)	 –	 in	 a	 scenario	 in	which	John	places	the	vase	in	a	precarious	location,	but	someone	else	knocks	it	over,	for	example	–	demonstrates	that	the	two	predicates	break	x	and	cause	x	to	break	are	not	 fully	 synonymous.	 	 This	 pair	 can	 be	 contrasted	 with	 the	 unacceptability	 of	conjunction	for	synonymous	active/passive	pairs:	
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(16)	 a.							#	John	loves	Mary,	but	Mary	isn’t	loved	by	John.		 b.							#	John	doesn’t	love	Mary,	but	Mary	is	loved	by	John.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Shibatani	1976,	28)	That	only	one	variant	of	the	conjunction	of	causative	sentences	is	acceptable	–	(15a)	but	 not	 (15b)	 –	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 sentences	 is	one	of	inclusion.		An	analogous	relationship	holds	between	a	general	verb	of	motion	and	a	verb	of	manner	of	motion:	(17)	 a.	 John	didn’t	walk	to	the	park,	but	he	went	to	the	park.	b.							#	John	walked	to	the	park,	but	he	didn’t	go	to	the	park.		In	 a	 non-synonymous,	 non-inclusive	 meaning	 relationship,	 either	 conjunction	 is	acceptable:	(18)	 a.	 I	didn’t	drive	to	school,	but	I	walked	to	school.		 b.	 I	didn’t	walk	to	school,	but	I	drove	to	school.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Shibatani	1976,	30)		 One	interesting	claim	that	has	been	made	regarding	this	distinction	(see,	e.g.,	McCawley	 1968,	 Shibatani	 and	 Pardeshi	 2002,	 Beavers	 2006,	 inter	 alia)	 is	 that	natural	 language	 encodes	 different	 “degrees”	 or	 “intensities”	 of	 causation.		Furthermore,	this	“degree”	of	causation,	often	called	“directness,”	is	morphologically	iconic.	 	Roughly,	 the	 closer	 the	encoding	of	 the	 causative	morpheme	 to	 the	verbal	root	 (the	 “compactness”	 of	 the	 verb),	 the	 more	 direct	 the	 causative	 event.	 In	particular,	lexical	causatives	are	more	direct	than	periphrastic	causatives:		(19)	 a.	 John	caused	Bill	to	die	on	Sunday	by	stabbing	him	on	Saturday.		 b.							#	John	killed	Bill	on	Sunday	by	stabbing	him	on	Saturday.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Fodor	1970,	433)		This	“directness”	manifests	as	a	difficulty	in	separating	the	causing	event	and	result	state,	 resulting	 in	 infelicity	when	 the	 causing	 event	 (targeted	by	 the	by-phrase)	 is	
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marked	 as	 temporally	 distinct	 from	 the	 resulting	 event.	 	 The	 lexical	 construction	encodes	 direct	 causation,	 but	 the	 periphrastic	 causative	 does	 not.	 	 In	 general,	modification	 of	 a	 periphrastic	 construction	 results	 in	 an	 ambiguity	 that	 is	 not	present	 for	 lexical	 causatives,	 suggesting	 that	 causative	 scenarios	 encoded	 by	periphrastic	causatives	are	(potentially)	bi-eventive,	while	those	encoded	by	lexical	causatives	are	conceived	as	a	single	event:	(20)	 a.	 John	caused	Bill	to	die	slowly.		 b.	 John	killed	Bill	slowly.		While	 (20a)	 allows	 a	 reading	 in	 which	 the	 dying	 event	 occurs	 slowly,	 but	 not	necessarily	the	causing	event,	(20b)	has	no	such	reading	for	many	speakers.	Causal	directness	and	morphological	iconicity	is	a	cross-linguistically	regular	phenomenon	 (Van	 Valin	 and	Wilkins	 1996,	 Shibatani	 and	 Pardeshi	 2002)	 and	 so	causal	directness	is	a	good	candidate	for	a	cognitively	universal	distinction,	insofar	as	 language	 is	 an	 indicator	 of	 thought.	 	 But	 directness	 is	 not	 the	 whole	 story	 as	concerns	 the	 verbal	 expression	 of	 causation.	 	 Even	 among	 themselves,	 the	periphrastics	seem	to	show	differences	in	meaning:	(21)	 a.	 She	let	him	mail	the	letter.		 b.	 She	had	him	mail	the	letter.		 c.	 She	forced	him	to	mail	the	letter.		Intuitively,	 these	 sentences	 are	 not	 appropriate	 descriptions	 of	 the	 same	 kinds	 of	causing	events.		It	will	be	argued	here	that	the	sentences	–	in	addition	to	whatever	other	 meaning	 differences	 might	 be	 present	 –	 represent	 points	 on	 a	 potential	continuum	with	respect	to	how	cooperative	the	patient	is	in	mailing	the	letter,	with	
let	corresponding	to	the	most	cooperative	and	force	the	least.		In	each	case,	the	agent	“causes”	the	patient	to	mail	the	letter,	but	there	is	nevertheless	a	difference	in	terms	
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of	how	much	(perhaps	patient-internal)	resistance	must	be	overcome	to	do	so	(see	e.g.	McCawley	1968,	Beavers	2006).		I	argue	in	this	thesis	that	these	differences	are	properly	 analyzed	 as	 differences	 in	 the	 causee’s	 inclination	 to	 act	 based	 on	 their	evaluative	stance	toward	the	caused	sub-event.		 Furthermore,	 it	 seems	 that	 some	periphrastic	 causatives	are	best	when	 the	caused	sub-event	is	intuitively	negative	or	unpleasant:	(22)	 a.	 “You	caused	me	to	weep,	you	caused	me	to	moan,	you	caused	me	to		leave	my	home.”	 	 	 	 (“In	the	Pines”,	traditional)		 b.							#	You	caused	me	to	rejoice.		(23)	 a.	 It	drove	him	to	commit	suicide.		 b.						??	It	drove	him	to	improve	his	life.	I	argue	that	these	verbs	are	sensitive	to	the	speaker’s	sentiment	toward	the	event	or	situation	encoded	by	 the	non-finite	 complement	 clause.	 	As	 is	 the	 case	 for	patient	inclination,	 speaker	 sentiment	 is	 a	 factor	 beyond	 those	 explored	 in	 previous	analyses	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	in	English.		 The	thesis	is	organized	as	follows:	chapter	2	gives	background	for	the	study	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	in	English,	 including	the	philosophical	tradition	and	 historical	 development	 of	 the	 understanding	 of	 causation,	 contemporary	theories,	 the	 grammatical	 effects	 of	 causation	 in	 English,	 and	 the	 historical	development	 and	 syntactic	 properties	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 causatives.	 	 Chapter	 3	presents	prominent	linguistic	accounts	of	the	periphrastic	causatives,	and	develops	the	 criterion	 of	 patient	 inclination	 as	 deterministic	 in	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 verb,	supported	by	corpus	examples.	 	Chapter	4	discusses	social	and	affective	influences	on	verb	selection,	 including	speaker	sentiment	and	register,	 including	both	corpus	studies	and	experimental	elicitation	and	 judgment	 tasks,	 and	chapter	5	concludes.
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Chapter	2:			 Background			 This	 chapter	 gives	 some	 background	 to	 a	 study	 of	 periphrastic	 causatives,	which	will	motivate	and	set	 the	 scene	 for	 the	analysis	 in	 subsequent	 chapters.	 	 In	particular,	 the	 history	 of	 the	 philosophical	 understanding	 and	 treatment	 of	 the	causal	 concept	 is	 given	 in	 section	 1,	 followed	 by	 an	 overview	 of	 contemporary	theories	of	causation	in	section	2.		Although	in	the	following	chapters	causation	will	be	 treated	 essentially	 as	 an	 unanalyzed	 univocal	 primitive	 (i.e.	 monosemous	 and	non-disjunctive),	 with	 variation	 across	 causative	 verbs	 encoded	 as	 constraints	above	and	beyond	 this	 core	 concept,5	 this	 is	 a	dramatic	 simplification,	 as	 the	 first	two	 sections	 of	 this	 chapter	 will	 make	 clear.	 Section	 3	 is	 a	 summary	 tour	 of	 the	grammatical	properties	of	causation	in	English,	and	section	4	is	a	discussion	of	the	historical	development	of	 the	English	periphrastic	 causative	verbs	as	well	as	 their	most	salient	contemporary	syntactic	features.		 A	useful	 starting	point	 for	 the	discussion	of	 causation	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	description	 of	 a	 very	 simple	 example	 of	 causation.	 	 The	 scenario	 is	 that	 of	 a	 boy	pushing	a	lamp	off	a	table	followed	by	the	lamp	falling	to	the	ground	and	breaking.		These	 events	might	be	 recounted	 as	 the	boy	broke	 the	 lamp	 or	 the	boy	 caused	 the	
lamp	 to	 break.	 	 The	 former	 makes	 use	 of	 a	 lexical	 causative	 and	 the	 latter	 a	periphrastic	causative,	but	in	both	cases	the	description	is	of	a	causative	event:	the																																																									5	But	see	revised	conception	of	causation	in	the	Conclusion.	
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boy	 pushing	 the	 lamp	 off	 the	 table	 caused	 the	 lamp	 to	 break.	 	 	 In	 this	 framing,	causation	 is	 a	 relation	 between	 two	 events.	 	 As	 such,	 it	 has	 several	 formal	properties.	 	 The	 causation	 relation	 is	 irreflexive	 (no	 event	 causes	 itself:	 the	 lamp	breaking	did	not	cause	the	lamp	to	break),	antisymmetric	(a	cause	causes	an	effect,	an	effect	never	causes	the	cause:	the	lamp	breaking	didn’t	cause	the	boy	to	push	it),	and	transitive	(if	event	A	caused	event	B	and	event	B	caused	event	C,	then	event	A	caused	event	C:	The	boy	pushing	the	lamp	caused	it	to	fall,	the	lamp	falling	caused	it	to	 break,	 so	 the	 boy	 pushing	 the	 lamp	 caused	 it	 to	 break).	 	 This	 represents	something	 of	 a	 common	 understanding	 of	 causation	 and	 is	 just	 about	 all	 that	 is	agreed	on	by	almost	everyone,	with	some	hesitation	of	the	designation	of	causation	as	 a	 formal	 relation,6	 and	 denial	 of	 just	 about	 everything	 by,	 for	 example,	 the	Occasionalists	(see	below).		In	any	case,	it	is	a	rough	preliminary	characterization	of	what	is	meant	here	by	causation.			
	
1.	 Early	Approaches	to	Causation		 	Issues	and	problems	related	to	causation	have	been	debated	by	philosophers	since	 ancient	 times,	 and	 indeed	 the	 search	 for	 explanations	 of	 any	 kind	 has	 often	been	 conflated	 with	 the	 search	 for	 causes.	 	 This	 identification	 of	 scientific	explanation	 with	 the	 discovery	 of	 causes	 is	 sometimes	 called	 the	 Aristotelean	paradigm	(e.g.	Kistler	2014),	but	it	appears	to	have	been	a	more	general	assumption																																																									6	Some	theorists	believe	that	causation	is	better	analyzed	as	the	transference	of	a	conserved	property	(see	below),	which	accounts	 for	most	 instances	of	physical	causation,	but	runs	 into	difficulty	 in	the	cases	of	social,	psychological,	causation-by-absence,	and	otherwise	not	obviously	physical	scenarios.	
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in	classical	Greek	thought.		In	Plato’s	Phaedo,	for	example,	there	is	discussion	of	“the	causes	 of	 each	 thing;	 why	 each	 thing	 comes	 into	 existence,	 why	 it	 goes	 out	 of	existence,	why	it	exists”	(96	a	6-10;	see	also	Falcon	2015).		But	further	investigation	and	reflection	on	the	nature	of	causation	has	revealed	subtleties	and	complications	that	have	exposed	this	intuitive	and	apparently	simple	notion	as	deeply	problematic	and	mysterious.			In	this	section,	a	very	brief	review	of	the	most	influential	pre-contemporary	theories	of	causation	is	presented,	beginning	with	the	dominant	theory	from	Greek	antiquity	 to	 the	 seventeenth	 century:	 that	 of	 Aristotle.	 	 	 The	 highlights	 are	 as	follows:	(i)	the	existence	of	causation	per	se	is	a	controversial	and	contentious	issue,	(ii)	the	Aristotelean	approach	regards	causation	as	a	part	of	an	explanatory	theory	and	 assumes	 causes	 are	 necessary	 for	 their	 effects,	 and	 (iii)	 Hume	 claimed	 that	causation	 cannot	 be	 directly	 observed	 and	 is	 therefore	 inadequate	 as	 an	explanation,	 but	 is	 instead	 only	 a	 generalization	 over	 regular	 succession.		Contemporary	approaches,	as	well	as	the	Hume-inspired	counterfactual	analysis	of	the	semantics	of	causal	language	that	will	be	adopted	here,	are	discussed	section	2.		
1.1	 Aristotle			 Aristotle’s	 writings	 on	 causation	 distinguished	 four	 varieties	 of	 cause:	Material,	 Formal,	 Efficient,	 and	 Final	 (Physics	 II	 3),	 which	 he	 explicates	 via	 the	examples	of	a	bronze	statue	and	silver	bowl.		A	statue	is	made	out	of	some	material,	and	made	 into	some	structure	by	some	sculptor	with	some	purpose	 in	mind.	 	The	
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material	the	statue	is	made	of	–	bronze	in	this	example	–	is	the	Material	Cause.		The	structure	or	form	of	the	statue	as	conceived	by	the	sculptor	is	its	Formal	Cause.			The	action	of	the	sculptor	 in	making	it	 is	the	statue’s	Efficient	Cause.	 	And	the	purpose	for	creating	the	sculpture	 is	 its	Final	Cause.	 	We	would	probably	refer	to	the	Final	Cause	today	as	a	“reason”	or	“purpose”	rather	than	a	“cause”	–	indeed,	his	“health	is	the	cause	of	walking”	 (Metaphysics	1013	a.24	–	1014	a.25)	 is	nearly	 impossible	 in	contemporary	English	–	but	both	can	be	answers	to	a	“why”	question.	 	Of	 the	four	causes,	only	Efficient	Cause	conforms	to	modern	notions	of	causation,	but	Aristotle’s	notion	 of	 Final	 Cause	 has	 had	 a	 lasting	 influence	 on	 subsequent	 conceptions	 of	causation.	Aristotle	 seems	 to	 assume	 (in	 Physics	 and	Metaphysics)	 that	 all	 nature	 is	governed	 by	 purpose;	 that	 there	 is	 an	 intended	 end	 (‘telos’)	 that	 serves	 as	 Final	Cause.		This	is	closely	related	to	his	idea	of	first	causes:	Aristotle	claims	that	nothing	is	 its	 own	 cause,	 but	 he	 explicitly	 rejects	 the	 idea	 of	 infinite	 causal	 regress	(Metaphysics	994	a.	1	–	b.	31),	and	he	proposes	therefore	that	everything	has	a	first	(or	unmoved)	mover	(Physics	258	b.	10	–	259	a.	20)	or	a	first	(ultimate)	cause.		This	is	 often	 read	 as	 being	 synonymous	 with	 God,	 but	 that	 is	 not	 made	 explicit	 in	Aristotle	(see	Broadie	2009	,	34).		Crucially,	though,	Aristotle	claims	that	the	causal	chain	must	terminate,	which	had	a	strong	influence	on	Medieval	philosophy	(see	the	following	section).	For	 Efficient	 Cause,	 which	 best	 corresponds	 to	 causation	 as	 it	 is	 currently	conceived,	the	most	important	notion	is	that	of	necessity.		The	idea	of	efficacy,	that	there	 is	 a	 real	 causal	 connection	 existing	 in	 the	 world	 and	 that	 connection	
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represents	a	necessary	relation	between	cause	and	effect	–	that	a	cause	is	necessary	for	the	effect7	–	seems	to	be	not	at	all	problematic	for	Aristotle	(see	Broadie	2009,	32)	and	 it	was	mostly	 taken	 for	granted	by	anyone	who	took	seriously	 the	 idea	of	causation	up	and	until	the	empirical	critique	of	Hume	(see	below).		
	 1.2	 The	Medievals	and	Early	Moderns			 Thomas	Aquinas’	 treatment	 of	 causation	was	 closely	 tied	 to	 his	 theological	beliefs	 and	his	 conception	 of	 God	 (see	Marenbon	2009,	 41).	 	 Aquinas,	 too,	 argues	against	infinite	causal	regress	and	explicitly	identifies	first	cause	with	God:	“It	is	not	possible	 to	 proceed	 to	 infinity	 in	 efficient	 causes”	 so	 there	 must	 be	 some	 first	efficient	 cause	 “which	 everyone	 calls	 God”	 (Summa	 Theologiae	 I	 q.	 2	 a.	 3).	 	 To	strengthen	 the	 argument	 (and	 justify	 his	 rejection	 of	 the	 infinite	 regress)	 he	distinguishes	 accidental	 from	 essential	 causation.	 	 Aquinas	 found	 compelling	 the	argument	 that	 there	might	 be	 an	 infinite	 regress	 of	 fathers	 starting	 from	any	 one	individual,	and	allowed	that	each	father	would	be	an	efficient	cause	of	his	son,	but	claimed	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 father	 and	 son	 is	 accidental	 causation,	while,	 for	 example,	 “a	 stone	moved	 by	 a	 stick,	 and	 a	 stick	 by	 a	 hand”	 is	 essential	causation	(Summa	Theologiae	I	q.	46	a.	2	and	7).		His	explanation	of	this	difference	is	obscure,	but	seems	to	hinge	on	whether	the	effect	is	wholly	predictable.	An	 alternate	medieval	 theory,	 and	 one	 that	 Aquinas	 criticized,	 was	 that	 of	Occasionalism.		Occasionalists	held	that	there	is	no	cause	other	than	God	and	that	no																																																									7	“When	the	agent	and	patient	meet	suitably	to	their	powers,	the	one	acts	and	the	other	is	acted	on	of	necessity”	(Metaphysics	book	9,	chapter	5;	see	also	Anscombe	1971)	
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regularities	perceived	in	nature	can	be	relied	upon	(see	Marenbom	2009,	47).			They	claimed	 that	 God	 cannot	 do	 what	 is	 impossible,	 but	 only	 that	 which	 is	 logically	contradictory	 is	 impossible,	 and	 outside	 that	 restriction	 there	 is	 no	 real	 causal	connection	 between	 perceived	 events.	 	 To	 account	 for	 causal	 assumptions,	 some	held	that	God	only	 interrupts	 the	expectations	that	 the	world	will	 follow	a	regular	order	(an	expectation	that,	of	course,	he	had	given	us)	in	the	case	of	miracles.	Descartes,	who	was	mostly	concerned	with	physical	processes,	believed	that	the	 effect	 was	 essentially	 contained	 in	 the	 cause:	 that	 “There	must	 be	 at	 least	 as	much	in	the	efficient	and	total	cause	as	in	the	effect	of	that	cause”	(Descartes	1985,	i.	285).	 	 Elsewhere,	 he	 claims	 that	 the	 effect	must	 be	 somehow	 similar	 to	 the	 total	cause,	which	led	him	to	“the	transference	conception”	of	causation,	in	which	there	is	the	transfer	of	some	quality	(e.g.	motion)	from	the	causal	body	to	the	effected	body8	(see	 Clatterbough	 2009,	 58).	 	 In	 other	 places,	 however,	 Descartes	 essentially	identifies	himself	as	an	Occasionalist	and	claims	that	God	continually	recreates	the	universe	 from	moment	 to	 moment	 (Descartes	 1985,	 ii.	 33;	 and	 see	 Clatterbough	2009,	59).		This	is	in	harmony	with	the	growing	popularity	of	Occasionalism	in	the	early	modern	period.	The	 other	 dominant	 idea	 of	 causation	 at	 this	 time	 was	 Materialism.	 	 In	
Leviathan	 and	 Concerning	 Body,	 Thomas	 Hobbes	 identified	 cause	 and	 effect	 with	agent	 and	 patient	 (see	 Clatterbough	 2009,	 63).	 	 The	 properties	 of	 the	 agent	 are	explanatory	 causes	 and	 the	 properties	 of	 the	 patient	 are	 the	 effects.9	 	 Ultimately,	these	notions	are	circular,	since	the	definitions	of	agent	and	patient	 include	causal																																																									8	Cp.	Transmission	theories	of	causation,	described	in	the	next	section.	9	This	is	reminiscent	of	the	causer	and	affectedness	criteria	of	modern	proto-roles	(Dowty	1991).	
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relationships.		Hobbes’	materialism	often	relies	on	the	idea	of	stronger	and	weaker	forces	 interacting	 (Clatterbough	 2009,	 64),10	 which,	 like	 his	 agent	 and	 patient	criteria,	 fails	 to	 be	 explanatory	 since	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 force	 is	 usually	 defined	 in	terms	of	causal	efficacy;	it	is	a	reified	causal	connection.11	There	were	accounts	of	causation	by	many	of	the	prominent	philosophers	of	the	early	modern	period	(see	overview	in	Clatterbough	2009).		Spinoza	attacks	the	vestigial	 remains	 of	 final	 causes	 and	 proposes	 an	 inferential	 interpretation	 of	causation,	 but	 much	 of	 his	 writing	 is	 confusing	 and	 contradictory	 on	 this	 issue.		Leibniz	 essentially	 denies	 that	 causal	 interactions	 exist	 and	 claims	 instead	 that	things	 in	 the	 world	 act	 in	 harmony	 with	 one	 another	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	indistinguishable	from	causal	interaction,	which	seems	to	be	a	distinction	without	a	difference.		It	is	perhaps	not	surprising	that	scientists	had	much	success	at	this	time	by	simply	ignoring	the	question	of	final	cause	and	motive	force	(by	e.g.	Robert	Boyle	and	 Isaac	 Newton),	 but	 problems	 of	 causation	 reared	 their	 head	 even	 amidst	 the	revolutions	 in	 physical	 science.	 	 Newton	 struggled	 with	 the	 non-mechanical	character	of	gravity	(see	Clatterbough	2009,	68),	which	seemed	to	some	people	an	“occult	 power”	 (Newton	 1953,	 125)	 and	 to	 only	 highlight	 the	mystery	 of	 efficient	physical	causation.																																																													10	Cp.	the	force-dynamic	approaches	to	causation	described	in	chapter	3.	11	Besides	which,	as	David	Hume	puts	 it,	 “I	begin	with	observing	that	 the	terms	of	efficacy,	agency,	
power,	 force,	 energy,	 necessity,	 connexion,	 and	 productive	 quality,	 are	 all	 nearly	 synonymous;	 and	therefore	 ‘tis	 an	 absurdity	 to	 employ	 any	 of	 them	 in	 defining	 the	 rest”	 (Treatise	 Book	 1,	 Part	 III,	Section	XIV).	
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	 1.3	 Hume			 Probably	 the	 most	 famous	 and	 influential	 non-Aristotelian	 theory	 of	causation	(and	the	one	that	most	challenged	traditional	Aristotelian	notions	on	the	subject)	was	that	of	David	Hume.		He	applied	a	skeptical	empirical	approach	to	the	notion,	 which	 is	 “suppos’d	 to	 be	 founded	 on	 intuition,	 and	 to	 be	 one	 of	 those	maxims,	which	tho’	they	may	be	deny’d	with	the	lips,	‘tis	impossible	for	men	in	their	hearts	 really	 to	doubt	 it”	and	 found	 “in	 it	no	mark	of	any	such	 intuitive	certainty”	(Treatise	 Book	 1,	 Part	 III,	 Section	 III).	 	 He	 goes	 on	 to	 claim	 that	 “every	demonstration,	which	has	been	produc’d	 for	 the	necessity	 of	 a	 cause,	 is	 fallacious	and	 sophistical”	 and	 proceeds	 to	 demolish	 the	 Aristotelian	 necessity	 that	 had	 so	dominated	the	thinking	on	causation	till	that	time.		Elsewhere:	When	 we	 look	 about	 us	 towards	 external	 objects,	 and	 consider	 the	operation	of	causes,	we	are	never	able,	in	a	single	instance,	to	discover	any	power	or	necessary	connexion;	any	quality,	which	binds	the	effect	to	 the	 cause,	 and	 renders	 the	 one	 an	 infallible	 consequence	 of	 the	other.	 	 We	 only	 find,	 that	 the	 one	 does	 actually,	 in	 fact,	 follow	 the	other.		The	impulse	of	one	billiard-ball	is	attended	with	motion	in	the	second.	 	 This	 is	 the	whole	 that	 appears	 to	 the	outward	 senses.	 	 The	mind	feels	no	sentiment	or	inward	impression	from	the	succession	of	objects:	Consequently,	there	is	not,	in	any	single,	particular	instance	of	cause	 and	 effect,	 any	 thing	which	 can	 suggest	 the	 idea	 of	 power	 or	necessary	connexion.	 	 	 	 	 (Enquiry,	41)		Hume	 denied	 the	 necessary	 connection	 between	 cause	 and	 effect,	 and	provided	a	new	reduced	conception	of	cause	making	use	of	the	features	of	constant	conjunction	and	regular	succession.12		Indeed,	he	seemed	to	extend	his	skepticism	to																																																									12	In	fact,	Hume	gave	two	non-equivalent	definitions	for	cause,	but	it	seems	likely	that	one	should	be	read	as	a	definition	of	the	kinds	of	relations	that	are	called	causes,	while	the	other	definition	was,	in	part,	an	attempt	to	give	a	psychological	explanation	for	why	they	are	so	called:	“so	united	[…]	that	the	idea	of	the	one	determines	the	idea	of	the	other”	(see,	e.g.	Robinson	1962,	Richards	1965)	
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the	 entire	 inductive	 enterprise:	 “Let	 men	 be	 once	 fully	 perswaded	 of	 these	 two	principles,	That	there	is	nothing	in	any	object,	consider’d	in	itself,	which	can	afford	us	
a	reason	for	drawing	a	conclusion	beyond	it;	and,	That	even	after	the	observation	of	
the	 frequent	 or	 constant	 conjunction	 of	 objects,	 we	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 draw	 any	
inference	 concerning	 any	 object	 beyond	 those	 of	 which	 we	 have	 had	 experience”	(Treatise	Book	1	Part	III,	Section	XII).	 	In	denying	necessity,	he	claims	of	cause	and	effect	that	“I	 immediately	perceive,	that	they	are	contiguous	 in	time	and	place,	and	that	the	object	we	call	cause	precedes	the	other	we	call	effect.		In	no	one	instance	can	I	go	any	farther,	nor	is	it	possible	for	me	to	discover	any	third	relation	betwixt	these	objects.”	(Treatise	Book	1,	Part	III,	Section	XIV).		Hume’s	skepticism	proved	hard	to	dissolve	 and	 it	 has	 had	 an	 enormous	 influence	 on	 subsequent	 conceptions	 of	causation.13		
	 1.4	 Kant				 In	the	introduction	to	his	Prolegomena	to	Any	Future	Metaphysics,	Immanuel	Kant	 wrote	 “I	 openly	 confess	 my	 recollection	 of	 David	 Hume	 was	 the	 very	 thing	which	 many	 years	 ago	 first	 interrupted	 my	 dogmatic	 slumber	 and	 gave	 my	investigations	 in	 the	 field	 of	 speculative	 philosophy	 a	 quite	 new	 direction”	(Prolegomena,	pg.	8).	 	Kant	seemed	to	be	deeply	 troubled	by	Hume’s	claims	about	cause	and	effect,	but	allows	that	“He	demonstrated	irrefutably	that	it	was	perfectly	
																																																								13	Among	the	later	proponents	of	Hume’s	regularity	theory,	as	well	as	his	rejection	of	the	necessity	of	causation	 on	 empirical	 grounds,	 was	 John	 Stuart	 Mill,	 who	 made	 it	 popular	 to	 define	 causal	connections	in	terms	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	(see	Wilson	2016).		One	such	definition	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.		
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impossible	for	reason	to	think	a	priori	and	by	means	of	concepts	such	a	combination	[of	cause	and	effect],	for	it	implies	necessity”	(Prolegomena,	pg.	5).		Kant	maintains	the	notion	of	cause,	however,	and	insists	that	it,	like	other	metaphysical	notions,	is	in	fact	a	priori,	even	while	denying	that	reason	alone	can	derive	it.			Kant	 claims	 that	 causation	 is	 “knowledge	 lying	 beyond	 experience”	(Prolegomena,	 pg.	 13),	 a	 “transcendental”	 notion.14	 	 To	 get	 around	 Hume’s	objections	to	the	possibility	that	it	can	ever	be	known	as	real,	Kant	makes	use	of	the	distinction	 of	 the	 analytic	 and	 the	 synthetic.	 	 Analytic	 statements	 (logical	 truths,	tautologies)	are	statements	that	“express	nothing	in	the	predicate	but	what	has	been	already	 actually	 thought	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 subject”	 (Prolegomena,	 pg.	 14).	 	He	includes	as	analytic	statements	like	“all	bodies	are	extended”	since	extension	is	part	of	 the	meaning	of	 “body”.	 	Synthetic	statements	 (or	 judgments,	as	Kant	has	 it)	are	those	 that	 are	 not	 analytic.	 	 He	 notes	 that	 “Judgments	 of	 experience	 are	 always	synthetical”	 (Prolegomena,	 pg.	 15),	which	 is	 the	 class	 of	 the	 synthetic	 a	 posteriori.		Furthermore,	 analytic	 statements	 are	a	 priori,	 but	 Kant	 claims	 that	 “Metaphysical	Judgments,	properly	so	called,	are	all	synthetical”	and	thus	claims	the	existence	of	a	third	category,	 the	synthetic	a	priori,	which	 includes	 the	knowledge	 that	all	events	have	causes.		In	this	way,	Kant	carves	a	new	metaphysical	niche	for	causal	necessity,	safe	from	the	skepticism	of	Humeans	(or	the	vulnerability	of	potential	falsification):	it	 is	 not	 derivable	 from	 reason	 or	 observable	 by	 experience,	 as	 was	 convincingly	argued	by	Hume,	but	nonetheless	real	and	true.																																																										14	Perhaps	a	precursor	to	semantic	primitives	(Goddard	1998,	306).	
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	 1.5	 Causal	Eliminativism			 Under	the	metaphysical	morass	of	Kant	and	his	disciples,	and	given	his	style	of	 thought,	 it	 is	 perhaps	not	 surprising	 that	Nietzsche	 took	 a	dramatic,	 somewhat	reactionary	 stance	on	 causation:	 “One	 should	not	 reify	 ‘cause’	 and	 ‘effect’	 […]	 one	should	use	‘cause’	and	‘effect’	only	as	pure	concepts,	that	is	to	say,	as	conventional	fictions	 for	 the	purpose	of	 designation	 and	 communication	 –	not	 for	 explanation.”	(Beyond	Good	and	Evil	sec.	21).		But	in	the	early	20th	century,	Bertrand	Russell,	too,	found	 the	 concept	 of	 causal	 law	 outdated	 and,	 ultimately,	 illusory:	 “The	 law	 of	causality,	I	believe,	like	much	that	passes	muster	among	philosophers,	is	a	relic	of	a	bygone	age,	surviving,	like	the	monarchy,	only	because	it	is	erroneously	supposed	to	do	no	harm”	(Russell	1913,	1).		He	believed	that	all	of	causation	could	be	reduced	to	functional	 dependency,	 as	 is	 often	 the	 practice	 in	 physical	 sciences.	 	Wittgenstein	also	seemed	to	have	no	use	for	causation	in	terms	of	necessary	law	“The	hypothesis	[of	 causation]	 is	 well-founded	 if	 one	 has	 had	 a	 number	 of	 experiences	 which,	roughly	speaking,	agree	in	showing	that	your	action	is	the	regular	sequel	of	certain	conditions	which	we	then	call	the	causes	of	the	action”	(Wittgenstein	1958,	15).		In	earlier	work,	he	was	blunter:	“We	cannot	infer	the	events	of	the	future	from	those	of	the	 present.	 	 Superstition	 is	 nothing	 but	 belief	 in	 the	 causal	 nexus”	 (Tractatus	5.1361).		There	seemed	to	be	a	taste	among	some	thinkers	around	this	time	for	the	complete	removal	of	causation	from	the	metaphysical	ontology.	Russell,	 for	 his	 part,	 later	 softened	 his	 position	 of	 causation.	 	 In	 1948	 he	advocated	 a	 view	 of	 “causal	 lines”	 (c.p.	 causal	 processes,	 causal	 chains	 –	 see	 the	
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following	section)	that	seemed	to	allow	for	the	idea	of	efficient	cause	in	some	guise.		Indeed,	 philosophers	 –	 and	 even	 Russell’s	 venerated	 physicists	 –	 have	 found	 it	difficult	to	eliminate	the	concept	of	causation	completely.		The	notion	seems	to	exist	as	part	of	 the	background	 for	 thought	and	speech	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Searle	1998)	and	 it	 is	questionable	whether	a	coherent	conception	of	reality	is	even	possible	without	the	causal	relation.		
2.	 Contemporary	Approaches			 Following	 Hume’s	 skeptical	 assault	 on	 the	 necessity	 of	 the	 causal	 relation,	John	Stuart	Mill,	a	Humean	regularity	causal	theorist,	popularized	the	description	of	apparently	 causal	 events	 in	 terms	 of	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 (e.g.	Anscombe	 1971).15	 	 A	 very	 influential	modern	 approach	 to	 causation	 in	 that	 vein	was	that	of	Mackie	(1965)	who	noted	that	most	things	we	call	causes	of	events	are	neither	 necessary	 nor	 sufficient	 for	 their	 effect,	 but	 are	 rather	 a	 species	 of	conditions	he	called	INUS	conditions:	“the	so-called	cause	is,	and	is	known	to	be,	an	
insufficient	but	necessary	part	of	a	condition	which	is	itself	unnecessary	but	sufficient	for	 the	 result”	 (Mackie	 1965,	 16).	 	 He	 provides	 the	 illustrative	 example	 of	investigators	concluding	that	a	 fire	was	caused	by	a	short-circuit.	 	 In	this	case,	 the	investigators	 are	 not	 claiming	 that	 a	 short-circuit	 was	 necessary	 for	 the	 house	catching	fire	at	that	time,	since	any	number	of	other	things	–	a	bolt	of	lightning,	an	overturned	 candle,	 etc.	 –	 could	have	 set	 it	 on	 fire.	 	Nor	 are	 they	 claiming	 that	 the																																																									15	According	to	the	empiricist	Mill,	 there	 is	no	objective	necessity,	despite	 the	need	for	a	 logic	 that	included	necessity.		For	Mill,	all	necessity	is	verbal	(see	e.g.	Wilson	2016).	
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short-circuit	was	sufficient	for	the	house	catching	fire,	since	if	the	short-circuit	had	occurred	 and	 there	 was	 no	 flammable	 material	 nearby,	 for	 example,	 the	 house	would	not	have	caught	on	fire.		Rather	they	are	claiming	that	the	short	circuit	was	a	necessary	part	of	a	complex	of	conditions,16	which	were	together	sufficient,	but	not	necessary,	 for	 the	 fire.	 	This	seems	very	different	 from	the	Aristotelean	account	of	causes.		 Many	contemporary	approaches	are	motivated	by	the	need	to	account	for	the	intuitions	 of	 necessity	 surrounding	 causation,	 combined	 with	 the	 empirical	difficulties	 associated	 with	 it.	 	 The	 dominant	 approach	 in	 cognitive	 linguistics	 is	force-theory,	which	is	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.		In	this	section,	some	other	prominent	 contemporary	 approaches	 to	 causation	 are	 presented,	 including	 the	approach	–	that	of	counterfactual	dependency	–	that	is	adopted	here.		
	 2.1	 Probabilistic	Theories				 If	I	am	told	that	smoking	causes	cancer,	I	infer	that	if	I	smoke	I	am	more	likely	to	get	 cancer	 than	 if	 I	do	not.17	 	The	cause	 (smoking)	 raises	 the	probability	of	 the	effect	 (cancer).18	 	Probability	 theorists	of	causation	often	claim	that	 this	 increased	(or	decreased)	probability	of	an	effect	is	all	that	causation	really	is	(see	Williamson	2009,	on	which	this	subsection	heavily	relies)	even	beyond	inferences	from	causal																																																									16	 Determining	 just	 what	 those	 other	 conditions	 might	 be	 and	 distinguishing	 them	 from	 non-contributing	properties	is,	of	course,	sometimes	a	problem	all	its	own.	17	Note	 that,	while	 this	 is	 true	 of	 a	 generic	 statement,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 true	 of	 specific	 statements:	“smoking	causes	cancer”	means	something	different	 than	“smoking	caused	his	cancer”.	 	Probability	theorists	of	causation	are	not	always	careful	about	this	distinction.	18	Ignoring	here	that	the	use	of	the	lexical	causative	raise	ultimately	makes	this	circular	as	an	account	of	causation.		The	relation	can	be	restated	in	terms	of	correlation.	
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statements,	and	that	therefore	causation	should	be	defined	in	terms	of	probabilistic	dependencies.		 Probably	 the	 earliest	 serious	probabilistic	 account	 of	 causation	was	 that	 of	Reichenbach.19	 	 Most	 famously,	 he	 noted	 that	 causation	 could	 not	 be	 reduced	 to	functional	 relationships	 since	 they	 are	 symmetric,	 while	 causation	 is	 not,	 and	 he	analyzed	 the	 direction	 of	 time	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 asymmetric	 direction	 of	 causation	(Reichenbach	 1956).	 	 Reichenbach	 introduced	 the	 familiar	 directed	 graphs	 often	used	 to	 visualize	 causation,	 and	 proposed	 the	 Principle	 of	 Common	 Cause,	which	allowed	him	to	derive	the	direction	of	causation	based	on	the	increased	probability	of	 two	 otherwise	 independent	 events	 given	 the	 occurrence	 of	 some	 other	 event,	their	common	cause	(see	Williamson	2009,	189).		Good	(1961),	unlike	Reichenbach,	appeals	 to	 time	 in	 his	 probabilistic	 account	 of	 causality.	 	 He	 also	 developed	 the	notion	of	causal	nets	using	directed	acyclic	graphs	(see	below).		Suppes	(1970)	also	appeals	 to	 time	 in	his	definition	of	cause.	 	He	defines	 two	event-types,	prima	facie	cause	and	spurious	cause	(Williamson	2009,	191ff).		Where	A	and	B	are	both	events:	(24)	 prima	facie	cause:	(i)	t’	<	t,	(ii)	P(Bt’)	>	0,	(iii)	P(At|Bt’)	>	P(At)	
spurious	cause:	for	all	elements	Ct’’	of	some	prior	partition	that	screens	off	Bt’	from	At,	a	prima	facie	cause	of	Bt’,	(i)	P(Bt’Ct’’)	>	0,	(ii)	P(At|Bt’Ct’’)	=	P(At|Ct’’).		In	other	words,	spurious	causes	are	those	“causes”	for	which	some	prior	event	(or	events)	 is	 a	 common	 cause	 to	 both	 spurious	 cause	 and	 effect,	 but	 given	 the	occurrence	of	the	common	cause,	the	spurious	cause	does	not	alter	the	probability	of	the	effect.		Real	causes	are	all	prima	facie	causes	that	are	not	spurious	causes.		For	the	case	in	which	a	falling	barometer	might	be	thought	to	cause	a	subsequent	storm,																																																									19	Reichenbach’s	earliest	accounts	were	epistemological,	 rather	 than	metaphysical	 (see	Willaimson	2009,	pg	188),	but	he	later	offered	an	analogous	metaphysical	account.	
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Suppes’	account	discounts	this	as	a	spurious	cause	since	it	is	“screened	off”	from	the	storm,	by	the	preceding	atmospheric	conditions	(see	Salmon	1980).		 Causal	 Nets	 are	 Bayesian	 networks	 in	 which	 the	 conditionalities	 of	 the	conditional	 probability	 distributions	 are	 interpreted	 to	 be	 causal	 relationships.	 	 A	Bayesian	 network,	 in	 turn,	 is	 a	 directed	 acyclic	 graph	whose	 nodes	 are	 variables	with	 probability	 distributions	 dependant	 on	 their	 parents.	 	 An	 important	assumption,	known	as	the	Markov	condition,	is	that	each	variable	is	probabilistically	independent	 of	 its	 non-descendants,	 conditional	 on	 its	 parents.	 	 Then,	 the	probability	 of	 some	 set	 of	 events	 occurring	 is	 the	 product	 of	 the	 conditional	probability	of	each	event	occurring,	given	the	occurrence	of	the	parents.		So,	assume	a	Bayesian	network	consisting	of	the	acyclic	graph	below	and	the	probabilities:	P(A)	=	.3,	P(B)	=	.9,	P(C|AB)	=		 .4,	P(C|A’B)	=	.5,	P(C|AB’)	=	.1,	P(C|A’B’)	=	.8,	P(D|C)	=	.8,	P(D|C’)	=	.7.			
		 Figure	1:	Directed	Acyclic	Graph		
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Then,	 for	 example,	 P(AB’CD)	 =	 P(A)P(B’)P(C|AB’)P(D|C)	 =	 .3	 *	 .1	 *	 .1	 *	 .8	 =	 .0024		(this	 example	 from	 Williamson	 2009,	 194).	 	 Interpreted	 causally	 (The	 Causal	Markov	Condition),	the	Markov	condition	states	that	each	variable	is	independent	of	anything	that	is	not	its	effect,	conditional	on	its	direct	causes.		It	is	typically	assumed	that	 this	 condition	 holds	 for	 causation.	 	 Necessity	 clearly	 plays	 no	 role	 in	probabilistic	theories	of	causation.			 A	 related	 approach	 to	 causation	 is	 that	 of	 the	 Manipulation	 theories.		Manipulation	 (or	 Agency,	 or	 Intervention)	 theories	 propose	 that	 what	 is	characteristic	 of	 causal	 relationships	 is	 that	 they	 are	 relationships	 that	 can	 be	manipulated	with	an	associated	change	in	outcome.		If	a	relationship	is	causal,	then	if	the	cause	is	changed	in	some	appropriate	way,	there	will	be	a	change	in	the	effect	(see	Woodward	2009,	 234).20	 	 Some	of	 the	most	detailed	 implementations	of	 this	approach	to	causation	are	those	of	Judea	Pearl	(see,	e.g.,	Pearl	2000).			This	theory	of	causation	is	often	implicit	in	scientific	experimental	design.		An	attractive	feature	of	manipulation	 theories	 is	 that	 they	 seem	 to	 offer	 a	 simple	 and	 intuitive	 way	 of	eliminating	 spurious	 causes.	 	 They,	 like	 probabilistic	 theories,	 however,	 run	 into	difficulty	 in	 accounting	 for	 how	 causation	 is	 recognized	 in	 normal	 cases,	 when	knowledge	of	conditional	probabilities	and	the	effects	of	manipulation	are	unknown	(but	see	Pearl	&	Verma	1991).	 	 In	some	interpretations,	Counterfactual	theories	of	causation	(see	below)	are	essentially	manipulation	theories.		
																																																								20	 This	 approach	 is	 suggestive	 in	 light	 of	 Piaget’s	 (1930)	 claim	 that	 a	 child’s	 first,	most	 primitive	concept	of	causation	is	of	the	manipulative	“push/pull”	variety.	
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2.2	 Transference	and	Process	Theories			 A	 group	 of	 approaches	 sometimes	 called	 transference	 (or	 production)	theories	 assume	 that	 causation	 involves	 the	 transmission	 of	 some	 conserved	quantity,	like	energy	(e.g.	Dowe	2000),	or	the	interactions	of	some	power,	like	force.		Although	 these	 definitions	 are	 in	 danger	 of	 circularity	 depending	 on	 how	 the	conserved	quantity	or	power	is	defined	(see	discussion	of	Materialism	and	footnote	11	above),	some	proposals	along	this	line	have	been	popular	and	useful	as	modeling	tools	 in	 linguistic	 theory	 (see	Copley	&	Wolff	2013).	 	One	such	prominent	view	 in	linguistics	and	cognitive	science	is	the	force-dynamic	theory	of	causation,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapter.		Related	to	transference	approaches	to	causation	are	Process	theories,	which	have	 their	 root	 in	 the	 later	 work	 of	 Bertrand	 Russell	 (see	 section	 1.6)	 and	 view	causation	as	essentially	a	process,	rather	than	a	relation.		One	important	view	within	this	approach	is	that	of	Wesley	Salmon’s	(1984;	and	see	Dowe	2008)	which	involves	propagation	of	what	he	calls	a	“mark”:			Let	 P	 be	 a	 process	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 interactions	 with	 other	processes	would	 remain	 uniform	with	 respect	 to	 a	 characteristic	 Q,	which	 it	 would	 manifest	 consistently	 over	 an	 interval	 that	 includes	both	of	 the	space-time	points	A	and	B.	 	Then	a	mark	(consisting	of	a	modification	of	Q	into	Q*),	which	has	been	introduced	into	process	P	by	means	of	 a	 single	 local	 interaction	 at	 a	 point	A,	 is	 transmitted	 to	point	B	if	P	manifests	the	modification	Q*	at	B	and	at	all	stages	of	the	process	between	A	and	B	without	additional	interactions.	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Salmon	1984,	148)		He	combines	this	definition	with	a	Reichanbachian	probabilistic	theory	to	arrive	at	his	 theory	of	 causation.	 	As	do	other	 conserved	quantity	 approaches,	 this	 account	
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fails	to	handle	prevention	or	causation	by	absences	(see	Copley	&	Wolff	2013):	lack	
of	water	caused	my	thirst.	 	Furthermore,	as	concerns	causation,	a	major	problem	in	terms	of	explanatory	adequacy	for	the	transference	accounts,	and	for	the	production	accounts,	 is	 a	 lack	of	 empirical	 evidence	 for	 the	proposed	quantities	beyond	 their	causal	efficacy.21			
	 2.3	 Causal	Pluralism	and	Anti-Reductionism			 There	are	two	ways	to	maintain	the	existence	of	causation,	and	yet	deny	the	possibility	of	a	univocal,	non-disjunctive	explanation.	 	The	first	 is	to	deny	that	 it	 is	univocal,	and	the	other	is	to	deny	that	it	can	be	explained.		These	are	the	approaches	of	Causal	Pluralism	and	Anti-Reductionism,	respectively.	There	are	several	causally	pluralistic	theories,	but	what	they	have	in	common	is	 the	 shared	 view	 that	 the	 apparently	 singular	 notion	 of	 causation	 is	 actually	 a	diverse	 collection	 of	 concepts	 that	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 each	 other	 (see,	 e.g.,	Godfrey-Smith	2009,	Psillow	2008).		The	simplest	of	these	approaches	is	that	there	are	 two	 concepts	 of	 causation:	 a	 dependence	 cause	 and	 a	 production	 cause	 (Hall	2003).	 	 The	 first	 of	 these	 corresponds	 to	 the	 counterfactual	 analysis	 of	 causation	(see	the	following	section)	and	the	second	is	essentially	the	transference	theory	in	the	 previous	 section.	 	 Hall	 (2003)	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 some	 situations	 of	which	
																																																								21	 Something	 else	 these	 theories	 have	 in	 common	 is	 their	 restriction	 to	 physical	 causation.	 	 Some	researchers	 treat	 abstract	 and	 social	 causation	 (She	 made	 me	 do	 my	 homework)	 as	 basically	metaphoric	 for	 physical	 causation	 (see	 Copley	 &	 Woolf	 2013	 pg.	 23	 for	 discussion).	 	 This	 thesis	resists	 that	 approach	 to	 non-physical	 causation	 and,	 in	 fact,	 I	 suspect	 that	 the	 opposite	 approach	might	even	be	more	fruitful.	
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properties	of	counterfactual	dependency	are	true	and	the	properties	of	transmission	of	 some	 conserved	 quantity	 is	 false	 and	 some	 situations	 of	 which	 counterfactual	dependency	 is	 false	 and	 conserved	 quantity	 transmission	 is	 true,	 but	 that	we	 call	both	situation-types	cause.	 	Not	surprisingly,	 in	other	theories	the	causes	multiply.		Another	 theory	 that	 is	 interesting	 for	 the	 present	 purpose	 is	 that	 of	 Elizabeth	Anscombe	(1971),	who	made	reference	to	word	meaning.		For	her,	the	fact	that	the	periphrastic	 causative	 cause	 is	more	 general	 than	 lexical	 causatives	 like	burn	 and	
scrape	 suggests	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 causation	 might	 be	 a	 very	 general	 one	 that	 is	parasitic	on	some,	possibly	huge,	number	of	specific	relationships	that	share	some	properties	and	get	lumped	together	as	causes.		Whether	or	not	some	minimal	lexical	entry	for	cause	can	be	given	that	corresponds	to	whatever	it	is	(if	anything)	that	is	shared	by	all	 these	particulars,	or	whether	 the	only	condition	on	causation	 is	 that	some	lexical	causative	can	be	used	to	describe	it	is	not	made	clear.	Anti-Reductionists	 hold	 that	 causation	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 a	 non-causal	definition,	that	there	is	no	non-circular	completion	of	a	statement	like	“e	caused	r	if	and	 only	 if	 …”	 (Carroll	 2009).	 	 Importantly	 for	 the	 treatment	 of	 causation	 in	decompositions	 and	 other	 linguistic	 treatments	 of	 that	 sort,	 while	 people	 who	believe	that	causation	is	primitive	are	Anti-Reductionists,	not	all	Anti-Reductionists	believe	that	causation	is	primitive.		The	most	plausible	alternative	to	this	approach,	however,	 would	 seem	 to	 require	 that	 causation	 is	 in	 some	 way	 observable	 or	accessible	via	introspection	(Carroll	2009,	281),	which	immediately	runs	aground	of	the	empirical	doubts	expressed	by	Hume.		
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2.4	 Counterfactual	Dependency					 The	semantics	of	causation	are	irreducibly	modal.	 	If	I	say	that	X	caused	Y,	I	am	 not	 only	 saying	 that	 X	 happened	 and	 then	 Y	 happened.22	 	 I	 am	 saying	 that	 Y	happened	 as	 a	 result	 of	 X;	 I	 am	 claiming	 (whether	 or	 not	 such	 a	 claim	 is	epistemically	 or	 metaphysically	 justified)	 that	 there	 is	 some	 essential	 connection	between	X	and	Y.		In	other	words,	I	am	making	a	claim	not	only	about	the	utterance	world,	but	about	all	possible	worlds	(see,	e.g.,	Stalnaker	1968).23	 	 It	 is	perhaps	not	surprising,	 then,	 that	 the	 modal	 construction	 par	 excellence,	 conditionals,	 often	express	causation.		Of	course,	conditionals	can	be	used	to	express	relations	that	are	not	 causal.	 	 For	 example,	 sometimes	 the	 if-clause	 expresses	 epistemological	conditions	–	what	must	hold	to	infer	the	consequent:	(25)	 a.	 If	the	ground	is	wet,	it	(must	have)	rained.		 b.	 If	her	car	is	out	front,	she’s	at	home.		 c.	 If	he’s	smiling,	he	won	the	bet.		Sometimes	conditionals	express	deontic	dependence:		(26)	 a.	 If	we’re	having	fish,	we	should	order	white	wine.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (McCawley	1981,	49)		 b.	 If	you’re	tired,	sleep.		And	there	are	even	uses	of	the	conditional	–	sometimes	called	“biscuit	conditionals”	–	for	which	the	antecedent	gives	conditions	for	the	relevance	of	the	utterance	of	the	consequent:	(27)	 a.	 There	are	biscuits	on	the	sideboard	if	you	want	some.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Austin	1970,	212)																																																									22	Pace	Hume.	23	Or	rather	about	all	“sufficiently	similar”	worlds.		See	discussion	below.	
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	 b.	 If	you’re	interested,	there’s	a	documentary	about	biscuits	showing.		But	many	uses	of	the	conditional	express	a	causal	relation:		(28)	 a.	 If	you’re	boiled	in	oil,	you’ll	die.		 b.	 If	Mike	straightens	his	tie	once	more,	I’ll	kill	him.		 c.	 If	butter	is	heated,	it	melts.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (McCawley	1981,	49)		Causal	 relations	 can	also	be	expressed	via	 counterfactual	 conditionals,	which	 is	of	course	a	large	part	of	the	motivation	for	the	counterfactual	dependence	analysis	of	causation:		(29)	 a.	 If	I	hadn’t	heated	the	butter,	it	wouldn’t	have	melted.		 b.	 If	I	had	heated	the	butter,	it	would	have	melted.		But	 there	 can	be	 complications	with	 attempts	 to	 test	 for	 causation	using	negative	counterfactuals,	as	suggested	by	the	following	attested	example:	(30)	 I’m	gonna	die	if	you	touch	me	one	more	time.		Well,	I	guess	that	I’m	gonna	die		no	matter	what.	 	 	 	 	 	(“I’ve	Got	a	Match”,	They	Might	Be	Giants)		Denying	the	antecedent	is	a	fallacy	even	for	causal	conditional	inferences.		It	is	still	somewhat	mysterious	how	(A)	if	you	shoot	me,	I	will	die	can	be	a	logical	consequence	of	the	true	statement	(B)	I	will	die	no	matter	what,	and	yet	(A)	can	seem	not	to	be	vacuous	(see	also	footnote	29	below).	One	of	the	more	appealing	and	often	repeated	definitions	of	causation	makes	direct	 use	 of	 the	 counterfactual	 conditional	 (Stalnaker	 1968;	 Lewis	 1973):	individual	or	event	X	caused	event	Y	if	Y	would	not	have	occurred	if	not	for	X.24		This	can	 be	 restricted,	 and	 absurdities	 of	 distance	 and	 time	 avoided,	 by	 appealing	 to																																																									24	This	definition	is	tantamount	to	claiming	that	X	is	a	necessary	condition	for	Y.	 	Strictly	speaking,	most	of	the	intuitive	candidates	for	causes	of	events	are	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	conditions,	but	are	rather	INUS	conditions	(Mackie	1988),	as	discussed	above.	
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causal	 chains25	 and	 minimal	 differences	 between	 possible	 worlds	 (see,	 e.g.,	discussion	 in	 Dowty	 1979).	 	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 straightforwardly	 true	 that	 if	 a	particular	window	had	not	been	manufactured	then	it	could	not	have	been	broken	when	 John	 happened	 to	 throw	 a	 ball,	 but	 it	 seems	 odd	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	manufacture	of	the	window	caused	it	to	be	broken	(or,	even	worse,	broke	it).		There	is,	 however,	 an	 arguably	 “less	 different”	 possible	 world	 from	 the	 actual	 world	 in	which	 John	 doesn’t	 throw	 the	 ball	 and	 the	 window	 is	 consequently	 not	 broken.		Since	this	possible	world	is	more	similar	to	the	actual	one	but	the	caused	subevent	still	does	not	occur,	 John	throwing	 the	ball	 is	a	better	candidate	 for	a	cause	of	 the	window’s	breaking	than	is	the	manufacture	of	the	window.		Roughly,	there	is	a	chain	of	events	or	conditions	between	both	(i)	the	manufacture	and	the	breaking	event,	as	well	 as	 (ii)	 the	 throwing	 of	 the	 ball	 and	 the	 breaking	 event,	 but	 the	 (ii)	 chain	 is	shorter	than	the	(i)	chain.	This	perspective	on	causation	is	far	from	transparent	or	unproblematic.		For	one	thing,	it	is	not	always	clear	which,	if	any,	world	with	some	particular	sufficient	condition	omitted	 is	 less	different	 from	 the	actual	one	 than	 the	worlds	with	 some	other	omitted.26		Furthermore,	there	seem	to	be	more	similar	preventative	possible	worlds	than	those	that	unhesitatingly	get	characterized	as	causative,	such	as	that	in	which	 John	throws	a	ball	at	a	slightly	different	angle	or	 the	ball	 is	prevented	from	striking	 the	 window,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 criterion	 for	 how	 similar	 is	 similar	
																																																								25	Or,	equivalently,	a	series	of	Dowty’s	(1979,	108)	“causal	factors.”	26	 This	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 so-called	 “frame	 problem”	 in	 artificial	 intelligence.	 	 Lewis	acknowledges	 the	 difficulty	 of	 this	 problem:	 “…the	 vagueness	 of	 over-all	 similarity	 will	 not	 be	entirely	resolved.		Nor	should	it	be.		The	vagueness	of	similarity	does	infect	causation,	and	no	correct	analysis	can	deny	it.”	(Lewis	1973,	560).	
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enough.	 	Counterfactual	approaches	also	face	the	difficulty	of	accounting	for	causal	transitivity.	 	As	mentioned	above,	 the	 causal	 relation	 is	 often	 said	 to	be	 transitive	(e.g.	 Lewis	 1973,	 Hall	 2000):	 If	 X	 caused	 Y	 and	 Y	 caused	 Z,	 then	 X	 caused	 Z.		However,	counterfactual	conditionals	are	 in	general	not	 transitive:	 it	 is	possible	to	accept	“If	J.	Edgar	Hoover	had	been	a	communist,	then	he	would	have	been	a	traitor”	and	 “If	 J.	 Edgar	 Hoover	 had	 been	 born	 a	 Russian,	 then	 he	 would	 have	 been	 a	communist”	 and	 yet	 deny	 “If	 J.	 Edgar	 Hoover	 had	 been	 born	 a	 Russian,	 then	 he	would	 have	 been	 a	 traitor”	 (Stalnaker	 1968,	 106).	 	 Despite	 these	 difficulties,	entailment	 and	 counter-factual	 dependency	 are	 adopted	 here	 as	 a	 conceptual	heuristic	for	causation.27		Caused	 eventuality	 entailment	 can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 a	 semantic	acceptability	 judgment	 by	 identifying	 core28	 periphrastic	 causatives	 and	 other	causative	 statements	 by	 result	 entailment	 and	 consequent	 generation	 of	contradiction	when	the	resultant	state	or	event	is	negated:		(31)	 a.							#	The	blast	caused	the	boat	to	heel,	but	the	boat	didn’t	heel.		 b.							#	John	made	Bill	leave,	but	Bill	didn’t	leave.		 c.	 Mary	begged	Bob	to	marry	her,	but	he	didn’t	marry	her.		 	 	 	 	 	 	(adapted	from	Wolff	and	Song	2003,	286)	
	
																																																								27	Although	much	 of	 the	 following	 discussion	will	 assume	 that	 causation	 is	 a	 relation	 between	 an	individual	and	an	event,	rather	than	between	propositions,	events,	or	 individuals	and	propositions,	this	assumption	is	not	crucial	and	the	approach	is	compatible	with	the	other	formulations.	28	Included	exceptions	are	the	let/allow	causative	types	with	sentient	patients:	She	let	him	leave,	but	
he	didn’t	leave	(Wolff	and	Song	2003,	286).	
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This	 criterion,	 however,	 does	 not	 exclude	 other	 factive	 verbs,	 such	 as	 watch	 or	
notice,	 and	 so	 counterfactuality	 must	 also	 be	 included	 in	 the	 linguistic	characterization	of	causation.29	(32)	 a.	 John	caused	the	lamp	to	break,	and	if	he	hadn’t	done	so	it	wouldn’t			 	 have.		 b.							#	John	saw	the	lamp	break,	and	if	he	hadn’t	done	so,	it	wouldn’t	have.		Note	 that	 this	 subsection	 focuses	more	 on	 the	 semantics	 than	 the	metaphysics	 of	causation.	 	 Some	 researchers	 (e.g.	 Lewis	 1973)	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 counterfactual	approach	a	correct	account	of	the	ontological	character	of	causation,	but	it	has	also	been	 adopted	 by	 linguists	 with	 no	 such	 ontological	 commitment	 (see	 especially	Dowty	 1979).	 	 Given	 the	 skeptical	 critique	 of	 Hume,	 in	 fact,	 perhaps	 this	 kind	 of	conflation	 is	 appropriate.	 	 The	 semantics	 of	 causation	 for	 the	 constructions	 of	interest	 –	 the	 periphrastic	 causative	 verbs	 in	 English	 –	 are	 discussed	 further	 in	subsequent	 chapters.	 	 The	 general	 expression	 of	 causation	 in	 English	 –	 beyond	conditional	expressions	–	is	the	topic	of	the	following	section.		
3.	 Causation	in	English		 			 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 1,	 the	 causal	 concept30	 has	 several	 different	expressions	 in	 natural	 language,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 number	 of	 effects	 on	 grammar	 and	
																																																								29	But	note	 that,	 strictly,	 counterfactuality	 is	a	 sufficient	but	not	necessary	condition	on	causation:	while	it	 is	true	that	being	shot	caused	Abraham	Lincoln	to	die,	 it	 is	clearly	not	true	that	if	Abraham	Lincoln	had	not	been	shot	he	would	not	have	died	(see	also	discussion	of	INUS	conditions	above	for	related	subtleties	of	sufficiency	and	necessity).		Nonetheless,	it	suffices	to	target	the	verbs	of	interest.	30	Or	concepts,	see	above.	
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lexicalization.	 	 As	 a	 reminder,	 the	 presence	 of	 causation	 is	 often	 signaled	 by	 the	ability	to	take	a	by-phrase	(Neelman	and	van	de	Koot	2010):	(33)	 a.	 John	killed	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 b.	 John	wounded	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 c.	 John	radicalized	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 d.	 John	made	Bill	run	away	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.		 e.						??	John	hit	Bill	by	shooting	him	with	an	arrow.31	But	 some	 not-clearly-causative	 events	 can	 appear	 in	 by-phrases	while	 some	 non-agentive	causers	cannot:	(34)	 a.	 John	saw	Bill	by	looking	at	him	through	binoculars.		 b.	 John	signaled	Bill	by	waving	his	hand.		 c.								?	The	painting	frightened	the	children	by	being	unusual.		 d.						??	The	storm	made	the	dog	nervous	by	being	so	loud.		In	general,	it	seems	that	reliable	purely	syntactic	criteria	for	causative	constructions	are	 elusive.32	 	 This	 is	 due	 in	 part	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 ways	 that	 causation	 can	 be	expressed	 in	 languages.	 	 In	 this	 section,	 some	 of	 the	 expressions	 of	 causation	 in	English	 and	 the	 grammatical	 effects	 of	 causal	 expressions	 are	 catalogued	 and	 the	most	common	approach	to	causation	in	grammar	is	summarized.	Specifically,	a	widespread	linguistic	model	of	causation	in	English	and	other	languages	involves	treating	causation	as	a	semantic	primitive,	with	a	causative	event	structure	 that	 can	 be	 decomposed	 and	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 lexical	 entry	 of	 causative	verbs.		The	decompositional	analysis	of	causative	verbs	is	the	topic	of	the	following	section,	and	some	types	of	grammatical	evidence	for	this	structure	are	presented	in	those	that	follow.	
																																																								31	Note	that	this	sentence	is	not	intended	to	include	a	parenthetical	by-phrase.	 	In	other	words,	the	relevant	reading	is	not	the	same	as	“John	hit	Bill	with	an	arrow	by	shooting	him.”	32	There	are	indeed	exceptions	even	to	the	counterfactual	tests	in	the	previous	section	and	discussed	in	the	following	chapter,	such	as	for	causation	involving	enablement.	
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	 3.1	 Predicate	Decomposition			 Predicate	 meaning	 is	 often	 modeled	 with	 primitive	 aspectual	 operators	 in	some	kind	of	an	event	structure	(see,	e.g.,	Rappaport-Hovav	and	Levin,	1998).		This	allows	a	sentence	like	John	got	angry	to	be	modeled	in	such	a	way	that	the	aspectual	information	can	be	abstracted	for	the	inchoative	verb	get:	(35)	 	 ‘John	got	angry.’	[BECOME	[	John	<	ANGRY	>	]]		 get:		[BECOME	[x	<STATE>	]]		Inchoatives	 and	 causatives	 are	 related	 by	 embedded	 structure	 in	 such	decompositions,	with	a	primitive	CAUSE	operator	introducing	causative	semantics:		(36)	 a.	 Inchoative:	 [	BECOME	[	x	<STATE>	]]		 b.	 Causative:	 [[	x	ACT<MANNER>	]	CAUSE	[	BECOME	[	y	<STATE>	]]]		Models	 of	 this	 sort	 easily	 and	 naturally	 capture	 entailment	 relations	 between	causatives,	 inchoatives,	 and	 associated	 stative	 sentences	 via	 embedded	 sub-structures	representing	containment	of	meaning:		(37)	 ‘John	made	Bill	shut	the	door.’		 →	‘Bill	shut	the	door.’	→	‘The	door	shut.’→	‘The	door	was	shut.’			[John	CAUSE	[Bill	CAUSE	[BECOME		[	the-door	<	SHUT	>	]]]]		 →	[Bill	CAUSE	[BECOME	[	the-door	<	SHUT	>	]]]		 →	[BECOME	[	the-door	<	SHUT	>]]		 →	[the-door	<	SHUT	>]		Causative:	 	 [John	CAUSE	[BECOME	[	the-door	<	SHUT	>	]]]	Inchoative:	 	 [BECOME	[	the-door	<	SHUT	>	]]	Stative:	 	 [the-door	<	SHUT	>	]		These	models	give	a	clear	and	 intuitive	 representation	of	various	ambiguities	 that	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	following	sections:	
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	(38)	 a.	 John	opened	the	door	again.		 (repetitive:	John	previously	did	it)		 	 											[{modifier-again}	John	CAUSE	[BECOME/BE	[the	door	<open>]]]		 b.	 John	opened	the	door	again.											(restitutive:	it	was	previously	open	)		 	 											[John	CAUSE	[BECOME/BE	[{modifier-again}	the	door	<open>]]]	They	 can	 also	model	 the	 result	 state	 temporal	 modifier	 phenomena	 in	 sentences	discussed	in	the	following	sections	as	well	as	those	like	the	following:	(39).	 a.	 John	gave	Mary	his	car	for	a	week.		 b.	 John	borrowed	the	book	until	next	week.	Here,	 the	modifiers	 for	a	week	and	until	next	week	are	not	modifying	the	events	of	giving,	 but	 the	 result	 state	 sub-events	 of	 having.	 	 These	might	 be	 represented	 in	event	schemas	as	follows:	(39’)	 a.	 [John	CAUSE	[HAVE	[{modifier-for	a	week}	Mary	John’s	car]]]		 b.	 [John	CAUSE	[HAVE	[{modifier-until	next	week}	(John)	the	book]]]	Here,	as	elsewhere,	modification	can	scope	over	a	result	state	(see	below).		In	these	structures,	 the	 similar	 structure	 of	 change	 of	 state,	 location,	 and	 possession	predicates	is	made	explicit:	(40)	 a.	 Change	of	State	predicates:	
{modifier}[x	CAUSE	[BECOME/BE[{modifier}	y	<result-state>]]]		
	b.	 Change	of	Location	predicates:	
{modifier}	[x	CAUSE	[BE-AT	[{modifier}	y	<location>]]]			 c.	 Change	of	Possession	predicates:	
{modifier}	[x	CAUSE	[HAVE	[{modifier}	y	z]]]			Predicate	 decomposition	 also	 allows	 for	 a	 structural	 account	 of	 aspectual	classes,	which	reveals	the	important	role	that	causation	plays	in	the	characterization	of	the	accomplishment	class:		
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(41)	 	 Activities	->		 	 “John	swept	the	table”	 [x	ACT	<manner>]]		 States	->	 	 “The	table	was	clean”	 [x	<state>]	Achievements	->	 “The	sky	cleared”	 										[BECOME	[x	<state>]]	Accomplishments	->		“John	swept	the	table	clean”		 	 	 	 [x	ACT	<manner>	[CAUSE	[BECOME	y	<state>]]]		 	 	 “John	cleaned	the	table”	 	[x	CAUSE	[BECOME	[y	<state>]]]		Aspectual	class	membership	is	one	way	of	accounting	for	the	difference	between	hit	and	break	 –	 the	 former	 is	 an	 activity	 verb,	while	 the	 latter	 is	 an	 accomplishment	verb,	which	crucially	includes	causative	meaning.	There	are	problems	with	decompositional	approaches	to	predicate	meaning	that	 are	 not	 mentioned	 here	 (see	 e.g.	 Beavers	 &	 Francez	 2006),	 but	 they	 are	illuminating	 and	 suggestive	 models	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 phenomena	 discussed.		Most	importantly	for	the	present	purposes,	they	highlight	the	central	importance	of	causation	for	predicate	meaning	in	English	and	other	languages.		These	approaches	are	also	supported	by	the	adicity-increasing	alternations	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	 as	 well	 as	 effects	 of	 causative	 meaning	 on	 argument	 structure	 more	generally.	 		
	 3.2	 Argument	Realization			 Causation	 has	 a	 number	 of	 effects	 on	 argument	 realization	 in	 English	 in	addition	 to	 the	 valence-increasing	 operation	 of	 the	 causative	 alternations.	 	 The	hypothesized	causative	semantic	primitive	and	associated	event	structure	discussed	above	 are	 supported	 by	 these	 effects.	 	 In	 general,	 causative	 events	 have	 special	realizations	in	argument	structure,	especially	in	combination	with	psych	verbs	that	
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take	 an	 experiencer	 argument.	 	 Many	 of	 these	 intransitive	 verbs	 have	 causative	variants	for	which	the	experiencer	is	an	object	and	the	erstwhile	object	stimulus	is	realized	as	a	subject	(e.g.	Chomsky	1970,	Grimshaw	1990,	Wechsler	1995).		In	these	pairs,	the	same	semantic	role	is	realized	in	different	argument	positions,	which	is	a	possible	challenge	to	the	Uniformity	of	Theta	Assignment	Hypothesis	(UTAH,	Baker	1988)	and	the	Universal	Alignment	Hypothesis	(UAH,	Perlmutter	and	Postal,	1984)	(Cheung	&	Larson	2014):	(42)	 a.	 The	child	feared	the	noise.		 b.	 The	noise	frightened	the	child.		 c.	 I	enjoy	horror	movies.		 d.	 Horror	movies	please	me.		 The	 challenge	 that	 causative	 psych-verbs	 pose	 for	 semantic	 accounts	 of	argument	 structure	 is	dramatically	 illustrated	by	 the	different	 role	assignments	 in	the	causative	and	non-causative	reflexive	sentences:	(43)	 a.	 I	fear/enjoy	myself.		 b.	 I	frighten/please	myself.		The	 difference	 between	 (43a)	 and	 (43b)	 is	minimal,	 except	 the	 latter	 is	 causative	and	the	former	is	apparently	not:	(44)	 a.								*	I	fear/enjoy	myself	by	contemplating	the	future.33		 b.	 I	frighten/please	myself	by	contemplating	the	future.		Relatedly,	 for	 some	 verbs,	 a	 missing	 object	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 underlyingly	reflexive,	with	the	causer	subject	co-referential	with	an	understood	object:34																																																												33	Excepting	the	idiomatic	enjoy	myself	reading,	as	in	“I	enjoy	myself	by	playing	the	guitar.”	34	The	causative	alternations	 in	English	 (see	previous	chapter)	make	 the	analysis	of	 some	of	 these	sentences	unclear.	
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(45)	 a.	 He	shaved.	 	 (cf.	The	barber	shaved	him)		 b.	 He	sat	at	the	table.	 (cf.	He	sat	his	guests	at	the	table)		 c.	 He	turned	around.	 (cf.	He	turned	his	daughter	around)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Croft	2010,	7-16)		 In	general,	causal	semantics	pays	an	important	role	in	subject	realization	in	English	and	other	 languages.	 	Causal	semantics	are	a	central	part	of	the	proto-role	entailments	 associated	 with	 subjects,	 while	 causal	 affectedness	 is	 a	 proto-object	entailment	 (Dowty	1991).	 	 In	 fact,	 it	 seems	 that	 causation	 is	more	 important	 than	any	 other	 entailment	when	 it	 comes	 to	 selecting	 subjects	 (Davis	&	 Koenig	 2000),	outranking	 even	 sentience,	 which	 accounts	 for	 the	 experiencer	 subject/object	alternation	in	(42).	Although	 causers	 are	 typically	 realized	 as	 subjects,	 they	 can	 also	 appear	 in	prepositional	phrases.		By-phrases	can	introduce	causers	in	passive	voice	sentences	(46)	and,	arguably,	in	by-Xself	adverbial	phrases	(47)	(e.g.	Levin	&	Rappaport-Hovav	1995)	as	well	as	those	mentioned	above:	(46)	 	 The	vase	was	broken	by	John.		(47)	 	 The	door	opened	by	itself.		Non-agentive	causers	can	also	be	introduced	in	from-phrases:		(48)	 	 The	car	was	wet	from	the	rain.		Although	a	full	account	of	all	the	interesting	interactions	of	causation	and	argument	realization	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	work,	many	researchers	have	seen	causation	as	 the	 key	 to	 the	 whole	 enterprise	 of	 argument	 realization	 via	 event	conceptualization	 (e.g.	 Croft	 1990,	 DeLancey	 1984,	 Jackendoff	 1990,	 Langacker	1987,	 Talmy	 1988).	 	 Talmy’s	 approach	 to	 causation	 is	 explored	 in	more	 detail	 in	chapter	3.	
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	 3.3	 Result	States			 A	necessary	consequence	of	a	canonical	causative	event	 is	a	result	state.	 	A	result	state	is	licensed	by	break,	but	not	hit,	which	is	precisely	that	state	entailed	by	the	 change-of-state	 intransitive	 variant.	 	 The	 result	 state,	 as	 product	 of	 causation,	also	has	a	number	of	realizations	and	grammatical	effects	in	English.		Furthermore,	the	 decompositional	 structure	 associated	 with	 causal	 predicates	 is	 justified	 by	robust	sublexical	scope	phenomena	involving	result	states.	In	English,	participles	can	almost	always	function	adjectivally	(Bresnan	1995,	8).		Thus,	we	have	a	smiling	child,	formed	from	the	present	participle	of	smile,	wilted	
lettuce,	 from	 the	 past	 participle	 of	 wilt,	 and	 an	 opened	 can,	 from	 the	 passive	participle	of	open.	 	The	latter	verbs	are	often	referred	to	as	adjectival	passives	and	they	are	overwhelmingly	associated	with	result	states.	 	For	example,	hit	and	break	differ	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 behavior	 and	 meaning	 of	 their	 adjectival	 passives:	 the	
broken	vase	can	refer	to	a	vase	that	either	was,	or	currently	is,	broken,	while	the	hit	
vase	has	only	the	past	event	reading.	 	 	 	 It	seems	that	for	almost	any	predicate	that	entails	 a	 result	 state	 and	 that	 can	 be	made	 passive,	 the	 passive	 participle	 of	 that	predicate	can	function	as	a	result	state	adjective.		“An	opened	can”	is	a	can	that	is	in	the	result	state	of	the	event	encoded	by	open,	“a	wrapped	present”	is	a	present	that	is	 in	 the	 result	 state	 of	 having	 been	wrapped,	 “a	 broken	 lamp”	 is	 a	 lamp	 that	 has	been	broken,	and	so	on.		In	fact,	the	verbs	that	encode	events	without	result	states	
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are	 often	 those	whose	 passive	 participles	 seem	 to	 be	 unable	 to	 used	 adjectivally:	*The	thanked	woman	(Bresnan	1995,	14).	An	 interesting	 and	 puzzling	 phenomenon	 of	 English	 grammar	 implicating	result	 states	 involves	 the	 apparent	 sublexical	modification	 of	 a	 class	 of	 non-static	complex	event	verbs,	in	which	modifiers	can	sometimes	target	a	specific	component	of	a	verb’s	meaning	while	leaving	the	rest	of	its	semantic	structure	out	of	its	scope.		This	is	demonstrated	in	(49)	below:	(49)	 a.	 The	Sheriff	of	Nottingham	jailed	Robin	Hood	for	four	years.		 	 	 	 						(McCawley	1974,	94;	attributed	to	Robert	I.	Binnick)	b.	 John	left	his	bicycle	at	Bill’s	house	until	tomorrow.	(Dowty	1979,	254)	c.	 John	went	upstairs	for	a	few	minutes.	 (Dowty	1979,	255)		In	the	most	natural	reading35	of	(49a),	for	four	years	modifies	the	sub-event	of	Robin	Hood	being	in	jail,	but	not	the	event	of	The	Sheriff	of	Nottingham	putting	him	there.		Similarly	for	(49b-c),	in	which	the	bicycle	being	at	Bill’s	house,	but	not	John	leaving	it	there,	and	John	being	upstairs,	but	not	John	going	there,	are	respectively	modified	by	until	 tomorrow	and	 for	a	 few	minutes.	 	Modification,	here,	 targets	a	result	state.		Temporal	 modification	 targeting	 result	 states	 can	 be	 used	 for	 caused	 change	 of	state,	caused	change	of	location,	and	caused	change	in	possession:		(50)	 a.	 John	opened	the	door	for	a	few	minutes.		 b.	 John	went	outside	for	a	few	minutes.		 c.	 John	borrowed	the	wrench	for	a	few	minutes.	
																																																								35	I	ignore	here	the	iterative	reading,	in	which	The	Sheriff	of	Nottingham	repeatedly	jails	Robin	Hood	over	a	four-year	span,	and	the	durative	reading,	in	which	he	spends	four	years	bringing	about	Robin	Hood’s	imprisonment	(see	Dowty	1979,	251	for	discussion).	
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Result	 states	 play	 a	 role	 in	 several	 scope	 phenomena	 involving	 causative	sentences.		One	of	the	more	interesting	of	these	is	the	apparently	ambiguous	reading	of	some	predicates	when	modified	by	almost.		The	sentence	(51)	below	has	at	least	two36	distinct	readings	(as	glossed	in	(51i)	and	(51ii)):	(51)	 John	almost	killed	Harry.		 i.	 ‘John	almost	did	something	to	cause	Harry	to	die.’		 ii.	 ‘John	did	something	that	caused	Harry	to	be	almost	dead.’		While	in	(51i)	almost	scopes	over	the	entire	event	of	killing,	in	(51ii)	it	scopes	over	the	 result	 state,	 i.e.	Harry	being	dead.	 	The	 sentence	 (51)	 can	 felicitously	describe	either	an	event	in	which	John	does	(or	intends	to	do)	something	that	has	no	effect	on	Harry	 at	 all,	 or	 an	 event	 in	 which,	 for	 example,	 Harry	 is	 seriously	 harmed	 but	survives.	
Almost	 scope	 ambiguity	 seems	 to	 be	 related	 to	 a	 larger	 phenomenon	 of	negation	ambiguities,	which	provide	a	diagnostic	 for	sublexical	semantic	structure	(Koontz-Garboden	&	Beavers	2009).	 	This	diagnostic	probes	for	which	parts	of	the	event	 structure	 negation	 can	 scope	 over.	 	 Their	 diagnostic	 of	 the	 verb	 drown	 is	repeated	below:	(52)		 a.		 ¬Manner:			Bob	didn’t	drown	Ponyboy	—	he	electrocuted	him	instead!			 	 b.		 ¬Cause:			Bob	didn’t	drown	Ponyboy	—	he	held	his	head	under,	but	he	really	died	of	a	heart	attack	due	to	shock!				 	 c.		 ¬Result:			Bob	didn’t	drown	Ponyboy	—	he	choked	on	the	water	and			 	 	 	 some	got	in	his	lungs,	but	he	miraculously	survived!			 	 	 	 	 	 								(Koontz-Garboden	&	Beavers	2009)	
																																																								36	 It	 has	 sometimes	been	 claimed	 that	 (51)	has	 three	or	more	distinct	 interpretations,	 but	 I	 agree	with	 (Dowty	1979,	244)	 that	 it	 is	hard	 to	 convince	oneself	 that	 the	proposed	 readings	are,	 in	 fact,	distinct.		
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Under	the	reasonable	assumption	that	the	result	state	of	the	manner	of	killing	verbs	is	death,	(52a)	negates	the	manner	of	killing,	but	not	the	result	state.		(52c),	on	the	other	hand,	negates	the	result	state,	but	not	the	manner	component	of	the	predicate	
drown	Ponyboy,	and	(52b)	represents	a	negation	of	the	causal	semantics.	For	many	change	of	state/location/possession	verbs,	there	is	a	difference	in	interpretation	 when	 they	 are	 modified	 by	 the	 so-called	 repetitive	 or	 restitutive	
again	(see	above),	which	hinges	on	whether	again	is	modifying	the	matrix	predicate	or	the	result	predicate	(Beck	&	Snyder	2001):	(53)	 John	opened	the	door	again.		 		Under	the	repetitive	reading	of	(53),	John	had	previously	opened	the	door	and	then	opened	 it	again,	while	under	the	restitutive	reading,	 the	door	had	previously	been	open	 and	 John	 caused	 it	 to	 again	 be	 open.	 	 The	 ambiguity	 of	 change	 of	 state	predicates	modified	by	again	 is	analogous	to	 the	ambiguity	of	predicates	modified	by	almost	or	negation.	It	is	clear	from	the	temporal	modification	phenomena	in	(49)	and	the	various	semantic	 scope	 ambiguities	 that,	 at	 least	 in	 some	 cases,	 the	 result	 states	 of	predicates	are	singularly	accessible	for	modification.		There	is	even	further	evidence	for	this	in	the	behavior	of	the	prefixes	re-	and	reversative	un-,	which	usually	modify	not	 the	 entire	 event,	 but	 the	 result	 state	 of	 the	 event	 encoded	 by	 the	 verbs	 they	attach	 to.	 	 For	 example,	 (54a)	 is	 felicitous	 even	 if	 the	 satellite	 has	 never	 before	entered,	 but	 only	 been	 in,	 the	 atmosphere,	 and	 (54b)	 contains	 a	 typical	 use	 of	
unwrap,	 in	 which	 the	 agent	 is	 not	 the	 individual	 who	 performed	 the	 original	wrapping:	
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(54)	 a.	 The	satellite	reentered	the	earth’s	atmosphere	at	3:47	p.m.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Dowty	1979,	256)		 b.	 John	unwrapped	the	present	from	his	grandmother.		
Reenter,	 then,	describes	another	 instance	of	 the	result	state	of	entering,	“being	 in,”	and	unwrap	 refers	 to	 a	 reversal	 of	 the	 result	 state	 of	wrapping,	 “being	wrapped.”		For	 verbs	 that	 can	 take	 these	 prefixes,	 the	 result	 state	 is	 accessible	 even	 to	morphologically	dependant	modifiers.	Finally,	resultative	constructions	provide	a	clear	demonstration	of	the	ability	of	 result	 states	 in	 English	 to	 have,	 in	 principle,	 some	 measure	 of	 linguistic	independence	from	the	activities	that	cause	them.		As	Wechsler	(1997)	has	pointed	out,	the	resultative	secondary	predicate	flat	 is	only	associated	with	the	result	state	of	 the	 event.	 	 This	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 depictive	 secondary	 predicates,	 which	 are	associated	with	the	entire	event:37	(55)	 a.	 John	hammered	the	metal	flat.	 (resultative)		 b.	 John	hammered	the	metal	drunk.	 (depictive)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Wechsler	1997,	318)	Since	 the	 result	 state	 applies	 to	 the	 direct	 object	 in	 (55),	 an	 intransitive	 variant	disallows	a	resultative	predicate	while	allowing	the	depictive:	(56)	 a.							#	John	hammered	flat.		 b.	 John	hammered	drunk.		Resultatives	can	also	frequently	allow	durative	modification	of	the	result	state,	and	they	are	often	ambiguous	with	modifiers	like	almost	and	again.	 	The	availability	of	result	 states	 for	 modification	 and	 predication,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 robust	 effects	 of	
																																																								37	 Depictives	 can	 also	 be	 associated	 with	 the	 object	 rather	 than	 the	 subject:	 John	 drank	 the	 soda	
warm.		But	these	depictive	constructions,	too,	hold	over	the	entire	event.	
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causation	on	argument	structure	discussed	above,	 is	a	 large	part	of	the	motivation	for	the	decompositional	approach	to	predicate	meaning.	Historically,	 the	 phenomena	 illustrated	 in	 (49)	 represented	 a	 compelling	prop	for	the	theory	of	Generative	Semantics	(GS).	 	Proponents	of	GS	proposed	that	elements	of	meaning	are	structurally	present	in	the	syntax	and	then	combined	prior	to	lexical	insertion	(c.f.	McCawley,	1974).		For	the	examples	in	(49),	in	such	a	theory,	the	result	state	is	represented	by	a	constituent	in	the	syntax	of	a	causative	sentence	and	scope	of	modification	is	a	straightforward	consequence	of	c-command.		GS	has	experienced	 a	 revival	 of	 sorts38	 with	 the	 abstract	 syntactical	 components	 PHAVE	(Harley,	1999)	and	‘little	v’	(see	Wechsler	2005	for	discussion).			As	has	been	pointed	out	(Dowty,	1979;	Wechsler	2005,	2008),	however,	GS	and	 its	 successors	do	not	 predict,	 and	 are	 often	 inconsistent	with,	 the	 facts	 about	adverbial	scope,	agent	selectional	restrictions,	and	idiom	formation.		Nonetheless,	a	version	of	this	approach	–	one	that	assumes	that	predicates	can	be	decomposed	into	structured	event	schemata	 including	a	primitive	CAUSE	operator	 that	are	relevant	for	semantic	scope	phenomena,	but	 that	sublexical	 structure	 is	not	 represented	 in	the	 syntax	 (c.f.	 Chierchia	&	McConnell-Ginet	2000,	441-448	 for	 a	 summary	of	 this	approach)	 –	 can	 be	 very	 useful	 for	 modeling	 the	 causative	 and	 result-state	phenomena	discussed	above,	 as	well	 as	abstracting	over	grammatically	 significant	predicate	classes.	
																																																								38	More	accurately,	PHAVE	and	‘little	v’	represent	a	variant	of	a	central	claim	of	GS,	that	complex	lexical	meaning	is	syntactically	encoded.	
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Regardless	 of	 the	 syntactic	 theoretical	 commitments,	 then,	 it	 seems	 that,	whether	or	not	 causation	 is	 a	metaphysically	 “real”	 relation,	 languages	 sometimes	treat	CAUSE	as	a	semantic	primitive	with	very	real	grammatical	consequences.			
4.	 English	Periphrastic	Causatives			 The	focus	of	this	thesis	is	on	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	in	English.	 	 In	later	 chapters,	 their	meaning	 and	 distribution	will	 be	 examined	 in	 detail.	 	 In	 this	section,	 their	 historical	 development	 is	 discussed,	 including	 valence	 patterns	 and	some	 salient	 semantic	 changes,	 followed	 by	 a	 discussion	 of	 their	 synchronic	syntactic	behavior.	
	 4.1	 Historical	Development			 Periphrastic	 causatives	 as	 a	 syntactic	 structure	 derive	 from	 Indo-European	and	 were	 present	 in	 Old	 English,	 albeit	 with	 a	 more	 restricted	 use	 than	morphological	causatives	(Baron	1977,	64).	 	This	 is	consistent	with	comparatively	restricted	 use	 of	 verbal	 periphrasis	 in	 general	 during	 this	 period	 (Baron	 1977,	Royster	 1922).	 	 Based	 on	 the	 written	 record	 –	 which	 is	 inevitably	 restricted	 to	formal	register	and	generally	 incomplete,	especially	prior	 to	widespread	 literacy	–	the	only	periphrastic	causatives	currently	in	use	that	had	causative	meaning	in	Old	English	 are	make	 and	 let.	 	 There	 were	 other	 periphrastics	 that	 have	 no	 current	causative	cognates,	as	well	as	non-causative	usages	of	verbs	like	have	and	get	during	this	period.	
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The	 only	 thorough	 diachronic	 study	 of	 the	 English	 periphrastic	 causatives	that	 I	 am	 aware	 of	 is	 the	 1972	 dissertation	 of	 Naomi	 S.	 Baron,	 republished	 as	“Language	 acquisition	 and	 historical	 change”	 (Baron,	 1977).	 	 This	 book	 examines	only	 the	 verbs	have,	make,	 and	get,	 but	 for	 study	 of	 a	 limited	 set,	 this	 is	 an	 ideal	selection,	 since	 these	 are	 the	most	polysemous	 and	 consequently	most	difficult	 to	trace	 of	 the	 English	 verbs	 examined	 here.	 	 These	 verbs	 also	 developed	 causative	meaning	after	having	other,	primary	non-causative	 interpretations.	 	 In	4.1.1,	4.1.2,	and	 4.1.3,	 I	 rely	 on	Baron’s	 (1977)	 account.	 	 Section	 4.1.4	 attempts	 to	 fill	 out	 the	historical	 record	 for	 the	other	periphrastic	causatives	examined	here	and	 is	based	on	the	cited	usages	in	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary.		
4.1.1 Make 	
Make	precedes	both	have	 and	get	 in	 its	use	as	a	periphrastic	 causative,	but	the	 older	 verb	macian	 wasn’t	 prominent	 until	 Late	 Old	 English	 and	 Early	Middle	English.	 	Other	verb	forms	were	more	commonly	used	to	express	its	common	non-periphrastic	 transitive	 “create”	 or	 “build”	 meaning.	 	 Additionally,	 other	periphrastics,	including	læten	(let	–	see	section	4.1.4	below)	were	more	common	as	causatives.	 	 The	 earliest	 complement	 patterns	 for	make	 were	 [(noun)	 +	 clause]	(make	it	that…),	[noun	+	noun],	and	[noun	+	adjective].		The	infinitive,	which	is	the	most	common	complement	in	modern	usage,	is	not	documented	until	late	in	the	12th	century	(see	Baron	1977,	p.	72).	 	Make	+	[noun	+	infinitive]	structures	occurred	in	
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both	the	bare	and	to-infinitive	forms.	 	The	to-infinitive	was	common	through	Early	Modern	English,	and	some	usages	were	even	found	in	19th	century:39		(57)	 “Making	the	dust	to	fly	in	all	directions”		(F.	E.	Paget,	1859,	“Curate	of	Cumberworth”	pg.	153,	OED)				 The	use	of	make	with	a	resistant	patient	does	not	seem	to	have	been	common	until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 16th	 century.	 	 A	 past	 participle	 verb	 form	 complement	 is	documented	 in	 the	 early	 13th	 century	 (made	 the	 hours	 brought).	 	 Instrumental	subjects	with	passive	complements	appear	in	Early	Modern	English:	(58)	 “His	generosity	made	him	courted	by	many	dependants”		(Johnson,	1759	“Rasselas”	xvi,	OED)		The	passive	complement	without	be	auxiliary	persist	in	some	phrases	(he	made	his	
wishes	 known).	 	 Locative	 prepositional	 phrase	make	 complements	 were	 not	 ever	productive	 in	 English,	 but	 are	 sporadically	 documented	 and	 can	 be	 seen	idiomatically	in	contemporary	English	(Make	yourself	at	home).	 	Attested	examples	of	the	argument	realization	patterns	from	Baron	(1977)	are	given	below,	only	some	of	which	have	grammatical	analogs	in	contemporary	English.		Note	that	throughout	this	 discussion,	 I	 use	 Baron’s	 labels	 for	 complements,	 while	 recognizing	 that	 the	word	labels	(e.g.	“Noun”)	are	better	thought	of	as	abbreviations	for	their	full	phrases	(e.g.	“NP”):40	(59)	 a.	 Clause:		 Þa	he	gemacode	eac	Þurh	drycræft,	Þæt	hy	agunnon,		swylce	hy	owice	wæron.	(=	then	he	made	each	through	sorcery,	 that	 they	 begin	 [to	 act]	 as	 if	 they	were	 alive)	(Wulfstan,	Homilies,	I	98,	25,	from	Baron	1977,	71-2)																																																										39	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	more	variation	 in	 infinitive	 form	 than	 is	 reflected	by	 the	Baron	 study	or	by	 the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	citations.		See	section	4.2	below.	40	 For	 the	 subsequent	 periphrastic	 verbs,	 constructed	 examples	 will	 be	 given	 to	 illustrate	 the	relevant	pattern.	
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	 b.	 Noun:	 	 ic	macige	ðe	mycelre	mægðe.	(=	I	shall	make	you	a	great		people)	(Genesis	xii,	2,	from	Baron	1977,	72)			 c.	 Adjective:			 and	heora	lufiȜendne ȜemaciaÞ	weliȜne	ecelice.	(=	and		of	 them	 lover	make	 prosperous	 forever,	 i.e.	 and	make	their	 lover	prosperous	 forever)	 (Ælfric,	Homilies	 II	88,	28,	from	Baron	1977,	72)			 d.	 Infinitive:		 Swa	makeð	Þe	halie	gast	Þe	Mon	bihalden	up	to	houene.		(=	 So	 makes	 the	 holy	 ghost	 the	 Man	 command	 up	 to	heaven,	 i.e.	 command	 the	 Man	 up	 to	 heaven)	 (c1175	Lamb.	Hom.	159,	from	Baron	1977,	72)		Þe	 deuel…	makeð	 Þe	 unbilefulle	man	 to	 leuen	 swilche	wiȜeles.	 (=	 the	 devil	 makes	 the	 unbelieving	 man	 to	believe	 such	 deceits)	 (c1200	 Trin.	 Coll.	 Hom.	 11,	 from	Baron	1977,	74)			 e.	 Past	part.:			 The	greke	Synon	With	his	fals	forswerynge…	Made	the		hors	 broght	 in-to	 troye.	 (=	 The	 Greek	 Sinon	 with	 his	false	oaths…	made	the	horse	brought	into	Troy)	(c1384	Chaucer,	H.	Fame,	I.155,	from	Baron	1977,	75)			 f.	 Locative	PP:			Now	hath	delthe	made	vs	two	at	debate	for	your	loue.	(=		Now	death	 has	made	 the	 two	 of	 us	 in	 debate	 for	 your	love)	(1470-85	Malory,	Arthur	XVIII.xx.761,	from	Baron	1977,	77)		Noe	yoman	of	this	office…	to	bere	or	make	oute	of	this	office	 any	 breade	 but	 by	 knowledge	 of	 the	 brevour.	(a1483	 Liber	Niger	 in	Househ.	Ord.,	 from	Baron	 1977,	77)			A	 summary	 table	 from	 Baron	 (1977,	 78)	 is	 reproduced	 below.	 	 A	 checkmark	indicates	emergence	and	an	“x”	indicates	obsolescence	of	the	form:						
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Complements: NP + Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive Past. Part. Locative PP 
1000 ✓ ✓ ✓    
1100    ✓: bare inf   
1200    ✓: 'to' inf   
1300     ✓: passive 
✓: fig. 
(pos.) 
1400      ✓: lit. (dir.) 
1500       
1600       
1700       
1800       
1900    ✖: 'to' inf rare: passive ✖: lit. 	 Figure	2:		Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	make.	
	
	
4.1.2 Have 	 The	ancestor	of	have	(Old	English	habban)	did	not	exist	as	a	causative	in	Old	English.	 	 It	originally	occurred	most	commonly	 in	 its	possessive	use.	 	 Its	use	as	an	auxiliary	 appeared	 by	 the	 8th	 century,	 but	 was	 absent	 from	 earliest	 Old	 English	record.		There	are	arguments	linking	its	emergence	as	a	causative	with	its	use	as	the	perfective	 auxiliary.	 	 Semantically,	 both	 are	 resultative.	 	 The	 possessive	with	 past	participle	 (I	 have	 a	 cup	 broken)	 might	 have	 been	 reanalyzed	 along	 two	 different	paths	 with	 (1)	 focus	 on	 the	 resultative	 meaning	 becoming	 the	 perfective	 (I	 have	
broken	a	cup)	and	(2)	focus	on	the	passive	meaning	becoming	the	causative	(I	had	a	
cup	broken)	(Baron	1977,	80).		Other	lines	of	examination,	however,	suggest	that	the	developments	 of	 the	 two	 uses	 were	 distinct.	 	 However,	 ambiguity	 in	 historical	examples	–	as	in	contemporary	examples	–	make	definitive	statements	about	origins	difficult.			
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Causative	have	is	cited	with	clausal	complement	by	the	late	12th	century,	but	it	was	 then	 in	 limited	use	 and	 is	 only	 currently	 seen	 in	 some	 somewhat	marginal	idiomatic	 expression	 (Luck/fate	 would	 have	 it	 that	 he	 succeed).	 	 Locative	complements	emerged	around	the	same	time	and	were	more	frequent	through	late	19th	century:	(60)	 	“There	I	was	had	into	a	whole	room	full	of	women.”41											(Fielding	1749	“Tom	Jones”	XVII.iii)		Adjectival	 complements	with	 resultative	meaning	 appear	 around	 the	 same	period	and	 persist	 (He	 had	 the	 game	 ready).	 	 Similarly,	 past	 participle	 complements	emerged	 late	 in	 the	 12th	 century	 and	 persist	 (I	 had	 a	 man	 killed).	 	 Noun	complements	with	 resultative	meaning	are	cited	 in	15th	 century,	but	are	currently	marginal	(??He	had	me	a	fool).	 	Infinitives	appear	in	late	14th	century.	 	Constructed	examples	of	 the	argument	realization	patterns	are	given	below,	most	of	which	are	grammatical	in	contemporary	English:		(61)	 a.	 Clause:											?	John	had	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 	 Training	had	the	boy	a	soldier	(in	no	time).		 c.	 Adjective:			 The	long	walk	had	John	hungry.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	had	Bill	(*to)	leave	the	room.		 e.	 Past	part.:			 John	had	his	dog	summoned.		 f.	 Locative	PP:			 John	had	his	dog	into	the	room.				The	following	chart	is	reproduced	from	Baron	(1977,	pg.	88):																																																												41	Note	also	the	passive	voice,	which	is	impossible	(or	very	restricted)	for	contemporary	have.	 	See	section	4.2	below.	
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Complements: NP + 
Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive Past. Part. 
Locative 
PP 
1000       
1100 ✓    ✓  
1200   ✓   ✓ 
1300    ✓: 'to' inf   
1400  ✓  ✓: bare inf   
1500       
1600       
1700       
1800       
1900    ✖: 'to' inf   	 Figure	3:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	have.		
4.1.3 Get 	
Get	has	many	contemporary	meanings	and	uses.		It	can	be	used	transitively	to	mean	“acquire”	or	“receive”	–	to	possess	with	or	without	causative	meaning	–	as	in	
he	got	a	new	 truck.	 	 It	has	possessive	meaning	 in	 the	perfective	aspect:	He’s	got	a	
new	truck.	 	 It	 is	also	used	as	a	resultative	or	passive	auxiliary	(It	got	destroyed),	to	introduce	deontic	modality	(He	has	got	to	maintain	it),	as	a	change	of	state	verb	(He	
got	free),	and	as	a	causative	(he	got	it	fixed,	John	got	Bill	to	leave),	which	is	of	course	the	focus	of	this	account.	
Get	emerged	as	a	causative	after	both	make	and	have.	 	The	verb	 itself,	with	any	 meaning,	 did	 not	 enter	 English	 until	 12th	 century,	 as	 a	 borrowing	 from	 Old	Norse,	 and	 didn’t	 occur	 as	 causative	 until	 14th	 century.	 	 Prior	 to	 that,	 it	 occurred	with	 locative	 constructions	 (he	 should	 get	 away,	 get	 out	 of	 the	 house)	 indicating	
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motion.42	 	 Subsequently,	 the	 verb	 allowed	 locative	 complements	 with	 causative	meaning	(he	got	the	hillside	at	his	back).43		Infinitive	 complements	 of	get	 are	 first	 cited	 in	 the	 early	 15th	 century,	with	optional	to.		Participle	complements	with	causative	reading	emerged	in	16th	century,	but	the	non-intentional	“happenstance”	reading	is	not	recorded	until	1787:	(62)	 “I	got	my	right	wrist	dislocated.”			 	 	 	 	 (T.	Jefferson,	1787,	“Writings”,	II	249,	OED)			Around	this	period,	get	began	being	used	as	a	perfective	auxiliary	(I	got	finished	last	
night).	 	Get	was	also	used	as	possessive	around	the	end	of	the	16th	century	(I	have	
got	 a	 car).	 	Get	 +	 [noun	 +	 adjective]	 (get	 it	 ready)	 complementation	 patterns	 are	recorded	 in	 the	 late	16th	 century.	 	 It	was	also	used	as	 inchoative	 late	16th	 century	(the	 strap	got	 loose),	perhaps	deriving	 from	a	deleted	 reflexive	object.	 	 In	 the	mid	17th	 century,	 it	 occurs	with	 “become”	meaning	with	 a	 past	 participle	 complement	(get	acquainted).		The	get	passive,	meanwhile,	is	not	documented	until	19th	century.		A	causative	get	+	[noun	+	noun]	pattern	never	developed	in	English	*the	army	will	
get	 you	 a	 soldier	 (Baron	 1977,	 98).	 	 Constructed	 examples	 of	 the	 argument	realization	 patterns	 are	 given	 below,	 only	 some	 of	 which	 are	 grammatical	 in	contemporary	English:	(63)	 a.	 Clause:											*	John	got	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 											*	Training	got	the	boy	a	soldier.		 c.	 Adjective:			 The	long	walk	got	John	hungry.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	got	Bill	*(to)	leave	the	room.																																																									42	This	origin	is	suggestive	in	light	of	the	semantic	analysis	that	will	be	developed	for	this	verb.		See	chapter	2.	43	Jesperson		(1961)	claimed	that	the	locative	derived	from	the	reflexive	(I	got	myself	down	->	I	got	
down),	which	would	suggest	a	prior	causative	meaning,	but	this	usage	occurs	after	the	get	+	[noun	+	locative]	 (c1350),	 which	 itself	 occurred	 after	 get	 +	 [locative]	 (c1300).	 	 The	 reflexive	 complement	form	was	not	cited	until	mid	15th	century	(Baron	1977,	.91)	
54	
 
	 e.	 Past	part.:			 John	got	his	dog	washed.		 f.	 Locative	PP:			 John	got	his	dog	into	the	room.		The	following	summary	chart	is	reproduced	from	Baron	(1977,	pg.	101):	
Complements: NP + Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive Past. Part. Locative PP 
1000       
1100       
1200       
1300      ✓ 
1400    ✓: 'to' inf   
1500   ✓ ✓: bare inf ✓  
1600       
1700       
1800       
1900    ✖: bare inf   	 Figure	4:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	get.		
 	
4.1.4 Cause, force, let, allow, and drive 			 The	noun	cause	was	borrowed	from	French	 in	 the	13th	century	and	did	not	emerge	as	a	verb	until	 the	middle	of	 the	14th	 century.	 	Verbal	cause	occurs	with	a	variety	of	now-defunct	complement	patterns,	but	it	is	not	clear	when	these	became	obsolete.	 Constructed	 examples	 of	 the	 argument	 realization	 patterns	 are	 given	below,	few	of	which	are	grammatical	in	contemporary	English:	(64)	 a.	 Clause:											*	John	caused	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 	 The	fall	caused	the	boy	pain.		 c.	 Adjective:						*	The	long	walk	caused	John	hungry.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	caused	Bill	*(to)	leave	the	room.		 e.	 Past	part.:					*	John	caused	his	dog	summoned.		 f.	 Locative	PP:	*	John	caused	his	dog	into	the	room.		 g.	 (none):	 John	caused	pain.		
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		A	 summary	 of	 complements	 based	 on	 first	 citations	 in	 the	Oxford	English	Dictionary	is	given	in	the	table	below:			
Complements: NP +  
Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive 
Past. 
Part. 
Loc/Dir 
PP (none) 
1000        
1100        
1200        
1300       ✓ 
1400 ✓   
✓: 'to' 
inf    
1500  ✓ ✓   ✓  
1600    
✓: bare 
inf    
1700      
1800        
1900        
current ✖  ✖ 
✖: bare 
inf.  ✖  	 Figure	5:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	cause.	
		Like	 cause,	 verbal	 force	 is	 historically	 preceded	 by	 a	 nominal	 form.	 	 As	 a	transitive	verb,	force	historically	occurs	with	a	variety	of	idiosyncratic	meanings.		As	a	causative,	 it	sometimes	appeared	with	a	NP	complement,	which	persists	 in	some	limited	uses	(The	police	forced	a	confession).		More	commonly,	it	was	used	with	the	persisting	locative	or	directional	PP	complement	or	an	infinitive,	of	which	only	the	
to-form	remains:		(65)	 a.	 Clause:											*	John	forced	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 											*	The	fall	forced	the	boy	pain.		 c.	 Adjective:					*	The	long	walk	forced	John	hungry.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	forced	Bill	*(to)	leave	the	room.		 e.	 Past	part.:					*	John	forced	his	dog	summoned.		 f.	 Locative	PP:			 John	forced	his	dog	into	the	room.		 g.	 (none):	 John	forced	a	retraction.	
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Complements: NP +  
Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive 
Past. 
Part. 
Loc/Dir 
PP (none) 
1000        
1100        
1200        
1300        
1400    ✓: 'to' inf    
1500       ✓ 
1600    
✓: bare 
inf  ✓  
1700      
1800        
1900        
current    
✖: bare 
inf.   rare 	 Figure	6:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	force.		 	Causative	drive	occurs	historically	with	a	restricted	set	of	complementation	patterns,	 the	 earliest	 of	 which	 is	 the	 [NP	 +	 PP]	 causative	 locative	 or	 directional	structure.	 	 No	 bare	 infinitives	 are	 recorded	 in	 the	 OED	 and	 all	 recorded	constructions	–	[NP	+	Adjective],	[NP	+	to	VP],	and	[NP	+	PP]	–	persist.		Constructed	examples	of	all	periphrastic	complementation	types	are	below:		(66)	 a.	 Clause:											*	John	drove	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 											*	The	fall	drove	the	boy	pain.		 c.	 Adjective:			 The	long	walk	drove	John	crazy.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	drove	Bill	*(to)	leave	the	room.		 e.	 Past	part.:					*	John	drove	his	dog	summoned.		 f.	 Locative	PP:			 John	drove	his	dog	into	the	room.		 		
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Complements: NP + Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive Past. Part. Loc/Dir PP 
1000      ✓ 
1100       
1200       
1300    ✓: 'to' inf   
1400       
1500       
1600       
1700       
1800   ✓    
1900       
current       	 Figure	7:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	drive.				 Early	 usages	 of	 allow	 included	 a	 transitive	 construction	 that	 meant	 “to	approve	of”.	 	There	 is	 also	 the	persistent	usage	with	a	 clausal	 complement,	which	means	 “to	 grant	 the	 truth	 of	 (some	 proposition)”.	 	 The	 causative	 constructions	include	a	contemporary	somewhat	limited	[NP	+	NP]	complement	(He	allowed	them	
a	break)	and	a	surprisingly	late	emerging	[NP	+	PP]	complement.		The	infinitive	bare	complement	 emerged	 early	 but	 is	 currently	 uncommon	 in	 American	 English	varieties,	while	the	currently	common	to-infinitive	is	attested	in	the	15th	century:		(67)	 a.	 Clause:											*	John	allowed	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 											*	Training	allowed	the	boy	a	soldier.		 c.	 Adjective:						*	The	long	walk	allowed	John	hungry.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	allowed	Bill	*(to)	leave	the	room.		 e.	 Past	part.:					*	John	allowed	his	dog	summoned.		 f.	 Locative	PP:			 John	allowed	his	dog	into	the	room.		 g.	 (none):	 John	allowed	a	retraction.				
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	 Figure	8:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	allow.				 Causative	let	is	found	in	early	Old	English	and	is	among	the	oldest	of	English	periphrastic	 causatives.	 	 For	much	 of	 the	 history	 of	 English	 it	 existed	 as	 an	 auto-antonym,	 like	 contemporary	 cleave	 or	 literally,	 with	 a	 co-existing	 periphrastic	frustrative	 usage	 meaning	 to	 prevent	 or	 hinder.	 	 The	 complementation	 patterns	with	the	exception	of	the	to-infinitive	persist	today,	but	the	bare	NP	complement	(he	
let	a	groan)	 is	 limited	and	mostly	 idiomatic	(let	blood,	bloodletting),	and	the	[NP	+	Adjective]	pattern	is	limited	to	expressions	like	let	alone	and	let	free.	(68)	 a.	 Clause:											*	John	let	it	that	his	children	would	be	cared	for.		 b.	 Noun:	 											*	Training	let	the	boy	a	soldier.		 c.	 Adjective:					*	The	long	walk	let	John	hungry.		 d.	 Infinitive:			 John	let	Bill	(*to)	leave	the	room.		 e.	 Past	part.:					*	John	let	his	dog	summoned.		 f.	 Locative	PP:			 John	let	his	dog	into	the	room.		 g.	 (none):										*	John	let	a	retraction.				
Complements: NP +  
Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive 
Past. 
Part. 
Loc/Dir 
PP (none) 
1000    ✓: bare inf    
1100        
1200        
1300        
1400    ✓: 'to' inf   ✓ 
1500        
1600        
1700        
1800      ✓  
1900        
current    ✖: bare inf.    
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	 Figure	9:	Historical	development	of	complement-patterns	of	let.				
	 4.2	 Syntactic	Properties			 The	English	 periphrastic	 causatives	 in	 the	 complement	 patterns	 of	 interest	here	take	an	NP	or	otherwise	nominal	subject	and	a	non-finite	clausal	complement	(usually	a	full	clause	John	caused	Bill	to	leave,	John	made	Bill	leave	–	but	sometimes	a	small	clause	John	caused	Bill	pain,	the	announcement	made	the	plans	irrelevant).		For	full	 clause	 complements,	 the	 periphrastics	 differ	 in	 whether	 they	 select	 for	 the	auxiliary/infinitive	marker	 to	 or	 whether	 they	 take	 a	 bare	 infinitive.	 	 Among	 the	verbs	examined	here,	the	following	judgments	are	robust	for	most	standard	dialects	of	American	English:	
Complements: NP +  
Approximate 
date Clause Noun Adjective Infinitive 
Past. 
Part. 
Loc/Dir 
PP (none) 
1000   ✓ ✓: bare inf  ✓ ✓ 
1100        
1200        
1300    ✓: 'to' inf    
1400    
(prob. 
Earlier)    
1500        
1600        
1700        
1800        
1900        
current   limited ✖: 'to' inf.   limited 
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(69)	 a.	 John	caused	Bill	*(to)	leave.		 b.	 John	made	Bill	(*to)	leave.		 c.	 John	drove	Bill	*(to)	leave.		 c.	 John	forced	Bill	*(to)	leave.		 d.	 John	had	Bill	(*to)	leave.		 e.	 John	got	Bill	*(to)	leave.		 f.	 John	let	Bill	(*to)	leave.		 g.	 John	allowed	Bill	*(to)	leave.	There	are	attested	exceptions	to	these	generalizations,	but	in	most	cases	they	are	so	infrequent	 that	 they	 might	 be	 performance	 errors	 or	 stylistic	 flourishes.		Nonetheless,	a	corpus	search	reveals	the	following:	(70)	 And	so	what	happened	was,	he	ended	up	not	being	 inducted	 into	 the	Army	but	 doing	 just	what	 DC	 Comics	would	 have	had	him	 to	do,	 which	was	 he	stayed	home,	he	rallied	everybody	against	saboteurs	on	the	home	front.44			 	 	 	 	 	 	 				(NPR_FreshAir,	2012)		 	(71)	 I	thought	it	was	me.	I	thought	I	was	just-	everything	I	did	was	what	made	me	
to	have	to	leave.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 													(ABC_Turning,	1994)		 	(72)	 We	left	Paris	shortly	after.	For	years	we	wandered.	Greece,	Egypt,	And	there,	a	 technological	 wonder	 allowed	me	 see	 sunrise,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 two	hundred	years...			 	 	 	 	 												(Interview	with	the	Vampire,	1994)			(73)	 He	caught	her	helping	me.	The	punishment	was	forcing	me	watch	him...	"			 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Bk:	Kiss	of	darkness,	2009)			However,	at	least	one	variant	from	the	judgments	above	–	the	to-infinitive	with	let	–	is	frequent	enough	to	warrant	consideration	as	a	dialectical	variant.		One	example	is	below:	
																																																								44	Note	that	construction	is	ambiguous	with	a	possessive	have	and	a	to-phrase	specifying	purpose	or	reason:	 I	 have	 him	 to	 help	 (with	 the	 gardening).	 	 The	 story	 being	 told	 in	 this	 example	makes	 this	reading	unlikely	here.	
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	(74)	 Let	me	to	go	to	a	specific.	During	the	campaign,	I	happened	to	be	travelling	with	the	President	for	a	little	bit…		 	 	 	 	 	 	 							(CNN_Crossfire,	1990)			 The	 non-canonical	 complement	 form	 for	 let	 is	 robust	 enough	 (at	 least	 on	CNN),	that	it	is	even	seen	in	passive	constructions:45		(75)	 No,	 I'm	 sure	 they	 were	 stopped	 and	 questioned	 on	 their	 way	 out,	 but	 my	understanding	is	they	were	let	to	leave	the	property.		
       (CNN_Burden, 1996) 	In	general,	though,	it	seems	to	be	relatively	difficult	for	let	to	passivize:46	(76)	 a.	 John	let	Bill	leave.		 b.								?	Bill	was	let	leave	by	John.		 c.	 John	let	Bill	know.		 d.						??	Bill	was	let	know	by	John.		The	periphrastics	differ	with	respect	 to	 the	ease	with	which	 they	can	occur	 in	 the	passive.	 	 Some	 periphrastics	 passifize	 easily	 and	 productively	 while	 some	 are	somewhat	 awkward	 in	 the	 construction,	 and	 others	 nearly	 impossible	 (see,	 e.g.	Hollmann	2006):	(77)	 a.	 John	was	forced	to	leave.		 b.	 John	was	made	(to)	leave.		 c.	 John	was	allowed	to	leave.		 d.								?	John	was	caused	to	leave.		 e.								?	John	was	let	(to)	leave.		 f.							??	John	was	got/gotten	to	leave		 f.									*	John	was	had	(to)	leave.		
Have	does	not	seem	to	allow	the	passive,	but	passive	get	 sentences	are	somewhat	common	in	corpora	(more	so	with	gotten	than	got)	despite	their	awkwardness	out	of	context:																																																									45	 The	 to-infinitive	 seem	 to	 be	 allowed	more	 frequently	 in	 the	 passive	 than	 the	 active	 in	 general	(Steve	Wechsler,	p.c.).		This	is	certainly	true	of	the	periphrastics:	John	was	made	to	leave.	46	Outside	of	the	frequent	idiom	let	go	meaning	fire	from	a	position.	
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	(78)	 “’Gross	misuses	of	 it	 for	political	and	sectarian	purposes	are	bound	 to	crop	up,	and	might	destroy	it;	but	with	periodic	sanitary	efforts	it	can	probably	be	
got	to	continue	in	a	sturdy,	placid	way,	as	is	needed.’”						(Kermode,	Frank,	1998,	Explorations	in	Shakespeare’s	language)	
.		 	 	 	 	 	 	
.		 The	verb	cause	 is	a	raising-to-object	–	or	Exceptional	Case	Marking	(ECM)	–	verb.	 	 It	 occurs	 naturally	 with	 pleonastic	 objects	 and	with	 idiom	 chunks	 and	 the	passive	complement	is	a	paraphrase	of	the	active:	(79)	 a.	 John	caused	it	to	rain.		 b.	 John	caused	there	to	be	a	shortage.		 c.	 John	caused	the	cat	to	be	out	of	the	bag.		 d.	 John	caused	the	shit	to	hit	the	fan.		 e.	 The	villain	caused	his	henchmen	to	kill	the	hero		 	 =		The	villain	caused	the	hero	to	be	killed	by	his	henchmen.		
Allow,	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	good	candidate	for	an	object	control	verb:		(80)	 a.					?	 John	allowed	it	to	rain.		 b.					?John	allowed	there	to	be	a	shortage.		 c.				#	 John	allowed	the	cat	(to	be)	out	of	the	bag.		 d.				#	 John	allowed	the	shit	to	hit	the	fan.		 e.	 The	villain	allowed	his	henchmen	to	kill	the	hero		 	 =/=	 The	villain	allowed	the	hero	to	be	killed	by	his	henchmen.		The	 status	 of	 the	 other	 periphrastic	 causatives	 is	 less	 clear.	 	 Except	 have47	 and	possibly	force,48	they	all	allow	pleonastic	objects:		(81)	 a.	 John	made	it	(be)	cooler	in	the	room.	b.								?John	forced	it	to	be	cooler	in	the	room.	c.	 John	got	it	to	be	cooler	in	the	room.	d.	 John	let	it	be	cooler	in	the	room.	e.								*	John	had	it	be	cooler	in	the	room.		But	many	are	bad	with	idiom	chunks:																																																										47	This	is	explained	by	a	causee	animacy	requirement	for	have.		See	chapter	3.	48	Force	seems	to	be	better	with	pleonastic	objects	in	more	elaborate	contexts:	John	forced	there	to	be	
seats	available	by	dragging	the	passengers	off	the	train.	
63	
 
	(82)	 a.								?	John	let	the	cat	be	out	of	the	bag.		 b.						??	John	made	the	cat	be	out	of	the	bag.		 c.						??	John	forced	the	cat	to	be	out	of	the	bag.		 d.						??	John	got	the	cat	to	be	out	of	the	bag.		 e.								*	John	had	the	cat	be	out	of	the	bag.		And	only	have	(and	possibly	make)	has	paraphrasal	active	and	passive	complement	clauses:49	(83)	 a.	 The villain had his henchmen kill the hero 
  = The villain had the hero be killed by his henchmen. 
 b. The villain made his henchmen kill the hero 
  =?= The villain made the hero be killed by his henchmen. 
 c. The villain forced his henchmen to kill the hero 
  =/= The villain forced the hero to be killed by his henchmen. 
 d. The villain got his henchmen to kill the hero 
  =/= The villain got the hero to be killed by his henchmen. 
 e. The villain let his henchmen kill the hero 
  =/= The villain let the hero be killed by his henchmen. 
 
 	 A	summary	of	this	section	in	given	in	the	table	below,50	where	✖✟ indicates	the	presence	of	some	corpus	occurrences	but	general	prohibition,	%	indicates	that	the	 number	 of	 occurrences	 warrants	 the	 status	 of	 dialectical	 variation,	 and	 ??	indicates	uncertain	status:																																																												49	More	accurately,	the	passive	and	active	complement	counterparts	are	paraphrases	for	almost	all	the	 periphrastics	 when	 there	 is	 a	 difference	 in	 animacy	 between	 the	 subject	 and	 object	 of	 the	complement	 clauses.	 	 The	 interesting	 cases	 are	 those	 for	 which	 the	 subject	 and	 object	 are	 both	animate	due	to	the	unique	meaning	of	the	periphrastics	in	these	cases,	as	will	be	seen	in	chapter	3.	50	It	 is	perhaps	worth	mentioning	one	final	interesting	syntactic	quirk	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	in	English,	which	is	that	they,	like	some	psych-verbs,	allow	so-called	“backward	binding”:		The	
picture	of	himself	bothered	John,	The	picture	of	himself	caused	John	to	change	the	way	he	dresses,	and	likewise	for	the	other	causatives	(with	the	possible	exception	of	have).	 	However,	this	is	most	likely	not	 real	 backward	 anaphora,	 since	 the	 reflexive	 is	 not	 actually	 an	 argument	 of	 the	 causative	 verb.		Since	 the	 reflexive	 is	 not	 outranked	 in	 an	 argument	 structure	 list,	 it	 is	 not	 subject	 to	 the	 binding	principles,	 which	 is	 probably	 also	what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 the	 putative	 backward	 anaphoric	 examples	with	psych	verbs.		Such	cases	do	seem	a	little	more	difficult	when	the	main	verb	is	neither	a	psych	or	causative	verb	(?The	picture	of	himself	hit	Bill	in	the	head)	so	perhaps	the	phenomenon	is	significant.	
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 Infinitive Control/Raising 
 bare to 
Passive 
Dummy Idiom chunk Pass. Paraph. 
cause ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
make ✔ ✖✟ ✔ ✔ ?? ?? 
force ✖✟ ✔ ✔ ✔ ?? ✖ 
get ✖ ✔ ?? ✔ ? ✖ 
have ✔ ✖✟ ✖ ✖ ? ✔ 
let ✔ % ? ✔ ✔ ✖ 
allow % ✔ ✔ ?? ✖ ✖ 	 Figure	10:	Some	syntactic	properties	of	the	periphrastic	causatives	in	English.			The	complementation	patterns	vary	widely	among	the	periphrastic	causatives,	and	complementation	for	these	verbs	appears	in	general	to	be	lexically	idiosyncratic	and	historically	variable.	 	The	remainder	of	 this	 thesis	deals	only	with	 [NP	+	 {to|bare}	infinitive	VP]	complements	and,	in	particular,	the	semantics	and	pragmatics	of	these	constructions,	which	seem	to	be	more	regular.	
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Chapter	3:			 The	Parameter	of	Causee	
Inclination		
	
1.	 Defining	Causation	and	Identifying	Periphrastic	Causative	
Verbs	
	
		 A	periphrastic	 causative	 is	understood	here	as	 a	verb	 that	 “controls	 a	non-finite	 complement	 clause	 and	 [whose	 constructions]	 express	 a	 causal	 relation	 in	which	the	occurrence	of	the	effect	is	entailed”	(Gilquin	2010,	1).51		The	exact	nature	of	 causation,	 or	 of	 a	 “causal	 relation,”	 is	 not	 entirely	 straightforward	 or	 easily	expressible,	as	was	demonstrated	in	the	previous	chapter,	but	it	is	here	understood	as	a	relation	between	an	event	–	specifically,	in	the	cases	of	most	interest	here,	the	actions	of	an	individual	directing	another	individual	–	and	another	event,	 in	which	the	second	event	is	counterfactually	dependant	on	the	first.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	caused	eventuality	entailment	can	be	 incorporated	 into	 a	 semantic	 acceptability	 judgment	 by	 identifying	 core52	periphrastic	 causatives	 by	 result	 entailment	 and	 consequent	 generation	 of	contradiction	when	the	resultant	state	or	event	is	negated:	(84)	 a.							#	The	blast	caused	the	boat	to	heel,	but	the	boat	didn’t	heel.		 b.							#	John	made	Bill	leave,	but	Bill	didn’t	leave.																																																									51	But	see	footnote	52.	52	Included	exceptions	are	the	let/allow	causative	types	with	sentient	patients:	She	let	him	leave,	but	
he	didn’t	leave	(Wolff	and	Song	2003,	286).	
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	 c.	 Mary	begged	Bob	to	marry	her,	but	he	didn’t	marry	her.		 	 	 	 	 	 	(adapted	from	Wolff	and	Song	2003,	286)	
	This	 criterion,	 however,	 does	 not	 exclude	 other	 factive	 verbs,	 such	 as	 watch	 or	
notice,	 and	 so,	 indeed,	 counterfactuality	 must	 also	 be	 included	 in	 the	 linguistic	characterization	of	causation.53	(85)	 a.	 John	caused	the	lamp	to	break,	and	if	he	hadn’t	done	so	it	wouldn’t			 	 have.		 b.							#	John	saw	the	lamp	break,	and	if	he	hadn’t	done	so,	it	wouldn’t	have.				Based	 on	 these	 criteria,	 the	 causatives	 examined	 here	 include	 cause,	 get,	 force,	
make,	 set,	 drive,	 and	 have,	 plus	 the	 exceptional	 let	 and	allow,	 which	 are	 felicitous	when	 the	 result	 is	negated	 in	 some	 instances,	but	are	 intuitively	 causal	enough	 to	nevertheless	warrant	inclusion.	 	Verbs	not	considered,	which	are	causative	but	are	restricted	 or	 specialized	 in	 some	 way,	 include	 persuade,	 convince,	 wreak	 (havoc,	destruction),	bring	about,	result	in,	give	rise,	lead	to,	induce,	and	render.	 	Due	to	the	difficulties	suggested	above,	the	causal	notion	itself	will	be	left	undecomposed	and	assumed	 here	 to	 be	 primitive	 (while	 obeying	 the	 factive	 and	 counterfactual	conditional	heuristics).		In	particular,	a	CAUSE	connective	will	be	used	as	shorthand	for	 this	 concept	 in	 the	 discussion	 of	 directive	 causation	 (described	 below):	CAUSE(x,e)	is	true	iff	individual	x	is	the	cause	of	event	e.54		 Causation	as	it	is	expressed	in	natural	language	is	not	uniform.		In	particular,	English	 periphrastic	 causatives	 are	 not	 typically	 interchangeable	 without	 an																																																									53	But	note	 that,	 strictly,	 counterfactuality	 is	a	 sufficient	but	not	necessary	condition	on	causation:	while	it	 is	true	that	being	shot	caused	Abraham	Lincoln	to	die,	 it	 is	clearly	not	true	that	if	Abraham	Lincoln	had	not	been	shot	he	would	not	have	died	(see	also	footnote	24	above	for	related	subtleties	of	sufficiency	and	necessity).		Nonetheless,	it	suffices	to	target	the	verbs	of	interest.	54	As	noted	above,	strictly	speaking	causation	is	a	relation	between	events.		But	since	the	focus	here	is	on	directive	causation,	which	is	always	agentive,	this	abbreviation	simplifies	the	account.		
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alteration	 of	 meaning,	 even	 when	 such	 a	 substitution	 results	 in	 an	 acceptable	sentence:	(86)	 a.	 She	let	him	mail	the	letter.		 b.	 She	got	him	to	mail	the	letter.		 c.	 She	forced	him	to	mail	the	letter.		Intuitively,	 these	 sentences	 are	 not	 appropriate	 descriptions	 of	 the	 same	 kinds	 of	causing	 events.	 	 It	will	 be	 argued	here	 that	 the	 sentences	 in	 (86)	 –	 in	 addition	 to	whatever	 other	 meaning	 differences	 might	 be	 present	 –	 represent	 points	 on	 a	potential	 continuum	with	 respect	 to	how	cooperative	 the	patient	 is	 in	mailing	 the	letter,	with	(86a)	corresponding	to	the	most	cooperative	and	(86c)	the	least.		In	each	case,	 the	 agent	 “causes”	 the	 patient	 to	mail	 the	 letter,	 but	 there	 is	 nevertheless	 a	difference	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 much	 (perhaps	 patient-internal)	 resistance	 must	 be	overcome	 to	 do	 so	 (see	 e.g.	 McCawley	 1968,	 Beavers	 2006).	 	 Whatever	 the	characterization	 of	 the	 differences	 might	 be,	 however,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 are	differences	in	the	meaning	of	different	periphrastic	causative	verbs.				 In	 the	 following	 sections,	 intuitions	 regarding	 meaning	 differences	 are	explored	 within	 Talmy’s	 (1988,	 2000)	 force-dynamic	 model	 of	 causation.	 	 These	intuitions	 are	 further	 explored	 and	 refined	 in	 section	 2.2	 by	 appealing	 to	 the	framework	of	Natural	Semantic	Metalanguage	 from	Wierzbicka	(1998),	and	 finally	they	are	interpreted	in	terms	of	the	semantic	parameter	of	causee	inclination	that	I	propose.	 	 In	 particular,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 for	 animate	 patients,	 the	 causee’s	psychological	 and	 emotional	 disposition	 toward	 performing	 the	 caused	 sub-event	partially	 determines	 the	 choice	 of	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb,	 and	 that	 inanimate	causee	 constructions	 are	 parasitic	 on	 animate	 cases,	 modulo	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
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disposition.		Sentences	in	which	the	causee	is	obeying	the	instructions	of	the	causer,	sometimes	called	“directive”	causation	(Talmy	1976)	will	be	the	primary	empirical	domain	of	this	chapter.	
2.	 Previous	Analyses		
2.1	 The	Force	Dynamic	analysis	of	causation		 In	 the	 framework	 of	 cognitive	 semantics,	 Leonard	 Talmy’s	 (1988,	 2000)	treatment	 of	 “force	 dynamics”	 has	 been	 influential	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	causation	(Jackendoff	1990,	Pinker	1997,	Copley	&	Harley	2010,	Wolff	&	Song	2003,	Wolff	 2007).	 	 In	 his	 presentation	 of	 conceptual	 force	 dynamics,	 Talmy	 (2000)	identifies	 the	 primary	 conceptual-semantic	 elements	 as	 an	 agonist	 (causee)	 and	antagonist	(causer).		Each	has	an	intrinsic	force	tendency	–	either	toward	motion	or	rest	–	and	there	is	a	resulting	balance	of	strengths,	with	either	the	causer	or	causee	as	the	stronger	entity.		Together,	these	result	in	a	force	interaction	outcome	of	either	motion	or	rest	(Talmy	2000,	414).		This	allows	him	to	model	not	only	the	causative	scenario	 in	 terms	 of	 physical	 forces,	 but	 also	 to	 similarly	 model	 the	 notions	 of	prevention	 (which	 has	 its	 own	 inventory	 of	 periphrastic	 verbs,	 the	 “frustratives”	such	as	prevent,	hinder,	and	inhibit)	and	enablement.	According	 to	Talmy’s	models,	make,	 force,	get,	 and	have	 are	all	examples	of	“effectuating”	 causation,	 in	which	 the	 causer	 exerts	 a	more	 powerful	 force	 on	 the	causee	 than	 vice-versa,	 resulting	 in	 motion	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 intrinsic	 force	tendency	of	 the	antagonist.	 	The	verbs	make	 and	 force	differ	 from	get	 and	have	 in	
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whether	 the	 causee’s	 intrinsic	 force	 tendency	 is	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction	 of	 the	causer’s	(for	make	and	force)	or	toward	rest	(for	get	and	have).	 	The	co-categorical	pairs	might	 then	differ	 in	 the	 strength	of	 their	 causee	–	 to	one	plausible	 intuition,	then,	the	causee	of	force	is	stronger	than	that	of	make	and	the	causee	of	get	stronger	than	have,55	 but	 in	 all	 cases	 it	 is	 ultimately	weaker	 than	 the	 causer	 and	 therefore	subject	to	the	direction	of	its	inherent	force	tendency.			 	 Causer	 	 	 																Causee				 make,	force					 get,	have	Figure	11:	Illustration	of	Talmy’s	force-dynamic	model	for	make	&	force	versus	get	&	have.56																																																										55	See	section	3	below	for	some	motivation	and	supporting	evidence	for	these	intuitions,	but	ultimate	challenge	to	their	accuracy	as	a	characterization	of	the	different	meaning	of	these	verbs.	56	In	the	force-dynamic	literature,	a	more	detailed	schematic	convention	is	used	for	illustration.		The	extra	 information	 is	 not	 directly	 relevant	 to	 the	 discussion	 here.	 	 In	 Talmy’s	 (2000)	 notation,	
make/force	and	get/have	would	be	schematized	respectively	as	follows:	
	and .	
70	
 
Contrasting	with	the	effectuating	causative	verbs	are	the	enabling	causatives	like	let	and	allow.		For	these	verbs,	the	causer	does	not	necessarily	exert	a	force	on	the	causee,	but	rather	removes	an	impediment	–	whether	that	be	the	causer	itself	or	some	 other	 entity	 –	 to	 the	 causee’s	 desired	 action	 or	 state.	 	 If	 the	 potential	impediment	 is	 the	 causer	 itself,	 the	 causer	 causes	 by	 failing	 to	 impede.	 	 The	distinction	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 following	 different	 depictions	 of	 a	 water-draining	event:	(87)	 a.	 The	piston	squeezing	down	(made	the	water	drain/drained	the			 	 water)	from	the	tank.		 b.								*	The	plug	coming	loose	(made	the	water	drain/drained	the	water)			 	 from	the	tank.57		 c.	 The	plug	coming	loose	(let/allowed)	the	water	(to)	drain	from	the			 	 tank.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Talmy	2000,	505)	In	 (87a),	 an	 external	 device	 exerts	 a	 pressure	 on	 the	 patient	 (the	 water),	 which	pushes	 it	 through	 the	 drain.	 	 Since	 this	 is	 an	 example	 of	 effectuating	 causation	 (a	strong	 causer	 acting	 on	 a	 weaker	 causee),	 the	 make	 and	 the	 lexical	 causative	patterns	 are	 appropriate.	 	 In	 (87b),	 however,	 the	 event	 of	 the	 plug	 coming	 loose	does	not	represent	the	exertion	of	a	force	on	the	water,	but	rather	the	removal	of	a	force	 (the	 seal)	 that	 was	 preventing	 the	 desired/intrinsic	 result	 of	 the	 patient	(downward	motion).	 	This	satisfies	the	counterfactual	definition	of	causation	–	the	water	would	not	have	drained	from	the	tank	if	not	for	the	loosening	of	the	plug	–	but	introduces	an	additional	participant	that	the	causer	must	act	on	to	bring	about	the	result	state.	
																																																								57	This	sentence	might	be	felicitous	in	the	case	of	a	poorly	installed	plug	being	identified	as	the	cause	of	a	water	draining	event,	as	pointed	out	by	John	Beavers	(p.c.).	
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	 Although	Talmy	does	not	concentrate	on	such	scenarios,	his	model	might	be	extended	to	the	directive	case	of	enabling	causation	with	human	causer	and	causee,	for	 which	 the	 verbs	 let	 and	 allow	 represent	 an	 authority	 that	 removes	 an	 (often	unstated	 and	 social)	 obstacle,	 which	 frees	 the	 causee	 to	 exercise	 her	will.	 	 These	behaviors	are	reflected	in	the	verbs’	use:58	(88)	 a.	 “Let	the	meat	rest	20	to	30	minutes	after	cooking	to	let	the	juices			 	 settle	in	the	meat.”	 	 	 	 	(Washington	Post	1990)		 b.	 “Please	let	me	stay.		I’ll	behave.		No	profanity.		I	swear.”															 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 				(Esquire,	1998)		 c.	 “I	let	my	kids	decorate	their	rooms	any	way	they	want.”										 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Parenting,	1999)		In	(88a),	there	are	two	instances	of	let,	each	with	an	inanimate	object.		In	each	case,	the	 complement	 of	 the	 verb	 describes	 the	 natural	 tendency	 of	 the	 patient	 –	 if	undisturbed,	meat	will	“rest”	and	juices	will	“settle”	–	so	let	seems	to	mean	“remove	(or	don’t	create)	any	obstacles.”		In	(88b),	the	speaker	is	pleading	for	the	addressee	to	remove	what	is	likely	a	force,	probably	implied,	toward	his	or	her	removal,	and	in	(88c)	a	parent	describes	the	removal	or	non-enforcement	of	what	might	otherwise	be	considered	a	normatively	default	rule	governing	child	behavior.		In	each	case,	the	cause	 is	 an	 instance	of	 removal	 of	 (or	non-creation	on	 the	part	 of	 an	 authority	 to	create)	 an	 impediment	 on	 –	 to	 use	 force-dynamic	 terminology	 –	 the	 “agonist’s	intrinsic	 force.”	 	Social	causation	of	 this	 type,	 in	which	 the	causee	 is	human,	 is	 the	focus	of	Wierzbicka’s	(e.g.	1998)	approach	to	periphrastic	causative	verbs,	which	is	the	subject	of	the	next	section.	
																																																								58	 All	 collocation	 data	 and	 example	 sentences	 where	 not	 otherwise	 cited	 are	 from	 the	 Corpus	 of	Contemporary	American	English	(COCA),	maintained	by	Mark	Davies	at	Brigham	Young	University.	
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Although	Talmy’s	 framework	 is	 attractive	 in	 its	 simplicity	 and	 flexibility,	 it	fails	 to	 account	 for	 all	 –	 or	 even	 what	 are	 arguably	 the	 most	 interesting	 and	important	 –	 of	 the	meaning	 differences	 between	 the	 periphrastic	 causatives.	 	 For	example,	according	to	Talmy’s	model,	both	get	and	have	are	appropriate	in	causative	events	in	which	the	causer	overcomes	the	causee’s	intrinsic	force	tendency	toward	rest.		However,	these	verbs	are	not	synonymous,	as	demonstrated	in	the	difference	in	acceptability	of	the	sentences	below:	(89)	 a.	 The	police	got	the	protesters	to	disperse	by	meeting	their	demands.		 b.						??	The	police	had	the	protesters	disperse	by	meeting	their	demands.	In	both	sentences,	the	intrinsic	force	tendency	of	the	causee	(protesters)	is	toward	rest	 and	 they	 are	 opposed	 by	 the	 force	 tendency	 of	 the	 causer	 (the	 police),	 but	nothing	 in	 the	 force-dynamic	system	explains	why	(89a)	 is	 felicitous,	and	 (89b)	 is	not.	 	 To	 account	 for	 these	 differences,	 the	 desires	 and	motivations	 of	 the	 causee	must	be	represented.		The	Natural	Semantic	Metalanguage	approach	of	Wierzbicka	(e.g.	1998)	is	one	attempt	to	represent	these	kinds	of	meaning	distinctions.		
2.2	 Wierzbicka’s	(1998)	analysis	of	English	periphrastic	
causative	verbs	
	
2.2.1 Introduction 		 Wierzbicka	(1998)	models	the	differences	between	the	effectuating	causative	verbs	have,	get,	make,	and	 force	 in	terms	of	short	 lists	detailing	the	conditions	and	role	 bearer	 attitudes	 that	 she	 claims	 make	 each	 verb	 felicitous	 in	 context.	 	 Her	
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approach	is	 lexically	idiosyncratic	and,	 in	general,	she	rejects	the	notion	that	there	exist	a	priori	or	otherwise	extra-linguistic	types	of	causation	that	are	represented	by	the	English	periphrastic	causatives	(Wierzbicka	1998,	117).	 	 In	this	section,	I	posit	some	preliminary	descriptive	observations	and	provide	corpus	sentence	examples	to	 introduce	 and	 motivate	 her	 Natural	 Semantic	 Metalanguage	 approach	 to	 the	particular	verbs	of	interest	here,	beginning	with	causative	have.59	
 
2.2.2 Have 		 The	causative	verb	have,	as	in	(86a)	above,	She	had	him	mail	the	letter,	seems	to	occur	most	felicitously	with	animate,	agentive	patients.		In	the	cases	for	which	it	does	not,	as	for	sentences	containing	passive	participles	like	he	had	his	car	fixed,	an	unexpressed	agent	who	did	the	action	leading	to	the	state	expressed	is	understood.		The	verb	does	not	select	for	an	animate	or	animate-like	patient	if	it	is	conceived	as	non-agentive	or	somehow	unwilling:		(90)	 a.						??	She	had	the	cat	drink	the	milk		 b.						??	He	had	the	washing	machine	wash	the	clothes.			Wierzbicka	recognizes	this	feature	of	causative	have	and	claims	that	use	of	the	verb	suggests	a	hierarchical	relationship,	but	not	one	in	which	the	causer	has	unlimited	power	 over	 the	 causee,	 but	 rather	 the	 causee	 is	 “a	 cooperative	 performer	 of	 the	
																																																								59	 I	 should	note	 that,	 although	 I	do	not	have	any	major	disagreements	with	Wierzbicka’s	 semantic	intuitions,	 except	 for	 those	 regarding	 the	 verb	 make,	 I	 believe	 the	 periphrastics	 are	 much	 less	idiosyncratic	than	she	suggests,	as	will	be	explicated	below.	
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causer’s	will”	(Wierzbicka	1998,	121).60		She	represents	the	have	predicate	with	the	following	scenario	outline:	(91)	 Person	X	had	Person	Y	do	Z	=		 a.	 X	wanted	Z	to	happen	(to	W)		 b.	 because	of	this	X	wanted	Y	to	do	Z	(to	W)		 c.	 because	of	this,	X	said	something	to	someone		 d.	 because	of	this	Y	did	Z		 e.	 X	could	think	that	when	X	says	something	like	this	(about	something			 	 like	this)	Y	can’t	say:	“I	don’t	want	to	do	this”																			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Wierzbicka	1998,	120)		The	cooperative	nature	of	the	causee	in	performing	the	causer’s	will,	in	combination	with	 the	 lack	 of	 explicit	 causee	 desire	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 performed	 event	 is	 an	important	component	of	the	meaning	of	this	verb,	as	will	be	discussed	below.			
2.2.3 Get 			 The	 causative	 verb	 get,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 suggests	 cooperation	 of	 a	 less	enthusiastic	sort,	at	least	initially.		Like	have,	when	get	occurs	with	a	human	patient	it	signals	compliance,	but	does	not	require	that	the	patient	be	interested	specifically	in	performing	the	causer’s	will.		Similarly,	there	is	no	necessary	power	or	authority	that	 the	 causer	 has	 over	 the	 causee;	 rather	 the	 causer	 must	 do	 something	 that	somehow	influences	the	causee’s	desires	and	behavior.		In	general,	since	the	causee	must	be	made	 to	want	 to	do	whatever	 is	 caused,	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 causer	simply	wants	 the	 causee	 to	do	 something	 is	 insufficient	 for	get	 causation.	 	 This	 is	presumably	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 manipulative	 tone	 that	 often	 accompanies	 these	constructions,	 as	 in	 a	 sentence	 like	 he	 cleverly	 got	 the	 suspect	 to	 admit	 his																																																									60	For	a	pragmatic	account	of	similar	phenomena,	see	McCawley	(1968)	
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involvement	in	the	crime.	 	Get	can	also	take	nonhuman	complements,	as	in	I	got	the	
cat	to	drink	the	milk,	with	the	implication	that	the	agent	did	something	to	make	the	animal	want	to,	or	otherwise	be	willing	to,	perform	the	desired	action.		With	get,	the	patient	has	the	right	of	refusal	and	is	operating	according	to	its	own	will.		Sentences	in	the	corpus	are	consistent	with	these	intuitions,	as	the	examples	in	(141)	suggest:	(92)	 a.	 “…that’s	the	best	way	to	get	them	to	come	forward.”																 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 					(CNN	–	AM,	2006)		 b.	 “…a	number	of	us	have	been	trying	for	years	to	get	the	government	to			 	 recognize	it.”	 	 	 	 	 										(PBS	Newshour,	1990)			Wierzbicka	represents	the	behavior	of	get	as	follows:	(93)	 Person	X	got	person	Y	to	do	Z	=	
	 a.	 X	wanted	Y	to	do	Z		 b.	 X	knew	that	if	Y	didn’t	want	to	do	it	Y	would	not	do	it		 c.	 X	thought	that	if	Y	wanted	to	do	it	Y	would	do	it		 d.	 because	of	this	X	did	(said)	something	to	Y		 e.	 because	of	this	after	this	Y	wanted	to	do	Z		 f.	 because	of	this	Y	did	Z		 g.	 because	of	this	X	could	think:	“I	wanted	something	to	happen.		It			 	 happened”	 	 	 	 	 								(Wierzbicka	1998,	124)			The	 cases	 for	 which	 the	 patient	 is	 inanimate,	 as	 in	 the	 examples	 below,	 likely	represent	a	metaphoric	extension	of	this	scenario	–	or,	as	will	be	argued,	involving	a	different	kind	of	“wanting”.			(94)	 a.	 I	got	the	sauce	to	thicken		 	(Wierzbicka	1998,	123)		b.	 I	got	the	car	running	In	 most	 such	 cases,	 the	 patient,	 though	 inanimate,	 is	 conceived	 as	 having	 some	volitional	property,	and	in	particular	a	stubbornness,	which	must	be	manipulated	or	
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overcome.61	 	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 oddness	 of	 get	 when	 it	 occurs	 outside	 of	 a	context	of	effort	or	resistance,	as	in	context-neutral	?I	got	the	book	open.62		
2.2.4 Force 			 Force	 encodes	 direct	 compulsion.	 	 The	 patient	 of	 a	 force	 causative	 is	 non-cooperative,	but	has	no	right	of	refusal,	and	causation	is	typically	direct.		In	the	case	of	 inanimate	 patients,	 the	 distinction	 is	 again	 highlighted	 when	 compared	 to	 the	lexical	causative:	(95)	 a.	 Bill	opened	the	door.		 b.	 Bill	forced	the	door	open.	In	 (95b),	 there	 is	 an	 implication	 of	 resistance	 that	 is	 not	 present	 for	 (95a):	 #Bill	
forced	 the	 door,	 which	 easily	 relented,	 open.	 	 The	 pattern	 is	 extended	 for	 animate	patients,	for	whom	the	resistance	is	often	internal	–	emotional	or	cognitive.			(96)	 a.	 “…dry	leaves	will	inevitably	lead	to	huge	fires,	forcing	displacement	of			 	 deer,	elk,	and	upland	birds…”	 	 	 	(FieldStream,	2007)		 b.	 “…a	new	military	campaign	to	force	Muslims	from	their	homes	and			 	 villages…”	 	 	 	 	 												(ABC_Jennings,	1993)		 c.	 “The	court	forced	the	district	to	integrate.”	 (DenverNews,	2010)		The	resistance	of	the	causee	is	likewise	represented	in	Wierzbicka’s	explication:																																																										61	A	possible	exception	is	the	idiom	get	the	ball	rolling,	 for	which	resistance	is	not	obvious.	 	Part	of	the	meaning	of	 this	 idiom	plausibly	relies	on	a	relative	difficulty	of	overcoming	 inertia	 in	 initiating	some	process,	which	would	accord	with	the	generalization	given,	but	this	is	not	straightforward.	62	There	is	a	usage	of	get	that	occurs	in	sentences	like	I	just	need	to	get	my	shoes	on	and	I’ll	be	ready	to	
go.	 	 These	 present	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 generalization	 made	 here.	 	 One	 possible	 analysis	 of	 these	usages	 might	 claim	 that	 in	 sentences	 of	 this	 type	 something	 (a	 task)	 is	 preventing	 or	 delaying	 a	desired	outcome,	which	might	 then	 invest	 the	 task	with	a	sort	of	 figurative	resistance	and	 thereby	make	 get	 felicitous,	 but	 the	 details	 of	 such	 a	 proposal	 are	 not	 yet	 clear	 to	 me.	 	 Thanks	 to	 Steve	Wechsler	(p.c.)	for	pointing	out	these	constructions.	
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(97)	 Person	X	forced	person	Y	to	do	Z	(e.g.	to	apologize).	=		 a.	 X	wanted	Y	to	do	Z		 b.	 X	knew	that	Y	didn’t	want	to	do	Z		 c.	 X	thought	that	if	X	did	something	to	Y,	Y	would	have	to	do	Z		 d.	 because	of	this	X	did	something	to	Y		 e.	 because	of	this	Y	had	to	do	Z		 f.	 because	of	this	Y	did	Z		 g.	 Y	wouldn’t	have	done	Z	if	X	had	not	done	this	to	Y		 h.	 when	Y	was	doing	Z,	Y	thought:	“I	don’t	want	to	do	this”		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Wierzbicka	1998,	141)		The	desire	of	the	causee,	unlike	in	the	case	of	have,	 is	an	explicit	component	of	the	meaning	of	force.		
2.2.5 Make 			 According	to	Wierzbicka,	there	are	several	distinctive	uses	of	the	verb	make,	differing	both	 in	terms	of	verb	complement	and	subject	properties.	Typical	corpus	sentences	containing	causative	make	and	animate	patients	include	the	following:	(98)	 a.	 “When	they	were	far	enough	away	not	to	make	the	strange	horses			 	 nervous…”63				 	 	 	 	 											(Analog,	2000)		 b.	 “I	wanted	to	make	her	feel	better.”				 	 			(US	Catholic,	1998)		Common	to	sentences	of	this	type	is	the	emotional	or	otherwise	cognitive	nature	of	the	 caused	 event	 or	 state.	 	 	 For	 these	make	 constructions,	 Wierzbicka	 offers	 the	following	explication:																																																												63	Although	here	 the	 collocate	nervous	 is	 an	 adjective	 rather	 than	a	 verb,	 and	adjectival	 collocates	were	not	collected	for	causative	verbs	in	this	study,	the	generalization	that	animate	complements	of	
make	 select	 for	 cognitive	 features,	discussed	below,	 seems	 to	hold	 for	 this	 example.	 	 In	 any	 case,	 I	presume	the	relevant	details	are	consistent	with	an	elided	verb	feel	preceding	the	adjective.	
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(99)	 Person	X	made	person	Y	think/feel/want	something	=		 a.	 X	did	something		 b.	 because	of	this	Y	thought	something		 (b’	 because	if	this	Y	felt	something)		 (b’’	 because	of	this	Y	wanted	something)		 c.	 Y	wouldn’t	have	thought/felt/wanted	this	if	X	had	not	done	this		 	 	 	 	 	 	 													(Wierzbicka	1998,	130-134)		Another	make	causation	construction	type	is	that	for	which	the	verb	do	or	another	action	verb	occurs	in	the	complement	clause:	(100)	 a.	 “I’ll	make	you	dig	the	most.”		 	 									(Bk:	Salem	Falls,	2002)		 b.	 “It	may	make	him	pay	for	the	actual	harm	caused	by…”		 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	(EnvirAffairs,	1998)		For	 these	 sentences,	which	 I	will	 call	 “make	do”	 constructions,	 there	 is	 a	 coercive	reading	 resulting	 from	 a	 power	 differential,	 which	 Wierzbicka	 represents	 as	 in	(101):	(101)	 Person	X	made	person	Y	do	Z	=		 a.	 X	wanted	Y	to	do	Z		 b.	 Y	knew	this		 c.	 X	knew	that	if	X	didn’t	do	something	to	Y,	Y	wouldn’t	do	Z"		 d.	 because	of	this	X	did	(said)	something	to	Y		 e.	 because	of	this,	Y	thought	“I	have	to	do	it”		 f.	 because	of	this	Y	did	Z		 g.	 Y	wouldn’t	have	done	Z	(at	that	time)	if	Y	had	not	thought	this													 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 					(Wierzbicka	1998,	136)		For	the	“make	do”	pattern,	the	right	of	refusal	present	in	get	is	absent	or	diminished.		Substitution	of	make	in	a	sentence	like	I	tried	to	get	him	to	do	it,	but	he	refused	–	?I	
tried	to	make	him	do	it,	but	he	refused	–	is	less	felicitous.				 The	causer	of	a	“make	do”	construction	need	not	be	agentive.		Non-agentive	causers	occur	in	sentences	like	the	following:	(102)	 a.	 The	weather	made	us	cancel	the	event.		 b.	 The	noise	made	the	guests	leave.			
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These	 kinds	 of	 scenarios	 are	 directly	 analogous	 to	 that	 depicted	 in	 (101),	 absent	only	the	will	of	a	causer:	(103)	 Something	(X)	made	person	Y	do	Z	=		 a.	 person	Y	was	in	place	P		 b.	 something	(X)	happened	in	P	(e.g.	it	started	to	rain)		 c.	 because	of	this	Y	thought:	“I	have	to	do	something”		 d.	 because	of	this	Y	did	Z	(go	inside)		 e.	 Y	wouldn’t	have	done	Z	if	X	had	not	happened		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Wierzbicka	1998,	138)		Finally,	 the	 object	 of	 a	 make	 periphrastic	 causative	 need	 not	 be	 animate.	 	 The	significant	meaning	component	in	these	sentences	is	made	salient	when	compared	to	lexical	causatives:	(104)	 a.	 	 Henry	shattered	the	window.		 b.	 	 Henry	made	the	window	shatter.	Example	(104b),	 in	contrast	with	(104a),	 indicates	indirect	causation,	as	discussed	in	chapter	2.	 	While	(104a)	could	describe	a	scenario	in	which	Henry	punched	and	broke	 a	 window,	 (104b)	 would	 be	 dispreferred	 in	 such	 a	 context.	 	 “Make	 do”	causatives	 of	 this	 kind	 are	most	 felicitous	when	 something	 happens	 due	 to	 some	action,	 but	 nothing	 is	 done	 directly	 to	 the	 patient,	with	 an	 oftentimes-unexpected	result:	(105)	 Person	X	made	Z	happen	to	thing	Y	(e.g.,	open,	go	off)		 a.	 X	did	something		 b.	 because	of	this	something	(Z)	happened	to	thing	Y		 c.	 Z	wouldn’t	have	happened	to	Y	if	X	had	not	done	this		 d.	 X	didn’t	do	anything	to	Y		 e.	 because	of	this	people	could	think	that	Z	would	not	happen	to	Y		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 								(Wierzbicka	1998,	147)			 This,	however,	does	not	 seem	to	be	 the	whole	story	as	concerns	 the	 “make	do”	causative	construction,	as	 revealed	by	corpus	examples.	 	The	causative	 is	also	felicitous	when	the	means	of	causation	are	unknown	or	otherwise	unexpressed:			
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(106)	 “Who	can	make	the	disc	soar	highest,	furthest,	or	longest?”														 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 			(ChildDigest,	1998)		Contra	(105),	(106)	is	appropriate	even	when	the	agent	acts	directly	on	the	disc.		In	fact,	 (106)	 seems	 to	 be	 appropriate	 for	 nearly	 any	 kind	 of	 effectuating	 causal	interaction.	 	 Although	make	 typically	 signals	 a	 less	 direct	 causative	 event	 than	do	other	ways	of	expressing	causation,	such	as	lexical	or	morphological	causatives,	that	is	a	general	 feature	of	periphrastics	and	 is	common	to	all	 the	verbs	treated	 in	this	section,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 	 If	 these	 explications	 are	 taken	together,	 then,	 the	 periphrastic	 causative	make	 requires	 the	 internal	 (if	 animate)	(99),	 coercive	 (101),	 indirect	 (105),	 or	 unspecified	 (106)	 compulsion	of	 a	 patient.		When	it	is	expressed	in	this	way,	it	is	difficult	to	envision	an	effectuating	causative	scenario	 for	 which	 make	 would	 be	 obviously	 inappropriate.	 	 It	 is	 consequently	tempting	 to	 treat	make	 as	 a	 general	 causative.	 	 Despite	 this	 temptation,	 there	 is	some	evidence	for	polysemy:	(107)												??	John	made	Mary	happy	and	Bill	leave.	There	 is	 a	 zeugma	 effect	 for	 (107),	which	 is	 typically	 the	 result	 of	mixing	 senses.	This	suggests	that	there	are	at	least	separate	entries	corresponding	to	adjectival	and	verbal	 predicates	 of	 the	 small	 clause,64	 lending	 some	 plausibility	 to	Weirzbicka’s	multiplicity	 of	 explications.	 	 Among	 the	 directive	 effectuating	 periphrastic	causatives,	in	any	case,	make	seems	to	be	the	least	marked	of	the	set	and	is	probably	best	treated	as	a	general	causative	in	that	domain.		Furthermore,	although	the	point	will	not	be	argued	in	detail	here,	this	verb	will	be	treated	as	a	general	effectuating																																																									64	Perhaps	the	different	senses	are	better	characterized	semantically	than	syntactically:	?John	made	
Mary	feel	better	and	Bill	go	home.		Although	this	sentence	might	be	better	than	(26),	there	is	possibly	also	a	zeugma	effect	here.		
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causative	 even	 beyond	 the	 directive	 domain	 (with	 some	 noted	 exceptions	 and	complications)	below	and	in	the	next	chapter.				 A	more	 serious	 complaint	 than	 the	 lack	 of	 empirical	 coverage	 for	make	 is	with	the	Natural	Semantic	Metalanguage	approach	to	the	periphrastic	causatives	in	general,	and	what	that	approach	suggests	about	the	structure	(or	lack	of	structure)	of	their	meaning	differences.	 	Despite	the	intuitive	appeal	and	initial	plausibility	of	Wierzbicka’s	approach	to	the	meaning	of	 the	periphrastic	causative	verbs,	 there	 is	some	 evidence	 that	 these	 verbs	 can	 be	 differentiated	 from	 one	 another	 more	systematically,	without	stipulating	ad	hoc	explications.	 	 In	particular,	the	degree	of	resistance	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 causee	 –	 or,	 conversely,	 that	 of	 causee	 inclination	 –	appears	 to	 predict	 the	 choice	 of	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	without	 necessitating	the	more	 cumbersome	 and	 lexically	 idiosyncratic	 Natural	 Semantic	Metalanguage	scripts	 outlined	 above.	 	 This	 can	 be	 seen	most	 clearly	 in	 the	 cases	 for	which	 the	causee	is	animate,	although	it	can	in	principle	be	extended	to	the	general	case.	
	
2.3	 Summary					 Talmy’s	 analysis	 of	 the	periphrastics	 causatives	distinguishing	 the	 enabling	causatives,	for	which	the	intrinsic	force	tendency	of	the	causee	(antagonist)	is	in	the	same	direction	of	the	causer	(agonist),	from	the	effectuating	causatives.		Among	the	effectuating	causatives,	causatives	for	which	the	causee’s	intrinsic	force	tendency	is	
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toward	 rest	 are	 distinguished	 from	 those	 for	 which	 the	 intrinsic	 force	 tendency	opposes	that	of	the	causer.		This	approach	is	summarized	in	the	table	below:			
 Enabling Effectuating 
Opposed 
Causee 
    
Let + - - 
Allow + - - 
Get - + - 
Have - + - 
Force - + + 
Make - + + 	 Table	1:	Force-dynamic	characterization	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs.				 Wierzbicka	treats	the	causative	verbs	as	lexically	idiosyncratic	and,	as	such,	does	 not	 distinguish	 them	 in	 terms	 of	 features	 or	 paradigms.	 	 Despite	 this,	 the	description	of	the	verbs	can	be	distilled	into	a	number	of	distinguishing	properties	based	on	 the	causee’s	right	of	refusal,	 the	particular	 form	of	causing	action	on	 the	part	of	 the	causer,	 and	 the	desires	of	 the	causee.	 	One	possible	characterization	 is	given	below:								
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 Distinguishing properties 
      
Get Causee has right of refusal, Causer does or says something to make 
causee want to perform sub-event. 
Have Causee has no right of refusal, Causer says something to make causee 
perform sub-event 
Force Causee does not want to perform caused sub-event, Causer does 
something to causee which results in causee having to perform the 
sub-event 
Make 1 Causer does something that makes causee think/feel/want something 
Make 2 Causer does or says something that makes causee feel that causee has 
to perform sub-event 
Make 3 Something happens that makes causee feel that he/she has to perform 
sub-event 
Make 4 Causer does something that makes something happen to causee 	 Figure	12:	Summary	of	main	features	of	the	Natural	Semantic	Metalanguage	characterization	of	the	periphrastic	causatives.		In	the	following	section,	a	more	streamlined	and	predictive	treatment	of	these	verbs	will	be	proposed.	 			
3.	 Patient	Inclination	as	a	Feature	of	Periphrastic	Causative	
Verbs	
	
3.1	 The	inclination	continuum	
		 A	 feature	 that	 enriches	 the	 force-dynamic	 approach	 and	 allows	 for	 the	systemization	of	the	intuitions	behind	the	Natural	Semantic	Metalanguage	divisions	of	 the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	 in	English	 is	 that	of	patient	 inclination.	 	This	 is	related	to	a	property	that	Wierzbicka	notes	in	her	explication	for	force:	“when	X	was	doing	Z,	Y	thought	 ‘I	don’t	want	to	do	this’”	(97h).	 	By	“inclination,”	what	 is	meant	here	 is	one	particular	variety	of	a	disposition,	or	a	default	 tendency	of	 the	causee:	
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what	the	causee	would	do	or	experience	absent	interference	or	impediment.		In	this	way,	 inclination	 is	 the	social	variant	of	an	abstraction	of	Talmy’s	 forces,	which	are	themselves	essentially	physical	dispositions:	
	In	 the	 case	 of	 directive	 causation,	 inclination	 manifests	 as	 the	 willingness	 and	eagerness	 –	 sometimes	 expressed	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 hesitation	 or	 apprehension,	 as	discussed	 below	 –	 with	 which	 the	 causee	 performs	 or	 participates	 in	 the	 caused	event	or	 state.	 	These	notions	–	willingness,	 eagerness,	hesitation,	 apprehension	–	do	not	define	inclination,	but	they	are	all	more	salient	and	measurable	symptoms	of	preference	over	the	performance	of	or	participation	in	some	eventuality,	which	does	define	it:	(108)	 	 Definition:		 	 Inclination	is	a	scalar	measure	of	the	disposition	of	the	patient	in	a		directive	causative	event,	measuring	the	relative	evaluative	stance	toward	the	performance	of	the	caused	subevent.		The	 linguistic	 consequences	 of	 inclination	 and	 other	 varieties	 of	 dispositions	 are	discussed	in	the	following	sections.	Inclination	 is	 a	 gradable	 concept	 that	 may	 admit	 of	 borderline	 cases	 for	which	judgments	regarding	the	felicity	of	certain	causatives	can	vary.		Nevertheless,	there	exist	clear	cases	and	distinctions	that	can	be	made	in	terms	of	inclination	that	reliably	 predict	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 causative	 verbs	 examined	 here.	 	 By	 treating	inclination	 as	 Boolean,	 in	 fact	 –	 with	 values	 at	 polar	 extremes	 of	 the	 scale	 –	 the	
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meaning	differences	among	the	four	primary	directive	periphrastic	causative	verbs	can	 be	 parameterized.	 	 In	 this	 section,	 inclination	 is	 motivated	 and	 described	 in	terms	 of	 its	 relevance	 to	 the	 periphrastics	 and	 it	 is	 shown	 that,	 in	 at	 least	 one	possible	 typology,	 the	 primary	 directive	 periphrastic	 causative	 verbs	 exhaust	 the	logical	possibilities	of	 this	parameter.	 	Evidence	will	 include	relative	 felicity	under	embedding	by	 certain	 clausal	 complements	which	 seem	 to	 track	evaluative	 stance	toward	 some	 future	 event	 (fear	 and	 hope),	 modification	 of	 the	 caused	 event	targeting	 hesitation	 or	 resistance	 (despite	 his	 reluctance)	 and	 modification	 of	 its	head	by	inclinational	adverbs	(eagerly	and	grudgingly),	and	the	choice	of	the	causee,	extending	 the	 discussion	 somewhat	 beyond	 directive	 causation	 to	 inanimate	causees.		Evaluation	methodology	includes	both	traditional	acceptability	judgments	and	corpus	data,	beginning	with	the	former.	To	motivate	 the	 discussion	 of	 inclination	 and	 its	 effect	 on	 the	 periphrastic	causatives	examined	here,	it	is	useful	to	look	at	the	most	salient	division	among	the	verbs	discussed	here	 in	 terms	of	 that	parameter:	 the	 “enabling”	and	“effectuating”	causatives	(see,	e.g.	Talmy	2000),	as	introduced	in	section	2.1	above.		The	enabling	periphrastic	 causatives	 include	 let,	 allow,	 and	 of	 course	 enable.	 	 These	 verbs	 are	used	when	the	causee	removes	or	fails	to	erect	an	obstacle	to	the	prior	inclination	of	the	 causee.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 animate	 causees,	 this	 suggests	 an	 authority	 or	 power	differential	between	causer	and	causee:	(109)	 a.	 “Please	let	me	stay.		I’ll	behave.		No	profanity.		I	swear.”											(Esquire,	1998)		 b.	 “I	let	my	kids	decorate	their	rooms	any	way	they	want.”							(Parenting,	1999)	
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	The	 causative	 events	 described	 by	 the	 sentences	 in	 (109)	 can	 be	 satisfied	 by	 the	causer	 failing	 to	 perform	 any	 action	 whatsoever.65	 	 In	 contrast,	 the	 effectuating	causatives	require	positive	action	on	the	part	of	the	causer.		For	the	latter	verbs,	the	caused	event	is	not	in	alignment	–	and	in	some	cases,	is	in	dis-alignment	–	with	the	causee’s	inclination.		 Further	 distinctions	 can	 be	 made	 among	 the	 effectuating	 causatives	 using	more	 traditional	 terminology	 that	 can	 then	 ground	 a	 discussion	 in	 terms	 of	inclination.	 	Among	 these	 effectuating	 causatives	 (the	 periphrastics	 other	 than	 let	and	 allow),	 a	 distinction	 can	 be	 made	 between	 causation	 that	 involves	 the	manipulation	of	a	causee’s	will	(coercive	causation)	and	the	exercise	of	authority	or	force	 (compulsive	 causation),	 for	 which	 the	 causee’s	 will	 is	 either	 irrelevant	 or	explicitly	opposed.		Effectuating	causatives	include	get,	have,	make,	drive,	and	force.		Among	these,	get	is	the	clearest	exemplar	of	coercive	causation.		For	get-causation,	the	causee	must	 in	some	sense	be	a	willing	participant	 in	 the	action,	and	 it	 is	 this	willingness	that	the	causer	effectuates.		This	is	most	apparent	when	the	caused	state	involves	the	causee’s	desire	itself:	(110)	 a.	 John	got/??drove66/#allowed/#forced	Bill	to	want	to	do	it.		 b.	 John	#let/#had	Bill	want	to	do	it.67																																																									65	In	fact,	due	to	the	presence	of	the	free	choice	quantifier	any	in	(109b),	even	the	causee	need	not	do	anything	to	satisfy	this	sentence.	 	This	 illustrates	the	exceptional	nature	of	causatives	 let	and	allow	with	respect	to	the	definition	of	causation	requiring	entailment	of	the	caused	subevent.		See	footnote	52.	66	 Verb	 phrases	 like	 drove	 him	 to	 want	 to	 succeed	 are	 felicitous.	 	 The	 participle	 driven,	 which	idiomatically	means	 something	 like	 “ambitious”	when	 applied	 to	 people,	 seems	 to	 be	part	 of	what	makes	 these	 sentences	 possible.	 	 There	 are	 also	 many	 Google	 examples	 from	 fiction	 describing	romantic	passion	for	which	the	causee	seems	to	be	swept	away	or	otherwise	not	in	control:	…drove	
him	to	want	to	possess/conquer	her,	etc.	 	These	constructions	are	not	 inconsistent	with	the	account	given	here,	but	a	detailed	analysis	is	left	to	future	research.	
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	For	 coercive	 causation,	 then,	 it	 is	 the	will	 that	 is	 being	 acted	 upon	 by	 the	 causer.		This	 “will”,	 it	will	 be	 seen,	 is	more	 fruitfully	 thought	 of	 the	 patient’s	 inclinational	status.		A	summary	of	the	characterization	of	the	periphrastic	causatives	thus	far	is	given	below:			
 Enabling Effectuating Compulsive Coercive 
     
Let + - - - 
Get - + - + 
Have - + - - 
Force - + + - Table	2:	Preliminary	and	partial	analysis	of	periphrastic	causatives.		It	is	argued	below	that	these	divisions	can	be	simplified	and	their	differences	can	be	subsumed	under	the	notion	of	patient	inclination.		Reliable	tests	for	this	notion	are	somewhat	difficult	 to	construct,	however.	 	As	a	 first	approximation,	 the	notions	of	patient	 desire,	 apprehension,	 and	 willful	 opposition	 offer	 landmarks	 along	 an	inclinational	scale,	but	there	are	several	complications	that	will	be	outlined	and,	to	the	extent	possible,	met	below.				
3.2	 Embedding	contexts	for	inclined	and	resistant	causation		In	 the	 case	of	 enabling	 causatives,	 animate	 causees	appear	 to	be	eager	and	non-apprehensive,	 which	 manifests	 in	 felicitous	 embeddings	 under	 hope	 and	infelicitous	embeddings	under	fear:																																																									67	Note	that	make	is	felicitous	in	this	construction.		This	verb	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	below.	
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	(111)	 a.	 Bill	hoped	Mary	would	let	him	do	it.	 	 	 	b.							#	Bill	feared	Mary	would	let	him	do	it.	 	 		The	 verbs	 hope	 and	 fear	 indicate,	 respectively,	 positive	 and	 negative	 sentiment	toward	 an	 anticipated	 future	 eventuality.	 	 As	 such,	 in	 most	 cases	 they	 track	eagerness	 or	 resistance	 regarding	 that	 eventuality,	 insofar	 as	 individuals	 will	typically	be	eager	to	perform	an	action	toward	which	they	have	positive	sentiment	and	resistant	 in	 the	performance	of	negative	events.	 	The	proposed	reason	 for	 the	eagerness	and	non-apprehension	as	reflected	 in	 the	 judgments	with	hope	and	 fear	above	is	that	causee	of	let	is	an	inclined	patient,	which	means	that	let	represents	one	extreme	on	the	inclinational	scale:	(112)	 Definition:	An	 inclined	 causee	 prefers	 performing	 or	 participating	 in	 an	 eventuality	 to	not	 performing	 it.	 	 An	 inclined	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	 is	 a	 verb	whose	use	presupposes	an	inclined	causee.				That	sentences	embedded	under	hope	are	compatible	–	and	those	embedded	under	
fear	incompatible	–	with	an	agent	who	in	general	prefers	performing	an	event	to	not	performing	it	can	be	seen	in	sentences	that	do	not	include	a	periphrastic	causative	verb:	(113)	 a.	 Bill	hoped	he	would	win	the	race.		 b.							#	Bill	feared	he	would	win	the	race.			Barring	some	conflicted	feelings	about	winning	the	race	(see	discussion	below)	and	assuming	Bill	prefers	winning	to	losing,	(Bill)	will	win	the	race	is	incompatible	with	
fear.		None	of	the	other	periphrastic	causative	verbs	examined	here	show	the	same	
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behavior	 with	 hope	 and	 fear.	 	 They	 are	 either	 felicitous	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 have)	 or	marginally	felicitous	(as	for	get)	 in	either	construction,	or	anomalous	for	hope	and	felicitous	for	fear	(force).68		 At	the	other	extreme,	force-causation	involves	causees	that	are	apprehensive,	and	non-eager:	(114)	 a.							#	Bill	hoped	Mary	would	force	him	to	do	it.	 	 	b.	 Bill	feared	Mary	would	force	him	to	do	it.		The	causee	of	force	is	a	resistant	patient.	(115)	 Definition:	A	resistant	causee	prefers	not	performing	or	participating	in	an	eventuality	to	performing	 it.	 	 A	 resistant	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	 is	 a	 verb	whose	 use	presupposes	a	resistant	causee.			In	general,	hope	is	incompatible,	and	fear	compatible,	with	dispreference:	(116)	 a.							#	Bill	hoped	he	would	step	on	a	tack.		 b.	 Bill	feared	he	would	step	on	a	tack.		Except	 in	 the	case	of	a	 truly	bizarre	preference	structure,	(Bill)	will	 step	on	a	 tack	cannot	be	embedded	under	hope.	The	 inclinational	 relationships	 targeted	 by	 hope	 and	 fear	 are	 complicated	when	 an	 individual	 can	 act	 (and	 importantly,	 be	 cognitively	 and	 emotionally	inclined;	 in	 other	words,	 to	 feel)	 in	 opposition	 to	 himself,	 i.e.	 when	 a	 causee	 has	conflicting	desires.	 	For	example,	in	the	case	of	someone	with	a	history	of	avoiding	exercise	but	 a	desire	 to	 reap	 its	benefits,	 a	 sentence	 like	 (117a)	might	be	entirely	appropriate,	and	(117b)	has	a	perfectly	felicitous	reading:																																																										68	 These	 tests	 –	 as	well	 as	 complications	 and	 subtleties	 of	 interpretation	 –	 are	 discussed	 in	more	detail	below.	
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(117)	 a.	 Bill	hoped	his	personal	trainer	would	force	him	to	work	out.		 b.	 Bill	feared	his	advisor	would	let	him	procrastinate.	In	 both	 (117a)	 and	 (117b),	 Bill’s	 inclinations	 at	 one	 time	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 his	inclinations	 at	 a	 different	 time,	 allowing	 for	 non-anomalous	 mixtures	 of	 let	 with	apprehension	and	force	with	eagerness.		These	scenarios	–	in	which	an	individual’s	will	 is	divided	–	are	at	 the	 root	of	many	of	 the	 subtleties	of	 interpretation	 for	 the	periphrastic	causative	verbs.		 A	 distinction	 can	 be	 made	 between	 periphrastic	 causatives	 for	 which	 the	patient	is	inclined	and	those	for	which	the	patient	is	not	inclined.		Inclination,	as	an	indicator	 of	 preference,	 as	 defined	 in	 (108),	 consequently	 also	 measures	 the	willingness	and	eagerness	on	the	part	of	the	causee	to	perform	or	participate	in	the	caused	eventuality.		An	inclined	patient,	insofar	as	he	prefers	performing	the	action	to	 not	 performing	 it,	 is	 one	 who	 is	 not	 only	 willing,	 but	 is	 internally	 free	 from	hesitation	 or	 apprehension.	 	 Specifically,	 a	 person	 can	 be	willing	 to	 do	 something	even	 if	 he	 is	 apprehensive	 or	 not	 particularly	 happy	 to	 do	 so.	 	 Most	 responsible	people	experience	 that	state	of	affairs	often,	 in	 fact.	 	That	person	would	not	be	an	inclined	 causee	 in	 a	 causing	 event.	 The	 inclined	 periphrastics	 include	 let,	 and,	 as	suggested	 by	 (118b),	 get.	 The	 periphrastics	 whose	 patients	 are	 not	 inclined	 are	compatible	 with	 apprehension,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 object	 control	 constructions	with	fear,	as	discussed	in	the	preceding	paragraph	and	subject	to	the	complications	outlined	there:	(118)	 a.							#	Bill	feared	Mary	would	let	him	do	it.	b.							#	Bill	feared	Mary	would	get	him	to	do	it.	c.	 Bill	feared	Mary	would	have	him	do	it.	d.	 Bill	feared	Mary	would	force	him	to	do	it.	
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	As	suggested	above,	 there	are	some	complications	with	these	 judgments	having	to	do	 with	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 person	 can	 be	 at	 odds	 with	 himself	 or	 his	 own	inclinations.	 	For	example,	 if	Bill	knows	 that	he	 is	easily	manipulated	 to	 forget	his	better	judgment	and	willingly	do	things	he	wouldn’t	do	with	more	reflection,	(118b)	might	 be	 appropriate.	 	 Importantly,	 this	 case	 involves	 a	 situation	 for	 which	 the	patient	is	conceived	as	having	more	than	one	will,	which	can	be	in	opposition	to	one	another.69		In	other	words,	judgments	regarding	the	periphrastics	become	unstable	when	 the	will	 –	 and	 consequent	 inclination	 –	 of	 the	patient	 can	 vary	or	bifurcate.		This	is	predicted	by	the	analysis	presented	here.		Crucially	in	such	cases,	there	is	at	least	one	will	that	is	not	contradictory	with	the	desire	for	or	against	performing	the	event	under	hope	and	fear,	respectively,	allowing	felicity.		A	causee	that	is	conflicted	is,	in	some	sense,	neither	inclined	nor	resistant.		A	 further	 distinction	 can	 be	made	 between	 patients	 that	 are	 resistant	 and	those	 that	 are	 not	 resistant,	 which,	 since	 inclination	 is	 scalar,	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	inclined.		Causatives	whose	patients	are	resistant	represent	causation	in	opposition	to	the	desires	and	preferences	of	the	causee,	as	defined	in	(115),	and	are	therefore	incompatible	with	the	object	control	verb	hope:	(119)	 a.	 Bill	hoped	John	would	let	him	do	it.	b.							#	Bill	hoped	John	would	get	him	to	do	it.	c.	 Bill	hoped	John	would	have	him	do	it.	d.							#	Bill	hoped	John	would	force	him	to	do	it.70																																																									69	 Note	 also	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 get	 that	 means	 something	 like	 “select”,	 for	 which	 (32b)	 is	felicitous.	 	For	example,	Mary	 is	choosing	among	several	candidates	 to	perform	a	 task	and	chooses	Bill.		This	sense	of	get	seems	to	be	focus-sensitive	and	is	the	preferred	reading	when	stress	is	on	him	in	(118b)	(John	Beavers,	p.c.).	70	There	is	a	use	of	force	in	which	the	causation	is	not	necessarily	over	the	desires	of	the	causee,	but	rather	the	causee’s	decision	to	do	something	is	compelled	by	the	removal	of	other	live	options.		For	
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	Similar	caveats	apply	to	these	sentences	regarding	variation	and	bifurcation	of	will	as	 those	 that	 were	 outlined	 in	 the	 fear	 constructions	 mentioned	 above.	 	 In	particular,	if	there	is	a	split	will,	then	there	is	no	clear	preference	relation	between	performing	and	not	performing	an	event,	so	the	patient	is	both	not	inclined	and	not	resistant	and	therefore	neither	an	embedding	under	hope	nor	an	embedding	under	
fear	is	blocked.		 These	 embeddings	 provide	 a	 four-way	 distinction	 among	 the	 periphrastic	causatives,	summarized	in	the	table	below:		 hope	 fear	
Let	 +	 -	
Get	 -	 -	
Have	 +	 +	
Force	 -	 +		Table	3:	compatibility	of	periphrastic	constructions	under	embeddings.		The	following	section	provides	more	evidence	for	these	distinctions	via	the	behavior	of	the	periphrastic	constructions	under	modification	of	the	caused	subevent.		
3.3	 Get	and	the	modification	of	Inclined	and	Resistant	caused	
eventualities			 	Just	as	non-resistant	patients	are	incompatible	with	embeddings	under	fear,	periphrastic	 constructions	 whose	 patients	 are	 not	 resistant	 result	 in	 semantic	anomaly	 in	 sentences	 containing	 despite	 his/her	 reluctance	 modifying	 the	 caused																																																									example,	a	closed	road	can	force	someone	to	take	an	alternate	route.		Although	this	use	is	common,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	a	preferred	reading	of	directive	force.			
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subevent.		Reluctance,	like	fear,	is	a	consequence	of	dis-preference,	and	therefore	is	disallowed	with	non-resistant	causees:	(120)	 a.							#	Mary	let	Bill	do	it	despite	his	reluctance.	b.	 Mary	got	Bill	to	do	it	despite	his	reluctance.	c.							#	Mary	had	Bill	do	it	despite	his	reluctance.	d.	 Mary	forced	Bill	to	do	it	despite	his	reluctance.	These	 judgments	 are	 subject	 to	 problems	 depending	 on	 when	 the	 modifier	 is	interpreted	 to	 hold,	 as	 in	 the	 case	when	 the	modifier	 (120b)	 is	 contemporaneous	with	the	caused	event	rather	than	with	(or	before)	the	causing	event.		This	difficulty	disappears,	however,	when	the	reluctance	is	specified	as	prior	to	the	causing	event	and	suggested	to	have	been	assuaged:	(121)	 Bill	was	initially/#ultimately	reluctant	to	do	it,	but	Mary	(eventually)	got	him	to.		Indeed,	 the	 verb	 get	 appears	 to	 include	 a	 temporal	 component	 that	 is	 not	necessarily	 present	 in	 the	 other	 periphrastics	 –	 it	 encodes	 a	 transition	 from	 a	resistant	to	an	inclined	causee.		For	that	reason,	it	can	be	represented	as	being	both	inclined	and	resistant	at	one	 time	or	another.	 	 It	 is	possible	 that	an	 individual	can	fear	 manipulation,	 but	 nonetheless	 willfully	 and	 even	 eagerly	 engage	 in	 some	eventuality	when	manipulation	is	complete.	 	With	the	introduction	of	the	temporal	component	 and	manipulation	 of	 the	will,	 complexities	 abound.	 	 Examples	 such	 as	cognitive	 predicates	 –	 which	 seem	 to	 exist	 on	 the	 border	 between	 willed	 and	unwilled	–	and	manipulation	 into	performing	 illicit	activities	 further	 illustrate	 this	possibility:	(122)	 a.								?	Bill	hoped	John	would	get	him	to	understand.		 b.	 Bill	feared	John	would	get	him	to	commit	the	crime.		
94	
 
For	get,	 it	 is	 inclination	 itself	 that	 is	 the	 target	of	 the	causative	event.	 	The	causer	seeks	to	make	the	causee	inclined	or	not	resistant.	The	 dynamic	 character	 of	 get	 also	 results	 in	 complications	 in	 cases	 of	modification	 of	 the	 head	 verb	 of	 the	 caused	 subevent.	 	 These	 complications,	 like	those	 for	 (120)	 above,	 are	 contingent	 on	when	 the	modification	 is	 interpreted	 to	hold.	 	 In	particular,	 the	adverbs	eagerly	 and	grudgingly	 seem	 to	 specifically	 target	inclined	and	resistant	agents,	respectively,	of	a	verb	that	they	modify.		In	particular	for	 periphrastic	 constructions,	 eagerly	 is	 felicitous	 in	 the	 complement	 of	 inclined	causatives	 (123)	 and	grudgingly	 in	 the	 complement	 of	 resistant	 causatives	 (124).		Note	that	these	adverbs	should	be	read	in	the	low-scope	position,	as	depicting	Bill’s	state	of	mind,	not	Mary’s:			(123)	 a.	 John	let	Bill	do	it	eagerly.		 b.	 John	got	Bill	to	do	it	eagerly.		 c.							#	John	had	Bill	do	it	eagerly.71		 d.							#	John	forced	Bill	to	do	it	eagerly.		(124)	 a.							#	John	let	Bill	do	it	grudgingly.		 b.								?	John	got	Bill	to	do	it	grudgingly.		 c.							#	John	had	Bill	do	it	grudgingly.		 d.	 John	forced	Bill	to	do	it	grudgingly.	
	Sentence	 (124b)	 has	 a	 salient	 reading	 in	 which	 grudgingly	 is	 not	 interpreted	 as	contemporaneous	with	the	verb	it	modifies,	do,	but	instead	refers	to	the	evaluative	stance	 of	 the	 verb’s	 agent,	 Bill,	 at	 some	 other	 time	 prior	 to	 the	 causing	 event.		Assuming	 this	 use	 is	 felicitous,	 this	 gives	 another	 four	way	 contrast,	 analogous	 to	
																																																								71	 This	 sentence,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 example	 with	 force	 is	 felicitous	 if,	 e.g.	 John	 is	 Bill’s	 boss	 and	 the	appearance	of	eagerness	is	part	of	the	job	responsibility.		In	fact,	all	of	these	sentences	are	felicitous,	including	all	of	those	in	(124),	if	eagerness/grudging	is	read	as	being	part	of	what	is	caused/allowed.	
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that	generated	by	the	embedding	behavior,	differing	only	in	that	these	adverbs	seem	to	 locate	 the	 presence	 of	 either	 inclined	 or	 resistant	 causation,	 rather	 than	 its	absence,	as	illustrated	by	the	reversal	of	values	for	get	and	have	as	compared	to	the	embedding	typology:			 eagerly	 grudgingly	
Let	 +	 -	
Get	 +	 +	
Have	 -	 -	
Force	 -	 +		Table	4:	compatibility	of	periphrastic	caused	sub-events	with	adverbial	modification.		Like	 get,	 have	 too	 displays	 some	 interesting	 inclinational	 properties,	 which	 is	revealed	 by	 the	 choice	 of	 causee	 DP/NP	 in	 the	 complement	 clause	 of	 the	periphrastic	causative.		Causee	selection	is	the	subject	of	the	following	section.		
3.4	 Have	and	the	consequences	of	causee	selection		 	For	have,	while	full	inclination	in	terms	of	preference	–	resulting	in	freedom	from	 internal	 hesitance	 –	 is	 not	 required,	 lack	 of	 resistance	 –	 in	 terms	 of	 willful	opposition	 reflecting	 dispreference	 as	 defined	 in	 (115)	 –	 seems	 to	 be	 taken	 for	granted.		This	requires	a	causee	that	is	capable	of	suspending	his	will	to	perform	the	will	of	the	causer.		The	conditions	for	such	a	suspension	are	usually	socially	complex	and	are	exemplified	in	the	employee/employer	contractual	relationship.		This	places	an	 animacy	 constraint,	 and	 in	 most	 cases	 a	 human	 constraint,	 on	 the	 causee	
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argument.72	 It	 seems	 that	 it	 is	 only	 in	 training	 contexts,	 for	which	 the	 causee	 can	operate	 as	 a	 relatively	 unmediated	 performer	 of	 the	 causee’s	 will,	 is	 the	 human	requirement	relaxed:	(125)	 a.	 The	executive	had	the	secretary	mail	the	letter.		 b.						??	John	had	the	cat	drink	the	milk.		 c.	 Over	many	months,	John	trained	his	dog	to	automatically	drink	from		his	water	dish	on	command.		To	show	off	the	feat,	John	had	the	dog		drink	the	water	in	front	of	guests.		To	 be	 the	 causee	 in	 have-causation,	 an	 entity	 must	 be	 capable	 of	 being	 an	unmediated	agent	of	the	causee’s	will.73		Perhaps	even	the	animacy	requirement	can	be	relaxed	in	cases	where	the	causee	is	conceived	as	such74	(126),	but	it	is	clear	that	the	will	of	the	patient	is	subjugated	to	that	of	the	causer	for	have	(127).	(126)	 	 The	programmer	had	the	robot	introduce	itself.	(127)	 	 The	hypnotist	had	the	man	cluck	like	a	chicken.	In	this	way,	conversely	to	the	way	in	which	causees	of	get	are	–	at	different	times	–	both	 resistant	 and	 inclined,	 those	 of	 have	 are	 neither	 resistant	 nor	 inclined.	 	 To	stretch	 the	 terminology	 somewhat,	 if	 the	 patients	 of	 verbs	 like	 let	 are	 clearly	inclined	 and	 those	 for	 force	 are	 resistant,	 they	 might	 best	 be	 considered	 “un-inclined”	for	have	(unmarked	for	inclination	or	resistance)	and	“trans-inclined”	for	
get	(representing	a	transition	from	resistant	to	inclined).		 The	 requirements	 that	 an	 inclinational	 profile	 of	 have	 puts	 on	 a	 patient	requires	 the	 willful	 suspension	 of	 –	 at	 least	 the	 display	 or	 expression	 of	 –																																																									72	Note	 that,	 since	 the	 focus	here	 is	 on	directive	 causation,	 all	 of	 the	 relevant	 sentences	 examined	here	have	an	animacy	 contraint,	 but	only	have	 lacks	another	usage	or	 sense	 that	 allows	 inanimate	causees	(except	the	special	usages	discussed	below).	73	 This	 feature	 of	 have	 makes	 it	 a	 directive	 causative	 par	 excellence	 and	 is	 sometimes	 used	 to	exemplify	that	causative	situation	type	(Shibatani	1976)	74	A	director	can	have	a	lamp	break	in	the	third	act,	for	example	(Heidi	Harley,	p.c.).		In	this	scenario,	the	entire	environment	is	subject	to	the	will	of	the	causer.		
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inclinational	 stance.75	 	 This	 is	 usually	 impossible	 for	non-human	animate	 causees,	but	the	possibility	of	a	training	scenario	as	in	(125c)	and	other	suspensions	of	will	as	in	(126)	invite	the	question	of	whether	the	animacy	requirement	can	be	relaxed	in	 certain	 environments	 of	 total	 control	 even	 if	 the	 causee	 is	 not	 conceived	 as	animate	or	under	the	unmediated	control	of	the	causer.		Indeed:	(128)	 	 The	director	had	the	car	explode	ten	minutes	into	the	chase.	This	 example	 still	 seems	 to	 be	 an	 instance	 of	 directive	 causation	 insofar	 as	 the	director	is	presumably	not	personally	manipulating	the	car,	but	rather	ordering	(or	directing)	 others	 to	 do	 so.	 	 The	 (implicit)	 causee	 of	 the	 causative	 verb	must	 be	 a	volitional	agent.		The	parameter	of	volition,	in	fact,	seems	to	track	inclination	in	the	case	of	directive	causation.		 The	notion	of	 inclination	 is	related	to	the	parameter	of	volition	 in	that	they	are	 both	 measures	 of	 the	 will.	 	 While	 the	 scale	 that	 the	 directive	 periphrastic	causatives	are	sensitive	to	 is	 inclination,	as	argued,	volition	is	often	easier	to	track	and	 can	 perhaps	 sometimes	 serve	 as	 a	 diagnostic	 indicator	 for	 the	 property	 of	interest.	 	Although	volition	is	grammatically	marked	in	some	languages,	that	is	not	the	 case	 in	 English.	 	 Nevertheless,	 there	 do	 exist	 predicates	 in	 English	 for	 which	volitionality	 is	 lexically	 encoded,	 as	well	 as	 adverbs	 that	 specify	 volitional	 status.		For	highly	volitional	verbs,	like	believe,	only	causatives	with	inclined	patients	seem	to	be	felicitous:76	
																																																								75	Note	that,	in	strict	adherence	to	the	definitions	above,	while	a	causee	of	a	have	event	might	in	fact	have	some	inclinational	stance,	the	use	of	have	makes	no	such	presupposition.	76	There	seems	to	be	an	interaction	here	with	stativity,	as	well,	as	can	be	seen	by	the	felicity	for	all	verbs	when	believe	it	is	replaced	by	murder	Felix	(John	Beavers,	p.c.).		See	below	for	clearer	evidence	that	the	volitionality	of	these	verbs	differ.	
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(129)	 a.	 John	let	Bill	believe	it.		 b.	 John	got	Bill	to	believe	it.		 c.								#John	had	Bill	believe	it.		 d.							#	John	forced	Bill	to	believe	it.	Inclination	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 volitionality,	 however.	 	 In	 particular,	 none	 of	 the	causatives	 are	 felicitous	 in	 non-volitional	 sentences	 (130),	 while	 all	 (with	 the	possible	exception	of	force)	are	appropriate	when	volition	is	made	explicit	(131):77	(130)	 a.							#	John	let	Bill	inadvertently/accidently	do	it.		 b.						??	John	got	Bill	to	inadvertently/accidently	do	it.		 c.							#	John	had	Bill	inadvertently/accidently	do	it.		 d.						??	John	forced	Bill	to	inadvertently/accidently	do	it.	(131)	 a.	 John	let	Bill	purposefully/intentionally	do	it.		 b.	 John	got	Bill	to	purposefully/intentionally	do	it.		 c.	 John	had	Bill	purposefully/intentionally	do	it.		 d.								?	John	forced	Bill	to	purposefully/intentionally	do	it.		It	is	clear	from	these	examples	that	volitionality	is	not	a	deterministic	parameter	for	the	selection	of	periphrastic	causative	verb.		Rather,	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	are	sensitive	to	a	finer-grained	notion	–	that	of	relative	resistance	versus	eagerness	–	which	is	what	has	been	referred	to	here	as	“inclination”	and	discussed	above.	 	In	the	 following	 sections,	 however,	 it	 will	 be	 observed	 that	 volitional	 predicates	sometimes	 track	 inclination	 in	 measurable	 ways,	 vindicating	 acceptability	judgments	like	those	in	(129).	For	sentences	with	an	inanimate	syntactic	causee	like	(128),	then,	there	still	exists	some	unexpressed	causee	or	causees	capable	of	performing	the	causer’s	own	
																																																								77	There	is	apparently	speaker	variation	regarding	the	judgment	for	(130a),	but	to	my	intuition	this	sentence	 is	 clearly	 infelicitous	 as	 long	 as	 causation	 is	 interpreted	 as	 being	 strictly	 directive.	 	 The	situation	 in	which	you	 see	 someone	about	 to	 accidently	 step	 into	 an	open	manhole	 cover	 and	you	“let”	 them	 do	 so	 by	 not	 warning	 them,	 for	 example,	 is	 not	 a	 directive	 causing	 event.	 	 The	 crucial	notion	for	a	directive	let	causative	is	that	of	permission.	
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will	 and	 further	 capable	 of	 suspending	 their	 own.	 	 As	 is	 the	 case	 of	 (125a),	 the	disposition	 targeted	 by	 the	 choice	 of	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	 is	 still	 that	 of	inclination.	 	 Or,	 more	 precisely,	 lack	 of	 inclination.	 	 For	 other	 felicitous	 uses	 of	periphrastic	causatives	with	inanimate	causees,	however,	there	is	no	covert	animate	agent	 to	 perform	 the	 caused	 action,	 and	 instead	 the	 causer	 must	 in	 some	 way	manipulate	the	causee,	which	relaxes	requirements	on	causee	selection.		These	are	no	 longer	 directive	 causative	 scenarios,	 but	 manipulative	 ones,	 and	 the	 relevant	parameter	for	the	selection	of	a	periphrastic	verb	is	no	longer	that	of	inclination,	but	some	other	variety	of	disposition.			In	the	case	of	manipulative	causation,	it	is	likely	that	the	relevant	disposition	is	just	inherent	direction	of	motion	(or	rest)	as	dictated	by	relevant	physical	forces	(or,	to	be	less	blatantly	circular	as	a	description	of	causation,	relevant	physical	fields	as	 described	 functional-dependently	 by	 field	 equations),	 whether	 that	 be	gravitational,	magnetic,	weak	nuclear,	van	der	Waals,	etc.,	as	described	by	physical	science.		These	types	of	causative	scenarios	are	similar	to	those	described	in	Talmy’s	force-dynamic	 model,	 absent	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 agonist’s	 (causer)	 inherent	 force	tendency,	which	 is,	 after	all,	 always	 in	 the	direction	of	 the	sub-event	 for	causative	events.	 	 Here,	 as	 above,	 it	 is	 the	 disposition	 of	 the	 causee	 that	 is	 relevant	 for	 the	selection	of	periphrastic	causative	verb.	 	So	 for	example,	gravitational	 interactions	are	 responsible	 for	 the	 selection	 patterns	 in	 (132)	 and	 magnetic	 interactions	 in	(133),	but	in	both	cases,	let	 is	used	when	the	caused	subevent	is	in	alignment	with	the	causee’s	disposition,	and	force	is	used	when	they	are	opposed:			
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(132)	 a.							 John	forced	the	boulder	(to	go)	up	the	hill.		 b.							#	John	let	the	boulder	(go)	up	the	hill.		 c.							#	John	forced	the	boulder	(to	go)	down	the	hill.		 d.									 John	let	the	boulder	(go)	down	the	hill.		(133)	 a.							 John	forced	the	two	negative	magnetic	poles	(to	go)	together.		 b.							#	John	let	the	two	negative	magnetic	poles	(go)	together.		 c.							#	John	forced	the	negative	and	positive	magnetic	poles	(to	go)	together.	d.							 John	let	the	negative	and	positive	magnetic	poles	(go)	together.		 		
Get	 is	 used	 when	 a	 disposition	 is	 overcome,	 usually	 with	 an	 effectuating	 action	followed	by	self-sustaining	activity	–	as	is	the	case	for	directive	causation,	there	is	a	change	in	disposition:	(134)	 a.	 John	got	the	ball	rolling.		b.							#	John	got	the	rock	to	drop.				In	(134a),	 the	static	 inertia	of	 the	ball	 is	overcome,	 followed	by	movement	 inertia,	representing	 a	 change	 in	 disposition,	 while	 in	 (134b)	 there	 is	 no	 disposition	transition	and	so	get	is	infelicitous.		Note	that	this	is	consistent	with	cases	in	which	an	initial	resistance	might	be	followed	by	a	stable	result	state	(like	rest),	so	John	got	
the	boulder	up	the	hill	 is	 felicitous	 if	 there	 is	some	result	state,	however	brief,	of	 it	being	 on	 top	 of	 the	 hill.	 	 As	 stated	 before,	 have	 is	 infelicitous	 in	 manipulative	causation	events,	since	inanimate	objects	are	(usually)	incapable	of	suspending	their	dispositions	in	obedience	of	the	will	of	a	causer.	In	the	sections	that	follow,	directive	causation	will	continue	to	be	the	primary	empirical	domain	of	study.		Furthermore,	in	the	corpus	studies	below	the	feature	of	volition	will	 initially	 serve	 as	 the	 focus	 of	 inquiry	 as	 a	more	 identifiable	 property	than	 inclination	 and	 as	 something	 that	 seems	 to	 track	 it,	 however	 roughly.	 	 This	
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focus	will	 then	shift	to	more	penetrative	analyses	based	on	preliminary	surveys	in	which	inclination	will	itself	be	measured	explicitly.	
3.5	 Summary				 The	discussion	above	might	be	 schematized	by	 the	 following	 complete,	but	ultimately	potentially	misleading	typology,	to	be	revised:			 Inclined	 Resistant	
Let	 +	 -	
Get	 +	 +	
Have	 -	 -	
Force	 -	 +	Table	5:	inclination	and	resistance	for	representative	periphrastics			Although	 there	 are,	 as	 represented	 in	 this	 table,	 two	 inclinational	 dimensions	distinguishing	the	periphrastic	causatives,	this	is	logically	inconsistent	at	any	single	point	 in	 time,	 since	 “inclined”	 and	 “resistant”,	 rather	 than	 being	 two	 independent	parameters,	are	gradable	antonyms	on	a	single	dimension	–	they	cannot	both	hold	simultaneously.	 	 If	 the	 periphrastics	 are	 assumed	 to	 encode	 values	 for	 this	parameter	statically,	this	would	exclude	get	from	the	logical	typology.		Its	presence	in	the	typology	crucially	depends	on	the	two	features	holding	at	different	times:	one	before	 the	 causing	 event	 and	 the	 other	 after	 it.	 	 For	 that	 reason,	 the	 typology	requires	 for	 clarity	 a	 distinction	 in	 the	 time	 that	 the	 inclinational	 measure	 holds	relative	 to	 the	 causing	 event.	 	 However,	 a	 four-way	 typology	 with	 two	 possible	values	before	the	cause	and	after	it	now	excludes	have,	which	is	neither	inclined	nor	resistant	either	before	or	after	the	cause,	and	creates	a	gap.		To	include	have,	there	
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must	 be	 an	 option	 among	 the	 periphrastics	 for	 unmarked	 values,78	 creating	 even	more	 gaps.	 	 This	 allowance	 generates	 the	 following	 exhaustive	 but	 no	 longer	exhausted	while	perhaps	more	transparent	typology:		 Before	Cause	Event	 After	Cause	Event	
Let	 inclined	 inclined	
Get	 resistant	 inclined	
Have	 (unmarked)	 (unmarked)	
Force	 resistant	 resistant		 Table	6:	revised	typology	of	periphrastic	causatives	based	on	inclination	and	time.		This	 typology,	 in	 turn,	 reflects	 points	 along	 the	 single	 inclination	 continuum,	reflected	by	the	tests	given	here	focusing	on	the	extreme	polar	values:		
	 	 	 let				>>				get			/			have				>>					force									INCLINED	 Causee	Inclination																			RESISTANT			 Figure	13:	Patient	Inclinational	hierarchy	for	selected	English	periphrastic	causatives.		In	 the	 following	 section,	 an	 attempt	 is	made	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	these	causative	verbs	in	terms	of	the	head	verbs	they	select	for	with	the	hypothesis	that	inclination	will	emerge.		As	a	more	salient	measure	on	individual	lexical	items,	volition	 will	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 preliminary	 observations	 of	 the	 survey	 in	 the	
																																																								78	A	typology	of	the	sort	given	in	the	chart	below	might	also	be	too	strong	in	its	characterization	of	
get,	which	is	arguably	not	necessarily	resistant	before	the	causing	event,	but	just	not	inclined,	or	not	necessarily	inclined	after	the	causing	event,	just	not	resistant.	 	In	this	characterization,	get	might	be	better	 specified	 as	 unmarked	 prior	 to	 the	 causing	 event	 or	 after	 it,	 so	 long	 as	 it	 represents	 an	inclinational	transition	of	some	kind,	but	this	possibility	is	not	pursued	here.	
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following	 section,	 with	 a	 returned	 focus	 on	 inclination	 proper,	 based	 on	 these	results,	in	the	section	that	follows	it.		
4.	 Corpus	Studies			
4.1	 Introduction	and	Methodology			 A	hypothesis	 following	 from	the	preceding	discussion	 is	 that	a	periphrastic	causative	 verb	 will	 display	 selectional	 biases	 on	 the	 predicate	 of	 the	 caused	subevent,	insofar	as	the	predicate	encodes	inclination.		A	further	hypothesis	is	that	these	 inclinational	 properties	 can	 possibly	 be	 tracked	 by	 the	 more	 clearly	identifiable	notion	of	volition	as	encoded	by	the	selected	predicate.		To	collect	data	bearing	on	the	selection	biases	of	periphrastic	causatives,	a	latent	semantic	analysis	was	performed	via	a	search	of	right	collocates	–	argument	positions	–	of	the	verbs	in	the	Corpus	of	Contemporary	American	English	(COCA).	 	The	COCA	is	a	450	million	word	 balanced	 corpus,	 equally	 divided	 among	 spoken,	 fiction,	 popular	magazines,	news	texts,	and	academic	publications,	as	well	as	by	year	for	each	year	from	1990-2015	(http://corpus.byu.edu/	coca/).			The	 data	 presented	 here	 were	 obtained	 by	 searching	 for	 verb	 lemmas	following	 “X	me|him|it	 (to)”,	 where	 X	 is	 one	 of	 eight	 causative	 verbs.79	 	 For	 each	verb,	the	five	most	frequent	verb	lemmas	among	all	verbal	collocates	in	the	corpus																																																									79	Unambiguously	singular	pronouns	were	searched	in	order	to	keep	the	frames	consistent	and	avoid	potential	confounds.		Her	was	omitted	due	to	the	homophonous	possessive	pronoun.		Note	that	it	is	included	 despite	 the	 focus	 in	 this	 chapter	 on	 directive	 causation,	 for	which	 the	 causee	 is	 animate.		This	is	due	to	a	desire	for	general	coverage	and	for	consistency.	
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were	collected,	resulting	in	a	list	of	verb	lemmas	(the	horizontal	x-axis	in	the	graphs	below).		Each	of	the	verb	lemmas,	then,	is	among	the	most	frequent	collocates	of	at	least	one	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs,	and	the	frequency	for	each	member	of	this	list	of	collocates	were	collected	for	each	periphrastic	causative	verb	expression,	allowing	 for	 a	 stable	 comparison	 set	 of	 collocates	 for	 the	 verbs	 of	 interest.	 	 The	vertical	y-axes	of	the	graphs	represent	the	number	of	occurrence	in	the	periphrastic	frame	({periphrastic}	NP	(to)	[V])	for	each	word	V	on	the	x-axis	normalized	by	the	total	number	of	occurrences	of	that	word	(or	in	this	case,	 lemmatized	verb,	[V])	in	the	entire	corpus.		For	a	given	periphrastic	causative	X	and	verb	y,	the	frequency	F	(the	value	of	the	y-axis	in	the	graphs	below)	is	given	by:	
(135)	 	 	 	
€ 
FX (y) =
#of ([X]me | him | it(to)[y])
#of [y] 	This	normalization	will	 be	 referred	 to	hereafter	 as	 “collocate	normalization”.	 	The	results	of	 this	procedure	 for	 the	periphrastic	 causative	verbs	are	presented	 in	 the	following	section.			First,	 though,	 to	get	an	 idea	of	how	certain	collocate	verbs	vary	 in	 terms	of	selection	biases	of	the	periphrastic	causatives,	the	frequencies	of	the	representative	verbs	 be,	 do,	 and	 ask	 are	 shown	 here.	 	 These	 data,	 unlike	 those	 in	 the	 following	sections,	are	normalized	by	the	periphrastic	verb	frequency	in	the	corpus	to	control	for	frequency	biases	among	the	relevant	comparison	set.		In	other	words,	the	y-axis	values	for	the	graphs	in	this	section	are	calculated	by	an	equation	similar	to	(135),	but	 with	 the	 number	 of	 occurrences	 in	 the	 corpus	 of	 the	 relevant	 periphrastic	
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causative	verb	in	the	causative	frame	in	the	denominator.80		This	will	be	referred	to	as	 “periphrastic	 normalization”.	 	 These	 graphs	 provide	 a	 snapshot	 of	 the	 varying	selectional	preferences	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs.		
	
	Figure	14:	Graphs	for	frequencies	of	some	verbs	with	the	periphrastics.																																																									80	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 119	 occurrences	 of	 ([cause]	me|him|it	 to	 [be])	 in	 the	 corpus,	 and	 1853	occurrences	 of	 ([cause]	 me|him|it	 to	 V)	 for	 any	 verb	 V	 in	 the	 corpus,	 resulting	 in	 a	 frequency	 of	119/1853	=	0.06422,	the	value	for	the	leftmost	bar	in	the	first	graph.	
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As	these	graphs	illustrate,	there	is	wide	variation	in	the	selectional	preferences	for	various	verbs	among	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs.	As	 mentioned,	 the	 following	 data	 is	 normalized	 by	 the	 total	 number	 of	occurrences	of	each	collocate	verb	in	the	corpus	–	so	variation	in	relative	frequency	rankings	is	a	true	reflection	of	variation	in	selectional	preferences	among	the	verbs	and	 not	 an	 artifact	 of	 verb	 frequency.	 	 Data	 and	 graphs	 of	 non-normalized	 log-frequencies,	as	well	as	 those	normalized	by	 frequency	of	 the	causative	verb	 for	all	periphrastics	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 data	 appendix.	 	 In	 section	 4.2,	 a	 survey	 of	 the	corpus	 results	 is	 presented	 along	 with	 some	 preliminary	 observations	 about	selectional	behavior	with	respect	to	volition.		In	section	4.3,	inclination	per	se	will	be	targeted	via	a	narrower	analysis	of	these	data.		
4.2	 Corpus	Results	and	Volition			 In	the	case	of	directive	causation,	volition	of	the	causee	is	assumed	here	to	be	encoded	by	the	periphrastic	causative	verb.		In	the	semantics	given	below,	this	will	be	made	explicit	via	the	inclusion	of	a	DO	operator.	 	However,	volition	plays	out	in	different	ways	 for	 the	different	verbs,	as	will	be	demonstrated,	and	not	all	uses	or	senses	of	the	periphrastics	are	directive,	so	frequent	verb	collocates	were	collected	that	 seem	 to	be	non-volitional.	 	One	 rough	 test	 for	non-volitionality	 is	 infelicity	 in	the	imperative.		Below,	judgments	for	that	test	are	given	for	the	collocate	verb	set:			
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		(136)	 	 a.	 Be	quiet!/#Be	tall!		 	 b.	 Take	a	cookie!		 	 c.	 Work	harder!		 	 d.						??	Seem	friendly!		 	 e.							#	Know	the	answer!		 	 f.	 Stay	away!		 	 g.	 Lose	the	jacket!/#Lose	your	keys!		 	 h.	 Do	it	now!		 	 i.	 Talk	louder!		 	 j.								#	Happen!		 	 k.								?	See	the	bird!		 	 l.	 Let	me	go!		 	 m.						?	Miss	school!/#Miss	Mary!		 	 n.	 Leave	school!		 	 o.	 Stop	doing	that!		 	 p.	 Ask	me	anything!		 	 q.	 Look	at	that!/??Look	pretty!		 	 r.	 Come	here!		 	 s.								?	Fall	down!		 	 t.	 Make	it	happen!/Make	a	birdhouse!		 	 u.	 Feel	better!/#Feel	happy!		 	 v.	 Tell	me	a	secret!		 	 w.	 Get	a	book	from	the	shelf!/Get	excited!		 	 x.	 Try	harder!		 	 y.	 Think	about	it!		 	 z.	 Go	away!		Based	 on	 these	 judgments,	 non-volitional	 or	 less	 volitional	 verbs	 include	 know,	
happen,	be,	feel,	lose,	seem,	look	(in	one	sense),	see,	miss,	and	fall.		The	volitionality	of	the	collocate	verb	has	measurable	effects	on	selection	patterns,	as	will	be	seen.		 As	described	in	previous	sections,	the	effectuating	causatives	like	get,	make,	and	 force	 differ	 from	 the	 enabling	 causatives	 like	 let	 and	 allow.	 	 The	 enabling	causatives	involve	the	removal	of	an	obstacle	and	so	the	causer	does	not	oppose	the	will	 or	 tendency	 of	 the	 causee.	 	 But	 let	 and	allow	 also	 seem	 to	 have	 an	 extended	meaning	 rooted	 in	 politeness.	 	 It	 appears	 that	 these	 verbs	 signal	 respect	 by	
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suggesting	 that	 the	 addressee	 has	 the	 social	 authority	 or	 status	 to	 impede	 the	activity	denoted	by	the	complement	clause.		This	might	be	the	source	of	expressions	like	 let	 me	 ask	 and	 its	 variants,	 which	 is	 typically	 followed	 immediately	 by	 the	question	the	speaker	intended	to	pose:	(137)	 a.	 “All	right,	let	me	go	back	to	the	question	of	the	budget…”	 		 	 	 	 	 	 											 	 											(ABC_Brinkley,	1996)		 b.	 “Let	me	bring	you	back	in	this	conversation”							(NPR_Saturday,	2002)		 c.	 “Let	me	just	touch	on	the	rest	of	the	story”							(NPR_TalkNation,	2007)			There	 is	 also	 a	 construction	 involving	 knowledge,	 in	 which	 the	 addressee	 is	expected	 to	 have	 some	 information	 and	 the	 speaker	 asks	 her	 to	 abstain	 from	withholding	it	by	requesting	of	her	to	let	me	know:	(138)	 	 “I	tried	to	let	him	know	how	important	he	was.”							(SportingNews,		2009)	 		These	constructions	are	so	common,	in	fact,	that	they	are	dominantly	represented	in	the	collocate	normalized	complement	clause	distribution:		
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Figure 15: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of let.81 
 
Note that, despite the relatively high frequency of non-volitional know due to the “let X 
know” construction – let is still extremely rare with nonvolitionals like feel and seem.  
This is predicted by the inclinational status of let as encoding an inclined causee and the 
coarse-grained relation, but robust correllation, between inclination and volition.   
																																																								81	 To	 take	 this	 verb	 and	 its	 most	 frequent	 collocate	 as	 an	 illustration	 of	 method,	 there	 are	 7000	occurrences	 of	 a	 lemma	 of	 ask	 in	 the	 “Let	 NP	 [ask]”	 frame,	 and	 95,605	 occurrences	 of	 ask	 in	 the	corpus,	giving	a	normalized	frequency	of	7000/95,605	=	0.07322,	the	value	for	the	leftmost	bar.		See	the	data	appendix	for	all	raw	data.	
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In order to filter the extended, non-causative uses of let from the complement 
distribution, the idiomatic know was removed.  Further, since the extended politeness 
usages are all imperatives, an attempt was made to remove these by searching for only 
those ‘[let] NP V’ utterances preceded by a noun.  The results are shown in the graph 
below, for which verbs that are infelicitous in the imperative are preceded by a tilde (~): 
 
Figure 16: Filtered distribution distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of 
let 
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Note that this filtering has lessened but not removed the interference with other uses.  It 
has also had unintended consequences, such as depressing the frequency of verbs that 
commonly occur in imperatives with let but might still sometimes be causative, like talk.  
Furthermore, the lack of syntactic structure or semantic role annotation in the COCA 
means that even those frames preceded by a noun are sometimes the extended usages: 
(139) a. Howie let me ask you….        (Spoken: Fox, 2015) 
 b. Critics let me ask you, I’m not trying to plug any particular movie… 
         (Spoken, 2015) 
 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 ask	 can	 occur	 with	 let	 in	 an	 imperative,	 but	 genuinely	directive	causative	use:	(140)	 Please	let	me	ask	him	a	question!	Crucially,	though,	in	both	distributions	above,	the	most	frequent	collocates	with	let	are	the	volitional	ask	and	stay,	and	the	least	frequent	are	the	non-volitional	or	less	volitional	seem	and	miss.	
Force,	as	argued	in	2.2,	denotes	direct	causation	acting	on	a	non-cooperative	patient.	 	 Since	 direct,	 coercive	 causation	 requires	 volitional	 control	 from	without,	verbs	 in	 complement	 clauses	 representing	 cognitive	 or	 emotional	 states,	 like	 feel	and	think,	are	comparatively	rare,	since	these	things	cannot	be	directly	coerced	or	compelled.	 	Similarly	to	(non-idiomatic)	 let,	non-intentional	stative	verbs	like	seem	and	know	are	practically	absent:					
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Figure 17: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of force. 	Even	when	causation	is	not	specifically	constrained	to	directive	varieties,	then,	force	seems	to	select	for	volition.	As	discussed	in	section	2.2	above,	causative	get	suggests	patient	cooperation	that	is	somewhat	more	resistant	than	that	of	patients	of	causative	have.82		Get	with	an	animate	patient	requires	that	the	causer	do	something	to	influence	the	causee’s																																																									82	Rampant	polysemy	makes	corpus	data	collection	 for	causative	have	 infeasible.	 	However,	 I	hope	that	the	stereotypical	employee/employer	relationship	that	is	evoked	by	sentences	like	she	had	him	
fax	 the	 letter,	 which	 seems	 to	 include	 a	 cooperative	 patient	 and	 a	 possible	 causer/causee	 power	differential,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 discussion	 in	 the	 preceding	 sections,	 makes	 the	 relevant	 semantic	character	of	this	verb	relatively	noncontroversial.	
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will,	but	she	has	no	direct	authority	or	power.		The	patient	has	the	right	to	refuse	the	agent’s	desires,	as	suggested	by	the	sentences	in	(141):	(141)	 a.	 “…that’s	the	best	way	to	get	them	to	come	forward.”	(CNN	–	AM,	2006)		 b.	 “…a	number	of	us	have	been	trying	for	years	to	get	the	government	to			 	 recognize	it.”	 	 	 	 	 										(PBS	Newshour,	1990)	
Also suggestive is the distribution of verbs that appear in the complements of get: 
 
Figure 18: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of get. 
 The	most	frequent	verbs,	such	as	talk,	stop,	leave,	stay,	work,	go,	tell,	and	come,	are	all	compatible	with	a	volitional	subject	when	it	is	animate	(and	some,	like	talk	and	
tell	 seem	 to	 preferentially	 select	 for	 a	 volitional	 subject),	 whereas	 non-volitional	verbs	like	seem,	know,	and	feel	are	comparatively	rare,	similar	to	the	results	for	let	
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and	force.		While	someone	can	refuse	to	do	something,	she	cannot	similarly	refuse	to	know	something.		This	further	supports	the	claim	made	in	the	previous	section	that	
get	causation	with	an	animate	patient	involves	influencing	the	patient’s	will,	which	appears	to	be	a	fundamental	feature	of	the	meaning	of	causative	get.	A	 summary	 of	 these	 data,	 including	 the	most	 and	 least	 common	 collocates	with	let,	get,	and	force	along	with	judgments	regarding	the	imperative	volition	test,	is	given	in	the	table	below:		
 
 
 
Most 
Common 
Collocates 
Felicity in 
Imperative 
Least 
Common 
Collocates 
Felicity in 
Imperative 
     
Ask ✔ Miss ?✖ 
Stay ✔ Seem ✖ 
Go ✔ Think ✔ 
Tell ✔ Be ✔✖ 
Let 
Fall ? Do ✔ 
     
Miss ?✖ Know ✖ 
Leave ✔ Seem ✖ 
Talk ✔ Let ✔ 
Stop ✔ Fall ? 
Force 
Take ✔ Be ✔✖ 
     
Talk ✔ Seem ✖ 
Stop ✔ Know ✖ 
Leave ✔ Happen ✖ 
Stay ✔ Be ✔✖ 
Get 
Work ✔ Ask ✔ 	 Table	7:	Summary	of	most	and	least	common	collocates	of	representative	periphrastic	verbs.		The	most	common	collocates	for	all	three	verbs	are	volitional	or	marginal,	and	the	least	common	tend	to	be	non-volitional.		A	possible	explanation	for	the	partially	exceptional	force	is	given	below.	
115	
 
4.3	 Inclination	in	the	corpus	data			 Not	 surprisingly,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 directive	 causation,	 the	 corpus	 data	above	 suggest	 that	 periphrastics	 with	 pronominal	 objects	 preferentially	 select	volitional	 predicates	 over	 nonvolitional	 ones	 in	 general.	 	 There	 is	 an	 interesting	trend	 for	 the	 most	 obviously	 volitional	 verb	 that	 might	 support	 the	 claim	 in	 the	previous	 section	 that	 inclined	 causatives	 are	 somehow	 “more	 volitional”	 than	resistant	 ones,	 however.	 	 As	mentioned	 in	 3.4	 above,	 highly	 volitional	 predicates	seem	to	be	better	with	inclined	patients.	 	This	is	reflected	in	the	corpus	results	for	the	most	unambiguously	volitional	predicate	among	the	complement	verb	class:	try.	
	Figure	19:	frequency	of	try	in	the	complement	of	periphrastic	verbs.	
Let Get Force
{periphrastic} NP (to) [try]
co
un
t/c
ou
nt
 o
f {
pe
rip
hr
as
tic
} V
P
 to
 [V
]
0.
00
0
0.
00
2
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
8
0.
01
0
116	
 
	These	data,	unlike	 those	presented	above,	 are	normalized	by	 the	 frequency	of	 the	periphrastic	verb	in	the	causative	construction	frame	(periphrastic	normalization),	so	 the	 differences	 between	 these	 values	 are	 not	 artifacts	 of	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	periphrastic.		 Although	it	is	only	a	single	verb	and	subject	to	any	number	of	confounds,	this	distribution	is	consistent	with	the	claim	that	volition	(or	something	like	it)	roughly	tracks	 the	 selectional	bias	differences	of	 the	periphrastic	 causative	verbs.	 	Making	use	of	the	imperative	test	for	volitionality	above,	the	effect	can	be	seen	to	be	more	widely	spread.		If	every	verb	that	is	felicitous	in	the	imperative	is	given	a	value	of	1	and	every	verb	that	(in	at	least	one	sense)	is	infelicitous	is	given	a	score	of	-1,	while	the	marginal	verbs	see,	miss,	and	fall	are	given	a	value	of	0,	and	then	these	numbers	are	 multiplied	 by	 their	 frequency	 with	 the	 three	 causatives	 examined	 above,	normalized	by	the	frequency	of	the	periphrastic	(since	it	 is	the	difference	between	the	periphrastics	verbs	 that	 is	being	probed	here),	 the	effect	with	 try	 is	 replicated	across	the	complement	set:83			
																																																								83	These	data	exclude	know	from	the	complement	set	of	let,	as	mentioned	above.		Note,	however,	that	even	when	know	 is	included	and	all	data	is	non-curated	and	uniform,	 let	has	a	volitionality	score	of	0.407760979, which	is	still	by	far	the	highest	of	the	three	verbs.	
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	Figure	20:	Volition	scores	for	let,	get,	and	force	based	on	felicity	of	their	collocates	in	imperatives.		These	data	show	higher	rates	of	 felicity	 in	the	 imperative	 for	collocates	of	 let	 than	
get,	 and	 higher	 rates	 for	 get	 than	 force,	 suggesting	 a	 difference	 in	 the	 degree	 of	volitionality	 selected	 in	 the	 causee	 for	 these	 verbs.	 	 If	 the	 marginally	 felicitious	examples	in	(136)	are	assimilated	to	volitionals,	the	odds	that	a	complement	will	be	volitional	 for	 each	 periphrastic	 can	 be	 calculated	 by	 comparing	 the	 counts	 in	 the	corpus	 of	 volitional	 verb	 collocates	 to	 nonvolitional	 verbs	 for	 each	 periphrastic	causative.	 	 Using	 this	 measure,	 the	 odds	 that	 a	 complement	 verb	 of	 let	 will	 be	volitional	is	10.83:1,	while	for	get	it	is	9.08:1,	and	for	force	it	is	5.49:1.	
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Volition,	 however,	 is	 clearly	 an	 imprecise	measure	 of	 inclination	 and	 a	 not	very	 predictive	 parameter	 in	 determining	 the	 selection	 of	 a	 particular	 verb.			Furthermore,	felicity	in	imperatives	is	only	a	rough	test	for	volition,	and	imperatives	can	 be	 bad	 if	 the	 verb,	 even	 if	 volitional,	 is	 associated	 with	 negative	 speaker	sentiment	(Childers	2013):	??Inflict	damage!,	 	??Do	bad	things!,	??Cause	harm!	 (see	chapter	4	for	a	discussion	of	negative	sentiment	and	cause).		These	distributions	do	reveal	differences	in	inclination,	however,	but	its	detection	requires	more	targeted	analysis.		In	particular,	the	presence	of	inclination	is	demonstrated	by	the	frequency	with	 which	 the	 complement	 verbs	 are	 modified	 by	 the	 respectively	 inclined	 and	resistant	 adverbs	 eagerly	 and	grudgingly	 and	 then	 relativized	 to	 the	 distributions	given	in	the	preceding	section.		 For	 each	 of	 the	 verbs	 comprising	 the	 complement	 vector,	 an	 inclinational	measure	 was	 obtained	 by	 dividing	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 frequency	 of	modification	by	eagerly	and	grudgingly	by	their	sum:		 (“eagerly	v”	+	“v	eagerly”)	–	(“grudgingly	v”	+	“v	grudgingly)	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------	(“eagerly	v”	+	“v	eagerly”)	+	(“grudgingly	v”	+	“v	grudgingly)			For	 a	 verb	 that	 only	 appeared	 with	 eagerly	 but	 never	 with	 grudgingly,	 an	inclinational	measure	of	1	would	be	assigned,	while	a	verb	that	is	only	ever	modified	by	“grudgingly”	and	never	by	“eagerly”	would	have	an	inclinational	measure	of	-1:		
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	In	 this	way,	 a	 verb	with	 a	 higher	number	 in	 the	 range	 [1,-1]	 represents	 a	 greater	degree	of	inclination.		For	each	verb,	this	inclinational	measure	weight	is	multiplied	by	 the	 frequency	 that	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 complement	 (as	 a	 percentage	 of	 all	 other	complement	verbs	of	that	periphrastic)	of	each	periphrastic	causative	and	the	sum	of	 all	weighted	 complement	 frequencies	 provides	 a	 degree	 of	 inclination	 for	 each	periphrastic	causative	verb:	
	
 
Based on the analysis in terms of inclination given in the sections above, it is predicted 
that let would score highest on this measure, force lowest, and get – as both inclined and 
resistant at one time or another – somewhere between the scores for let and get.  Indeed, 
χlet = 0.256, χget = 0.117, and χforce = 0.068. 
€ 
Cv =
xv − yv
xv + yv
χc = Cv pv
v
∑
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Figure 21: Inclination scores for collocate verbs of let, get, and force. 
 
Although inclination is not categorical due to the influences related to competing wills in 
context, as discussed above, as well as the likelihood that many of the collocate verbs are 
general with respect to inclination out of context, the trend demonstrates that the 
differences in these verbs in terms of inclination manifests as a measurable selection bias. 
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5.	 An	Event	Semantics	for	Directive	Causation					 A	formalization	of	the	meaning	of	the	four	verb	discussed	above	makes	use	of	events,	quasi-aspectual	operators	CAUSE	and	DO	as	employed	in	Dowty	(1979),	and	preference	operators	based	on	a	preference	relation	over	the	occurrence	of	events.	In	particular,	let	R	be	the	predicate	introduced	by	the	embedded	verb	with	meaning	R’,84	 and	 ∂	 be	 a	 presupposition	 operator	 (Beaver	 2008).	 	 Let	 PX	 be	 individual	 X’s	preference	relation	partially	ordering	the	domain	of	occurrences	(represented	by	an	occurrence	 operator	 O	 where	 O(e)	 is	 the	 proposition	 that	 event	 e	 occurs	 (Lewis	1973,	Dowty	1979)	and	~O(e)	is	the	proposition	that	event	e	does	not	occur,	or	the	complement	 of	 the	 set	 of	 worlds	 in	 which	 it	 does)	 such	 that	 O(e)	 PJohn	 ~O(e)	indicates	 that	 John	 prefers	 the	 occurrence	 of	 e	 to	 the	 non-occurrence	 of	 e,	abbreviated	 as	 PREFER(John,	 e)	 with	 the	 opposite	 ordering	 ~O(e)	 PJohn	 O(e)	abbreviated	as	DISPREFER(John,	e).	 	Finally,	assume	a	standard	temporal	ordering	signaled	by	number	such	that	for	times	t0,	t1,	and	t2,	and	a	precedence	ordering	<,	t0	 <	 t1	 <	 t2.	 	 CAUSE(x,	 e2)(e1)	 means	 that	 e1	 is	 the	 event	 of	 x	 causing	 event	 e2.		Example	sentences	containing	the	periphrastics	are	then	translated	as	follows:		(142)	 “John	let	Bill	dance”		
∃e1∃e2.[CAUSEt1(John,	e2)(e1)	∧	dance’t2(Bill)(e2)	∧		DOt2(Bill,	e2)		
∧	∂(∃e3.[dance’t2(Bill)(e3)	∧	PREFERt2(Bill,e3)])]																																																										84	Note	that	the	operator	DO	is	used	here,	rather	than	just	specifying	that	volitionality	is	a	part	of	a	subject	meaning	relation	R’(x,	e)	in	order	to	explicitly	encode	volition	in	the	meaning	of	the	directive	causative	verbs	and	distinguish	words	like	have	from	words	like	make.		See	below	for	a	discussion	of	the	consequences	of	this	distinction.	
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	(143)	 “John	forced	Bill	to	dance”		
∃e1∃e2.[CAUSEt1(John,	e2)(e1)	∧	dance’t2(Bill)(e2)	∧		DOt2(Bill,	e2)		
∧	∂(∃e3.[dance’t2(Bill)(e3)	∧	DISPREFERt2(Bill,	e3)])]		(144)	 “John	had	Bill	dance”				
∃e1∃e2.[CAUSEt1(John,	e2)(e1)	∧	dance’t2(Bill)(e2)	∧		DOt2(Bill,	e2)]		(145)	 “John	got	Bill	to	dance”		
∃e1∃e2.[CAUSEt1(John,	e2)(e1)	∧	dance’t2(Bill)(e2)	∧		DOt2(Bill,	e2)											∧	PREFERt2	(Bill,	e2)	∧	∂(∃e3.[dance’t2(Bill)(e3)	∧	DISPREFERt0(Bill,	e3)])]			Here,	as	discussed,	only	get	includes	a	grammatically	relevant	temporal	component	as	a	part	of	its	meaning,	beyond	those	included	in	the	formulation	of	CAUSE	and	DO.	The	 lexical	 meanings	 can	 be	 abstracted	 from	 the	 sentence	 meanings	 as	follows:		(146)	 	 Let:		
λxλRλyλe1λe2.[CAUSEt1(y,	e2)(e1)	∧	R’t2(x)(e2)	∧		DOt2(x,	e2)		
∧	∂(∃e3.[R’t2(x)(e3)	∧	PREFERt2(x,	e3)])]		(147)	 	 Force:		
λxλRλyλe1λe2.[CAUSEt1(y,	e2)(e1)	∧	R’t2(x)(e2)	∧		DOt2(x,	e2)		
∧	∂(∃e3.[R’t2(x)(e3)	∧	DISPREFERt2(x,	e3)])]			(148)	 	 Have:		
λxλRλyλe1λe2.[CAUSEt1(y,	e2)(e1)	∧	R’t2(x)(e2)	∧		DOt2(x,	e2)]			(149)	 	 Get:		
λxλRλyλe1λe2.[CAUSEt1(y,	e2)(e1)	∧	R’t2(x)(e2)	∧		DOt2(x,	e2)]																		∧	PREFERt2	(x,	e2)	∧	∂(∃e3.[R’t2(x)(e3)	∧	DISPREFERt0(x,	e3)])]	
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	Note	that	DO(x,	e)	means	that	e	is	under	the	unmediated	control	of	the	agent	x	(see	Dowty	 1979,	 118);	 here	 it	 specifies	 volitionality,	which	makes	 its	 inclusion	 in	 the	semantics	 a	 way	 of	 capturing	 directive	 (as	 opposed	 to	 manipulative)	 causation.		Given	that,	let,	force,	and	have	differ	only	with	respect	to	their	presuppositions.		The	difference	 between	 let	 and	 force	 is	 that	 the	 former	 presupposes	 that	 the	 causee	prefers	 performing	 the	 event	 to	 not	 performing	 it	 (146),	 while	 for	 force	 the	preference	relation	is	reversed	(147).			The	dynamic	character	of	get	 is	captured	by	the	assertion	that	the	patient’s	preference	relation	at	 the	time	of	 the	caused	sub-event	(t2)	has	a	 let-like	ordering	and	 the	 presupposition	 that	 the	 patient’s	 preference	 relation	 at	 some	 time	(immediately)	prior	 to	 the	causing	event	(t0)	has	a	 force-like	ordering	(149).	 	The	motivation	for	putting	only	the	prior	preference	under	the	presupposition	operator	is	 that	 it,	 but	 not	 the	 later	 re-ordered	 preference,	 survives	 negation	 and	 other	presupposition-transparent	constructions:	(150)	 	 I	didn’t/couldn’t	get	him	to	do	it.		He	was	#(un)willing.85	The	causee’s	previous	(and	presumably	surviving,	in	the	case	of	negation)	resistance	is	not	cancelled	by	negation,	so	presupposed,	but	the	inclined	status	does	not	project	and	is	likely	therefore	asserted	by	get.	The	verb	have	has	no	presuppositions	with	respect	to	patient	inclination,	and	is	as	such	the	unmarked	directive	causative,	as	suggested	in	(148).		One	immediate	question	 that	 this	 formulation	 invites	 is	 how	 have,	 which,	 as	 shown,	 seems	 to	 be																																																									85	Metalinguistic	 negation,	 with	 focus-marked	 get,	 is	 felicitous:	 I	 didn’t	 GET	 him	 to	 do	 it.	 	 He	 was	
willing.		This	seems	to	be	a	denial	of	the	appropriateness	of	the	utterance,	rather	than	its	truth.	
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quite	restricted	in	its	use,	could	be	the	unmarked	member	of	the	set.		It	is	plausible	that,	due	to	the	general	pragmatic	principle	that	speakers	should	seek	to	maximize	presuppositions	(Heim	1991),	it	will	often	be	less	felicitous	than	other	periphrastics	when	 their	presuppositions	 are	 satisfied.	 	 For	 illustration,	 the	 claim	 that	 speakers	should	maximize	presuppositions	is	clearly	demonstrated	in	cases	when	something	is	explicitly	in	the	common	ground:	(151)	 	 Max	has	a	dogi.		Iti/the	dogi/his	dogi/#a	dogi	is	always	barking.	In	 this	 example,	 it	 is	 asserted	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 dog	 and	 that	Max	 owns	 it.	 	 The	discourse	 is	 felicitously	 extended	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 dog	 is	presupposed,	as	is	the	case	for	the	pronoun,	definite	phrase,	and	possessive	phrase,	but	 infelicitous	 when	 the	 dog,	 which	 has	 already	 been	 introduced	 and	 whose	existence	is	now	taken	for	granted	by	the	interlocutors,	is	introduced	again,	as	is	the	case	 for	 the	 indefinite,	 which	 doesn’t	 presuppose	 existence.	 	 Similarly	 for	 cases	involving	have.			Suppose,	for	example,	that	both	I	and	my	friend	know	that	his	children	love	to	play	in	the	backyard	and	prefer	it	to	the	front	yard;	but,	since	they	usually	tear	up	the	garden,	my	friend	almost	always	tells	them	to	play	in	the	front.		Let,	but	not	have,	is	an	appropriate	description	of	my	friend	telling	me	about	a	change	in	this	pattern:	(152)	 a.	 I	let	the	kids	play	in	the	backyard	instead	of	the	front	yesterday.		 b.							#	I	had	the	kids	play	in	the	backyard	instead	of	the	front	yesterday.		Now	 suppose	 I	 have	 been	 petitioning	my	 boss	 for	 a	 raise	 for	months,	 but	 he	 has	been	unwilling	due	to	budget	constraints.		I	talk	about	this	with	my	spouse	and	we	commiserate.		Then	one	day	I	go	into	his	office	and	give	an	incredible	pitch	about	my	value	to	the	company	that	leaves	him	completely	dazzled.	 	He	is	so	grateful	for	my	
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work	and	skill,	and	so	eager	that	I	remain	at	the	company,	that	he	enthusiastically	offers	me	a	raise.		I	go	home	and	say	to	my	spouse:	(153)	 a.	 I	got	my	boss	to	give	me	a	raise.		 b.							#	I	had	my	boss	give	me	a	raise.		There	 is	 an	 obvious	 inclinational	 transition	 in	 this	 scenario,	 so	 get,	 which	presupposes	 that	 transition	 is	 appropriate,	 and	 have	 is	 not.	 	 Finally,	 if	 I	 have	 a	restaurant	that	is	closing	for	the	night	and	there	are	patrons	who	are	still	having	an	animated	conversation,	laughing	and	enjoying	themselves,	and	I	tell	them	they	have	to	leave,	and	they	plead	to	be	allowed	to	stay	awhile	longer,	not	to	have	to	go	out	in	the	rain	and	disperse,	but	I	insist	it	is	time	to	go,	even	while	they	continue	to	beg,	the	following	 judgments	about	a	description	of	 that	event	 to	someone	who	knows	 the	facts	seem	to	me	to	be	robust:	(154)	 a.	 I	forced	the	customers	to	leave.		 b.							#	I	had	the	customers	leave.		It	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 patrons	 prefer	 not	 leaving	 to	 leaving,	 force	 satisfies	 that	presupposition,	so	have,	which	does	not,	is	infelicitous.		In	fact,	if	anything	is	known	about	inclinations	–	and	usually	something	is	known	since	people	are	very	attentive	to	other	people’s	desires	and	apparent	preferences,	 especially	 in	directive	causing	scenarios	–	then	another	periphrastic	will	presuppose	more	information	consistent	with	the	scenario	and	therefore	be	pragmatically	more	appropriate.		Therefore,	the	only	time	have	will	be	felicitous	is	when	the	inclination	of	the	patient	is	unknown	or	somehow	irrelevant.	 	 In	a	causative	scenario,	 this	will	correspond	to	exactly	 those	cases	 in	 which	 the	 patient	 is	 seen	 to	 be	 will-less:	 his	 preferences	 aren’t	 relevant	since	he	is	a	performer	of	the	causer’s	will.		In	particular,	if	the	patient’s	inclinations	
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are	unknown,	but	directive	causation	is	still	possible,	there	is	typically	an	authority	differential	between	the	causer	and	causee,	which	corresponds	to	the	stereotypical	use	 of	 have.	 	 But	 note	 also	 that	 non-authority	 scenarios	 that	 are	 unmarked	 for	inclinations	are	also	felicitous	with	have,	such	as	telling	someone	that	is	looking	for	or	 trying	 to	 reach	 an	 acquaintance	 I’ll	 have	 him	 call	 you,	 or	 describing	 a	 trivial	request	of	a	friend,	as	in	I	had	her	loan	me	her	pen	for	a	few	minutes.		The	pragmatic	account	of	the	unmarked	variant	predicts	these	uses.		
6.	 Set,	Drive,	and	Make		
 It	 is	 useful	 to	 briefly	 extend	 the	 discussion	 of	 periphrastic	 causative	 verbs	and	 their	 behavior	 with	 respect	 to	 inclination	 to	 other,	 apparently	 more	idiosyncratic,	 or	 alternatively	more	 general	 predicates.	 	 In	 particular,	 one	 goal	 of	this	section	is	to	survey	two	other,	complex	periphrastics,	set	and	drive,	to	get	some	preliminary	idea	of	how	inclination	interacts	with	other	parameters	of	meaning,	like	aspect	and	sentiment.		Another	goal	is	to	identify	the	general	effectuating	causative	verb	make,	and	to	provide	some	evidence	for	its	status	as	such,	in	anticipation	of	the	following	chapter.	
Set	exemplifies	an	interesting,	temporally	complex	type	of	causation	encoded	by	an	English	periphrastic	 causative	 that	has	not	yet	been	discussed	 to	 this	point.		This	type	combines	both	an	initial	effectuation	followed	by	a	kind	of	self-agency	on	the	part	of	the	patient.		It	is	expressed	by	the	verb	as	it	occurs	in	the	following	kinds	of	sentences:	
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(155)	 a.	 	 Bob	set	the	bird	free.		 b.	 	 Bob	set	the	log	on	fire.		 c.	 	 Bob	set	the	alarm	clock	to	go	off	at	6:00	am.		
Set,	like	make	and	force,	requires	some	kind	of	direct	action	or	effectuating	force	on	the	 patient,	 but	 like	 let	 and	 allow,	 there	 is	 a	 subsequent	 kind	 of	 self-agency.		Although	 he	 does	 not	 identify	 set	 as	 encoding	 that	 causation	 type,	 Talmy	 does	characterize	the	notion	of	onset	causation,	as	illustrated	in	(156):	(156)	 a.	 I	slid	the	box	across	the	ice	by	pushing	on	it	(steadily).		 b.	 I	slid	the	box	across	the	ice	by	giving	it	a	push.	 				(Talmy	2000,	498)		The	 difference	 in	 interpretation	 between	 (156a)	 and	 (156b)	 is	 in	 the	 relative	mapping	of	causing	event	and	resulting	event.		In	(156a),	the	box	moving	across	the	ice	is	“the	ongoing	result	of	an	extended	force	impingement	without	which	it	would	stop,”	 (Talmy	2000,	498),	while	 in	 (156b),	 the	motion	 following	 the	 initial	push	 is	conceived	 as	 autonomous	 and	 requiring	 no	 further	 force.	 	 Interestingly,	 events	 of	this	type	are	often	described	as	“setting	(something)	in	motion,”	which	reflects	the	unique	causative	profile	of	set.		The	combination	of	effectuating	onset	causation	and	subsequent	self-agency	can	be	seen	in	the	sentences	below:	(157)	 a.	 “She	set	him	to	grazing	on	clover”	 	 					(Bk:ColdMountain,	1997)	b.	 “…pathways	 that	 are	 set	 into	motion	 by	 the	 consumption	 of	 abused	drugs…”	 	 	 	 	 																(DrugIssues,	2009)		 c.	 “…other	houses	and	barns	were	set	on	fire”											(SocialHistory,	1993)		In	 (157a),	 after	 an	 initial	 (here,	 perhaps	 enabling)	 causative	 event,	 the	will	 of	 the	patient	 sustains	 the	 event	 denoted	 by	 the	 complement	 clause.	 	 In	 (157b),	 certain	neural	pathways,	once	activated,	 remain	active	without	 further	external	 influence,	
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and	in	(157c),	the	set	on	fire	phrase	describes	a	situation	of	an	initiating	act	that	is	followed	by	self-sustaining	activity	–	the	burning	of	the	fire.		The	sentence	(155c),	in	which	someone	sets	a	device	to	do	something	at	a	later	time,	demonstrates	how	this	initiation	 plus	 self-agentive	 causative	 scenario	 can	 be	 conceptualized	 for	 complex	artifacts.	 	The	crucial	point	 is	 that	set	 introduces	an	aspectually	complex	causative	event,	in	which	a	(conceptually)	punctual	causing	event	is	followed	by	a	continuous	result	 activity	or	potential.	 	 The	 causing	 event	produces	 an	activity	 and	 is,	 in	 that	sense,	inchoative.		 In	 the	 corpus	 sentences,	 almost	 all	 verbs	 appearing	 in	 the	 complements	 of	the	set	causatives	are	activity	verbs:	work,	go,	etc.		This	tendency	is	consistent	with	the	characterization	that	set	is	a	direct	but	also	enabling	causative	of	a	self-directed	activity,	and	their	relatively	restricted	set	of	collocate	verbs	is	intriguing,	 if	not	yet	entirely	predictable,	in	its	own	right:	
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Figure 22: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of set. 
 
This distribution, of course, reveals little beyond a very restrictive collocation bias and, 
perhaps, a preference for activity verbs.  However, based on the discussion above and the 
corpus sentences themselves, set appears to be general with respect to the inclination 
status prior to the causing event, but specifies that the causee is inclined after it.  In other 
words, it is either like let, in which the causee is inclined, or like get, in which the 
causee’s inclinational status becomes inclined.86  In addition to this inclinational 
																																																								86	In	fact,	set	is	sometimes	used	similarly	to	the	“un-inclined”	causative	have,	for	which	the	patient	is	an	 instrument	 of	 the	 agent’s	will,	 as	 in	 John	 set	 the	 employees	 to	 cleaning	 the	 office.	 	 There	might,	however,	be	dialectical	variation	regarding	the	acceptability	of	such	uses.	
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encoding, this verb encodes onset causation and entails an ongoing resultant activity after 
a punctual causing event. 
Drive,	on	the	other	hand,	denotes	an	extended	effectuating	causation	that	 is	coextensive	with	the	path	leading	to	the	result	state.		For	most	sentences	containing	the	periphrastic	causative	drive,	 the	 interpretation	 is	 the	extended	application	of	a	(usually	unpleasant)	force	resulting	in	an	adverse	reaction	or	state:	(158)	 a.	 “The	smoke	drove	the	squirrel	from	its	tree.”	 	(Talmy	2000,	540)		 b.	 “...that	despair	drove	him	to	violence.”	 						(New	York	Times,	2002)		 c.	 “…your	incessant	barking	is	driving	me	crazy.”		(NPR_TalkNation,		2009)		 d.	 “Lucifer	was	driven	away	from	heavenly	paradise.”87		 	 	 	 	 	 	 										(Scandanavian	Studies,	1998)		In	 (158a),	 it	 is	 presumably	 the	 continuous	presence	of	 smoke	 that	 is	 co-extensive	with	 the	 squirrel	 going	 up	 the	 tree,	 and	 in	 (158b,c)	 it	 is	 a	 constant	 application	 of	despair	and	barking,	respectively,	 that	 is	continuously	and	cumulatively	 leading	to	the	adverse	result.		And	in	(158d),	although	the	judgment	is	more	subtle,	the	image	of	 “driving	 away”	 is	 one	of	 a	push	 co-extensive	with	movement	 away,	whether	or	not	the	process	be	a	literally	physical	one.	Like	 set,	 drive	 is	 relatively	 restricted	 in	 its	 collocation	 patterns,	 but	 in	addition	to	physical	activity	verbs,	it	also	co-occurs	with	the	volitional	and	cognitive	verbs	 try	 and	 think,	 and	 so	 does	 not	 necessarily	 specify	 some	 ongoing	 activity	following	the	(in	this	case	continuous)	causing	event:	
																																																								87	Here,	the	example	collocates	are	of	different	grammatical	categories	than	the	data	that	was	directly	gathered	in	the	study	and	presented	in	the	graphs.		They	are	presented	here	for	illustrative	purposes.	
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Figure 23: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of drive. 
 
Drive, like force, behaves like a resistant causative but with an additional strong animacy 
requirement and a consequent negative sentiment bias.  This is in addition to its aspectual 
character as a continuous process co-extensive with the effectuation of the result state. 
The periphrastic causative make, in contrast to set, commonly occurs with verbs 
of emotion and cognition: 
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Figure 24: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of make. 
 The	 most	 common	 verb	 in	 a	 complement	 clause	 of	 make	 is	 feel.	 	 Feeling,	 like	thinking	and	seeming,	is	not	necessarily	volitional	on	the	part	of	the	patient,	insofar	as	it	is	a	cognitive	state	that	is	potentially	unwilled.		The	semantics	for	make	seem	to	lack	a	requirement	of	volitionality.		While	the	collocation	frequencies	are	consistent	with	 the	 claim	 that	make	 is	 sensitive	 to	 the	 degree	 of	 volitional	 control	 that	 the	patient	can	exercise	over	the	event	described,	as	detailed	in	section	2.2	above,	make	
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is	 a	 general	 effectuating	 causative	 and,	 as	 such,	 is	 compatible	 with	 causative	scenarios	 for	which	 inclination	 is	 unspecified	 or	 irrelevant.	 	 That	make	 is,	 in	 fact,	general,	 can	be	seen	by	comparing	 the	distribution	above,	which	 is	normalized	by	collocate	 verb	 frequency	 (collocate	 normalized),	 to	 a	 distribution	 that	 is	 not	 so	normalized,	 but	 for	 which	 the	 verb	 selection	 frequency	 represents	 only	 the	frequency	 of	 verb	 lemmas	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 all	 verb	 lemmas	 in	 the	 periphrastic	construction	for	make	(periphrastic	normalized).		
	Figure	25:	distribution	of	verbs	appearing	with	make	normalized	by	verb	frequency	(left)	and	not	so	normalized	(right).			Despite	some	local	reordering	(look	and	seem,	work	and	happen),	the	most	frequent	collocate	 verbs	 are	 still	 the	 most	 frequent	 verbs	 when	 normalized	 for	 their	occurrence	 in	 the	 corpus,	 and	 likewise	 for	 the	 least	 frequent.	 	 This	 suggests	 that	there	 are	 few	 relative	 ranking	 patterns	 for	make	 that	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	 the	frequency	of	verbs	in	the	corpus.	The	similar	distribution	of	these	graphs	suggests	
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that	make	shows	very	few	selection	biases,	except	possibly	an	unusual	felicity	with	relatively	 bleached	 or	 semantically	 neutral	 predicates	 like	 seem	 and	 happen.		Otherwise,	 the	 selectional	 behavior	 of	make	 seems	 to	 come	 close	 to	 tracking	 the	verbal	lexicon	in	terms	of	relative	frequencies,	or	at	least	the	relative	frequencies	of	the	 sublexicon	 of	 verbs	 occurring	 in	 the	 complement	 of	 a	 periphrastic	 causative	verb.		Compare	this	to	the	periphrastic	normalized	and	collocate	normalized	graphs	for	a	causative	with	strong	selectional	biases,	like	force:	
	Figure	26:	distribution	of	verbs	appearing	with	force	normalized	by	verb	frequency	(left)	and	not	so	normalized	(right).			The	 periphrastic	 normalized	 variant	 for	 force	 shows	 radically	 different	 relative	frequencies	 than	 the	 collocate	 normalized	 variant	 (compare	miss,	 do,	 go,	 be,	 and	
make	 across	 the	 two)	 –	 this	 suggests	 that	 force	 has	 a	 strong	 selectional	 bias:	 the	distribution	 of	 its	 collocates	 is	 not	 just	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 underlying	 relative	frequency	of	 the	 verbs	 in	 the	 corpus.	 	 For	make	 on	 the	other	hand,	 its	 selectional	behavior	 is	mostly	explainable	 in	 terms	of	 the	relative	 frequencies	of	 the	collocate	
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verbs.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 collocate	 normalized	 variant	 is	 so	 similarly	distributed	to	the	periphrastic	normalized	variant	and	the	periphrastic	normalized	variant	 is	 not	 just	 a	 flattened	 version	 of	 the	 normalized	 one	 suggests	 that	make	preferentially	 selects	 frequent	 verbs.	 	 Exceptions	 to	 this	 include	 an	 apparent	preference	for	the	non-volitional	verbs	seem	and	happen	and	a	dispreference	for	the	semantically	 basic	 volitional	 verb	 do	 (for	 an	 explanation	 for	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 the	semantics	 of	make	 as	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 verbs	 examined	 here,	 see	 below).		Beyond	 this,	make	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 exercising	 strong	 selectional	 biases.	 	 In	particular,	it	seems	that	make	is	felicitously	substitutable	for	any	of	the	effectuating	verbs	have,	get,	and	force:		(159)	 a.	 The	executive	had	the	secretary	mail	the	letter		 	 	 →	 The	executive	made	the	secretary	mail	the	letter			 b.	 Got	you	to	look!		 →	 Made	you	look!			 c.	 I	forced	John	to	leave	the	party	 →	 I	made	John	leave	the	party			In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 all	 “having”,	 “getting”,	 and	 “forcing”	 events	 are	“making”	 events.	 	One	question	 that	 this	 immediately	 invites	 is	why	have,	 but	not	
make	is	blocked	by	Maximize	Presupposition	(John	Beavers,	p.c.).		One	possibility	for	this	is	that	make	 is	not	identical	to	the	directive	periphrastic	verb	in	terms	of	non-presupposed	 content.	 	 As	 described	 above,	 the	 directive	 periphrastic	 causatives	have,	as	a	part	of	their	non-presupposed	meaning	a	specification	that	the	causee	is	a	volitional	agent	of	the	caused	subevent,	via	the	DO	operator.		In	this	way,	they	differ	only	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 presuppositions,	 making	 have,	 which	 lacks	
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presuppositions,	infelicitous	when	the	presuppositions	of	some	minimally	different	verb	 is	 satisfied,	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 Maximize	 Presupposition	 principle.	 	 If	
make	does	not	encode	a	volitional	causee	as	a	part	of	 its	 semantics,	and	 therefore	lacks	 a	 DO	 operator,	 it	 is	 not	 identical	 in	 non-presupposed	meaning	 to	 the	 other	verbs	in	directive	causative	scenarios,	and	Maximize	Presupposition	does	not	apply.		While	 get,	 force,	 and	 let	 can	 have	 non-volitional	 (even	 inanimate)	 causees,	 for	manipulative	causation	as	discussed	above,	these	would	have	to	be	represented	as	different	 senses	 assuming	 the	 semantics	 given	 here.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 Maximize	Presupposition	 does	 not	 block	 the	 felicitous	 use	 of	 make	 in	 directive	 causative	events	is	further	evidence	that	make	is	not	polysemous,	but	is	in	fact	a	general	verb.		The	 status	 of	 make	 as	 a	 general	 effectuating	 causative	 will	 be	 assumed	 in	 the	experiments	described	in	the	following	chapter.		
7.	 Summary:		Patient	Inclination				 The	 most	 common	 collocate	 verbs	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 causative	 verbs	 let,	
force,	 and	get	 are	volitional	 verbs,	 as	 suggested	by	 their	 felicity	 in	 the	 imperative,	while	 their	 least	 common	 collocates	 tend	 to	 be	 non-volitional	 to	 some	 extent,	blocking	imperatives:					
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Most 
Common 
Collocates 
Felicity in 
Imperative 
Least 
Common 
Collocates 
Felicity in 
Imperative 
     
Ask ✔ Miss ?✖ 
Stay ✔ Seem ✖ 
Go ✔ Think ✔ 
Tell ✔ Be ✔✖ 
Let 
Fall ? Do ✔ 
     
Miss ?✖ Know ✖ 
Leave ✔ Seem ✖ 
Talk ✔ Let ✔ 
Stop ✔ Fall ? 
Force 
Take ✔ Be ✔✖ 
     
Talk ✔ Seem ✖ 
Stop ✔ Know ✖ 
Leave ✔ Happen ✖ 
Stay ✔ Be ✔✖ 
Get 
Work ✔ Ask ✔ 	 Table	8:	Summary	of	most	and	least	common	collocates	of	representative	periphrastic	verbs.		Based	on	this	measure	and	the	complement	distributions	however,	the	verbs	differ	in	their	degree	of	volitionality,	which	is	suggested	here	to	be	a	proxy	for	their	actual	meaning	difference.	The	 primary	 directive	 causative	 predicates	 examined	 here	 can	 be	distinguished	along	a	single	scale:	that	of	patient	inclination.		Patient	inclination	is	a	particular	variety	of	disposition	specifying	how	the	patient’s	preferences	are	aligned	with	 respect	 to	 performing	 or	 otherwise	 participating	 in	 the	 caused	 event,	 as	defined	in	(108),	(112),	and	(115).		While	inclination	might	at	first	blush	seem	to	be	epiphenomenal	 to	 some	 notion	 of	 force	 or	 causer	 intent,	 the	 difference	 between	
have	and	get	is	illustrative	of	the	distinction.		While	both	have	and	get	represent	an	indirect	 causative	 scenario	 involving	 relatively	 compliant	 patients,	 for	 have	 the	
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patient	is	a	“cooperative	performer	of	the	causer’s	will,”	while	for	get,	the	patient	is	only	cooperative	insofar	as	his/her/its	“will”	is	influenced.		It	is	the	inclination	of	the	patient,	 here,	 that	 is	 relevant	 for	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 causative	 verbs.	 	 Given	 this	criterion,	an	intuitive	partial	typology	including	the	primary	periphrastic	causatives	examined	in	this	chapter	is	repeated	below:			 Before	Cause	Event	 After	Cause	Event	
Let	 inclined	 inclined	
Get	 resistant	 inclined	
Have	 (unmarked)	 (unmarked)	
Force	 resistant	 resistant		 Table	9:	partial	typology	of	periphrastic	causatives.		 	A	 proposal	 for	 the	 causee	 inclinational	 hierarchy,	which	 is	 projected	 from	the	 features	 of	 inclination	 and	 resistance	 and	 including	 the	 verbs	 (except	make)	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	is	given	in	figure	27	below:																														let								>>							set	/		get		/	have							>>								force/drive									INCLINED	 Causee	Inclination																											RESISTANT		Figure	27:	Patient	Inclinational	hierarchy	for	selected	English	periphrastic	causatives.			 	Contra	Wierzbicka,	then,	types	of	causation	as	modeled	by	interactions	of	opposing	or	aligned	inclinations	are	 independent	of,	and	 identifiable	 in,	English	periphrastic	causatives.	 	 Contra	 Talmy,	 oppositions	 and	 alignments	 (in	 terms	 of	 interacting	forces,	 for	 him)	 are	 incomplete	 characterizations	 of	 the	 meanings	 expressed	 by	
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these	verbs,	as	seen	by	the	behavior	of	get	and	have.		As	argued	here,	Talmy’s	forces	are	 only	 a	 subtype	 of	 the	 dispositions	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 expression	 of	causation,	 and	 the	 disposition	 of	 the	 causer	 is	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 selection	 of	periphrastic	 causative	verb.	 	 Furthermore,	 there	 also	 seem	 to	be	other	 selectional	criteria	 not	 yet	 discussed	 that	 are	 wholly	 outside	 of	 Talmy’s	 force-dynamic	framework.		The	following	chapter	will	be,	in	part,	an	elaboration	of	the	latter	point.		That	chapter	extends	the	search	for	distinctions	among	these	verbs	to	the	question	of	 how	 both	 sociolinguistic	 factors	 and	 the	 speaker’s	 attitude	 with	 respect	 to	 a	subevent	or	state	influences	the	choice	of	a	periphrastic	causative.	
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Chapter	4:			 Sentiment	and	Register	
Selection	Biases					 In	 Shibatani’s	 1976	 conspectus	 introducing	 the	 classic	 The	 Grammar	 of	Causative	 Constructions,	 the	 verb	 cause	 is	 characterized	 as	 the	 most	 general	periphrastic	causative	verb	(Shibatani	1976,	32),	and	is	contrasted	with	other	more	semantically	restricted	causatives	like	make	and	get.		This	has	been	the	traditionally	dominant	view	of	the	meaning	of	cause,	that	it	is	the	“unmarked”	member	of	the	set	of	English	periphrastic	causatives	(for	a	more	recent	articulation,	see	Lauer	2010).		Indeed,	 at	 first	blush,	cause	 is	 so	 semantically	basic	as	 to	be	practically	a	 function	word	rather	than	a	content	word.		It	is,	for	example,	a	common	gloss	of	productive	causative	morphemes	in	languages	that	have	them	–	especially	when	the	causation	is	being	emphasized	as	general	(i.e.	as	not	specifically	direct	or	indirect,	sociative	or	manipulative,	 e.g.	 Shibatani	 and	 Pardeshi	 2002,	 99ff).	 	 A	 closer	 look	 at	 social	 and	expressive	 dimensions	 of	meaning,	 however,	 reveals	 that	 an	 abstracted	 notion	 of	causation	is	not	the	whole	story	as	concerns	the	meaning	of	cause.			In	 the	 sections	 below,	 I	 propose	 that	 sentiment	 and	 register	 are	distinguishing	parameters	of	meaning	for	the	selection	of	causative	verbs.		The	focus	of	the	chapter	is	on	the	verb	cause,	with	some	discussion	of	drive,	let,	and	allow,	as	well	 as	 a	 brief	 examination	 of	 periphrastic	 inchoative	 verbs	 as	motivation	 for	 the	distinctions	proposed	between	the	causatives.		I	propose	that	cause	has	two	senses,	
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one	 associated	 with	 formal	 register	 and	 the	 other	 unmarked	 for	 register.	 	 The	register	unmarked	sense	of	cause	is	shown	to	include	negative	sentiment	as	a	part	of	its	meaning,	while	 the	 formal	variant	 is	neutral	with	respect	 to	sentiment.	 	 I	claim	that	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 associated	 with	 colloquial	 cause	 is	 not	 a	 part	 of	 its	asserted	content,	but	is	instead	a	variety	of	projective,	not-at-issue	meaning.		In	this	chapter,	it	is	suggested	not	only	that	cause	has	a	richer	semantics	than	has	hitherto	been	 appreciated	 broadly,	 but	 that	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 social	 and	 expressive	components	 of	 meaning	 such	 as	 sentiment	 and	 register,	 a	 fuller	 picture	 of	 the	meaning	of	event-structural	predicates	like	causatives	and	verbs	of	becoming	can	be	drawn,	with	predictive	consequences	in	terms	of	inference	and	argument	selection.		
1.	 Sentiment	and	the	verb	cause	
	
		 Sentiment	plays	an	important	role	in	the	meaning	and	consequent	selectional	behavior	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 causatives	 in	 English.	 	 Specifically,	 the	 selection	 of	 a	causative	 verb	 seems	 to	 be	 influenced	 in	 part	 by	 the	 speaker’s	 evaluative	 stance	toward	 the	 result	 state	 or	 event	 denoted	 by	 the	 complement	 clause.	 	 	 To	 explore	whether	particular	verbs	 favor	positive	or	negative	 complements,	 in	 this	 section	 I	apply	 felicity	 judgments	regarding	evaluative	polarity	as	well	as	sentiment	 lexicon	classifications	to	collocates	in	corpus	sentences	and	compare	those	results	to	binary	
good/bad	collocation	preferences	as	reflected	by	Google’s	n-gram	resource.88		Based	
																																																								88	http://books.google.com/ngrams.	 	Note	that	although	Google’s	n-gram	measures	word-sequence	frequencies	in	books	published	in	English	for	the	last	200	years,	to	militate	against	large	diachronic	changes	in	meaning,	all	measures	that	follow	encompass	only	those	books	published	between	1950	and	2000.	
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on	these	tendencies,	more	detailed	and	targeted	experiments	are	described,	which	establish	negative	speaker	sentiment	as	a	robust	semantic/expressive	feature	of	the	otherwise	general	causative	verb	cause.	
1.1	 The	 Meaning	 of	 Cause:	 preliminary	 observations	 and	 a	
hypothesis			 The	verb	cause	evidently	carries	a	negative	connotation,	which	has	not,	to	my	knowledge,	been	noted	prior	to	Childers	(2013).		This	fact	is	surprising	in	light	of	its	neutral	term	of	art	status	in	disciplines	like	philosophy	and	physical	science,	as	well	as	its	use	as	the	name	for	the	semantic	primitive	in	lexical	decompositional	theories.		Nevertheless,	it	is	clearly	best	with	negative	outcomes:	(160)	 a.	 				 Who	caused	this	horrible	disaster?		 b.							 										??Who	caused	this	delightful	surprise?		This	tendency	is	borne	out	in	sentences	from	the	Corpus	of	Contemporary	American	English	(COCA	-	http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/):		(161)	 a.	 “…assess	the	damage	caused	by	the	burning	oil	wells.”				 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (ABC_Nightline,	1991)			 b.	 “…changes	of	job	and	heart	had	caused	some	wear	and	tear	on	the			 	 relationships.”	 	 	 	 (Bk:	Romantics,	2008)		 c.	 “The	things	you	didn’t	do	are	likely	to	cause	the	most	regret.”		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Prevention,	2006)		 d.	 “Divorce	caused	tumult,	but	didn’t	make	a	lasting	impression,	good	or			 	 bad.”	 	 	 	 	 	 (USA	Today,	2002)		In	 (161a),	cause	 is	 used	with	 a	 state	of	physical	damage	and	 is	 contrastive	with	 a	sentence	such	as	??...assess	the	repairs/improvements	caused	by	the	workers,	in	which	a	 positive	 sentence	 is	 no	 longer	 felicitous	 with	 the	 verb.	 	 In	 (161b),	 the	 physical	
	 143	
damage	 scenario	 is	 extended	metaphorically	 to	 relationship	 health,	 and	 in	 (161c)	
cause	 introduces	 a	 negative	 emotional	 state.	 	 Example	 (161d)	 is	 particularly	illuminating	in	that	it	contains	both	the	cause	and	make	causative	verbs,	showing	the	contrast	between	the	negative	 ‘tumult’	complement	of	 the	former	with	the	neutral	complement	 of	 make,	 ‘lasting	 impression,’	 which	 is	 explicitly	 identified	 as	 non-evaluative	via	a	direct	denial	that	it	is	either	good	or	bad.		 When	 used	 in	 some	 contexts,	 cause	 can	 occur	 with	 sentiment-neutral	complements,	as	the	sentences	in	(162)	demonstrate:	(162)	 a.	 “Humidity	causes	it	to	curl	and	turn	back.”	 	 													 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Atlanta,	2009)		 b.	 “…ultrahigh-frequency	sound	waves	could	be	used	to	cause	air	to			 	 bend	light.”	 	 	 	 	 	 (TechReview,	2002)		 c.	 “Oxidation,	the	same	chemical	reaction	that	causes	sliced	apples	to			 	 turn	brown.”	 	 	 	 	 	 		(MensHealth,	1994)		These	sentences	all	involve	physical	causation	without	negative	connotations.		Each	provides	a	physically	descriptive,	non-evaluative	context	 for	which	cause	 seems	to	have	a	specialized	neutral	meaning.		The	possibility	that	this	represents	a	separate,	register-specific	sense	is	discussed	in	section	3	below.				 In	its	core	usage,	it	seems	that	cause	is	more	general	than	many	of	the	other	periphrastic	causatives	discussed	 in	the	previous	chapter,	except	 for	 its	associated	inference	of	negative	sentiment.		Like	make,	modulo	sentiment,	cause	is	an	available	paraphrase	for	effectuating	causative	verbs:	(163)	 a.	 Mary	got	Bill	to	make	a	terrible	mistake			 	 	 →	Mary	caused	Bill	to	make	a	terrible	mistake			 b.	 Mary	had	Bill	commit	the	crime		 	 	 →	Mary	caused	Bill	to	commit	the	crime		
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	 c.	 Mary	forced	Bill	to	cheat	the	customers		 	 	 →	Mary	caused	Bill	to	cheat	the	customers		And,	 unlike	 make,	 cause	 can	 also	 paraphrase	 negative	 sentiment	 enabling	causatives:	(164)	 	 Bill	let	the	criminal	escape	→	Bill	caused	the	criminal	to	escape.		Based	 on	 these	 judgments,	 it	 seems	 that,	 absent	 sentiment,	 non-formal	 cause	 is	indeed	the	general	causative	verb	that	has	been	proposed.		 A	 hypothesis	 is	 that	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 of	 cause	 is	 associated	with	 the	affective	state	of	the	speaker	of	the	sentence,	rather	than	that	of	any	argument	of	the	verb.	 	 In	particular,	 I	propose	that	the	sentiment	is	that	of	the	speaker	rather	than	the	subject	of	the	sentence.		Suppose	Mary	is	unethical	and	recruiting	for	a	scheme:	(165)	 	 Mary	caused	Bill	to	participate	in	her	nefarious	plot.	In	this	sentence,	it	is	presumably	the	speaker,	rather	than	Mary,	who	is	critical	of		Mary’s	plot.		It	further	seems	that	negative	sentiment	is	more	like	a	condition	of	use	(like	 a	 semantic	 harmony	 condition	 of	 some	 kind)	 rather	 than	 something	 that	 is	intentionally	expressed	by	the	speaker.	 	This	intuition	is	based	on	obscurity	of	this	meaning	to	introspection	on	the	meaning	of	cause,	which	might	suggest	that	it	is	not	intentionally	 selected	 for	 an	 expressive	 purpose.	 	 In	 this	 way	 cause	 differs	 from	expressives,	slurs,	and	epithets:	(166)	 a.	 This	damn	computer	is	too	slow.		 b.	 That	honky	Bill	is	always	complaining.		 c.	 Jim	is	one	stupid	bastard.		For	the	sentences	in	(166),	damn,	honky,	and	bastard,	respectively,	are	explicitly	and	intentionally	used	by	the	speaker	to	express	some	intensity	of	emotion	or	evaluative	
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stance.		This	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case	with	cause.		If	I	am	told	about	some	event	that	John	caused	it	to	happen,	I	do	not	assume	that	it	is	a	part	of	the	speaker’s	intent	to	inform	me	of	her	negative	sentiment	toward	the	event,	even	if	I	am	able	to	infer	that	sentiment	based	on	her	use	of	the	word.		In	that	way,	cause	differs	as	well	from	words	 that	have	negative	sentiment	as	an	apparent	part	of	 their	asserted,	at-issue	content,	 like	 sloppy,	 disgusting,	 or	 the	 pre-adverbial	 excess	 particle	 too	 as	 in	 he’s	
driving	too	fast	or	he’s	driving	too	slow.		For	these	lexemes,	negation	of	the	evaluative	stance	results	in	falsity.89			Reflection	suggests	that	when	cause	is	used	with	positive	speaker	 sentiment,	 as	 in	 (160b),	 the	 result	 is	 infelicity	 but	 not	 ungrammaticality,	and	 expressive	 inappropriateness	 but	 not	 falsity.	 	 A	 fuller	 discussion	 of	 these	intuitions	and	an	attempt	to	characterize	the	nature	of	the	meaning	associated	with	
cause	is	given	in	section	2	below.		
1.2	 Corpus	Studies			 In	recent	years,	much	work	has	been	done	and	many	technological	advances	have	 been	 made	 in	 the	 area	 of	 sentiment	 analysis.	 	 Machine	 learning	 and	 data	mining	techniques,	in	particular,	have	yielded	powerful	computational	resources	for	the	automatic	classification	of	author	sentiment	in	various	domains	(see	e.g.	Pang	et	al.	2002,	Pang	&	Lee	2008,	Hatzivassiloglou	&	McKeown	1997,	Kennedy	&	 Inkpen	2006,	Blair-Goldensohn	et	al.	2008).		In	what	follows,	however,	a	rather	more	naïve																																																									89	Negative	 sentiment	 of	 these	 kinds	 of	words	 can	 sometimes	 be	 contradicted	 for	 poetic	 effect:	 “I	wish	they’d	invent	a	cereal	for	someone	who	like	it	all	floppy	and	drippy	and	droppy	and	lumpy	and	sloppy	and	soggy	and	gloopy	and	gooey	and	mushy	and	nice”	(“Cereal”,	Shel	Silverstein).	
	 146	
approach	to	sentiment	classification	is	employed,	in	which	the	relative	frequencies	of	right	adjacent	evaluative	adjectives	(good	and	bad)	are	compared	for	the	verbs	of	interest	as	a	means	of	gauging	whether	certain	verbs	have	evaluative	connotations	as	reflected	solely	by	their	selectional	properties.		 Prior	to	that	study,	though,	data	were	collected	to	shed	light	on	the	general	selectional	behavior	of	the	verb.		In	order	to	probe	whether	the	verb	cause	expresses	negative	sentiment	toward	the	caused	subevent	 in	naturally	occurring	sentences,	 I	collected	sentences	from	COCA	containing	tokens	of	cause	 followed	by	pronominal	NPs90	 and	 an	 infinitival	 VP	 headed	 by	 to,	 similar	 to	 the	 collection	method	 for	 the	study	 described	 in	 chapter	 2.	 	 As	 described	 there,	 COCA	 is	 a	 450	 million	 word	balanced	 corpus,	 equally	 divided	 among	 spoken,	 fiction,	 popular	magazines,	 news	texts,	and	academic	publications,	as	well	as	by	year	for	each	year	from	1990-2015.		In	 all,	 1,853	 sentences	 matched	 this	 frame.	 	 In	 order	 to	 get	 a	 general	 picture	 of	collocation	behavior,	a	search	was	then	performed	to	gauge	the	frequency	of	the	five	most	 common	 complement	 verb	 stems	 for	 cause	 alongside	 the	 five	most	 frequent	complement	verbs	for	the	other	periphrastic	causatives	discussed	in	chapter	2.		The	number	 of	 occurrences	 in	 the	 corpus	 of	 ‘[cause]	 NP	 to	 V’	 for	 each	 verb	was	 then	divided	by	 the	 total	number	of	verb	complements	of	cause	 in	 that	structure	 in	 the	corpus,	giving	a	frequency	of	each	complement	verb	normalized	by	the	total	number	of	sentences	matching	the	frame.	 	This	 is	not	the	optimal	normalization	procedure	for	 looking	 at	 collocates	 of	 a	 single	 periphrastic,	 but	 it	 is	 useful	 for	 comparing	
																																																								90	 In	particular,	 singular	pronouns	me,	him,	 and	 it.	 	Omitting	you	 to	 restrict	 the	 search	 to	 singular	subjects,	and	omitting	her	to	avoid	the	homophonous	possessive	pronoun.	
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collocate	 frequencies	 across	 periphrastics,	 as	 is	 done	 below.	 	 A	 more	 useful	 and	revealing	normalization	is	described	following	that	discussion.		 The	results	 for	cause	 are	given	 in	 figure	28	below.	 	The	bar	graph	 indicates	the	 frequency	of	occurrence	of	 the	verb	as	a	proportion	of	all	 sentences	collected.		For	example,	the	verb	be	was	the	most	frequent,	occurring	in	119	sentences	out	of	the	1853	sentences	that	match	the	‘[cause]	NP	to	[V]’	frame,	or	6.422%	of	sentences,	as	shown	by	the	 leftmost	bar	of	 the	graph.	 	As	mentioned	above,	cause	 sometimes	occurs	 in	 sentiment-neutral	 contexts.	 	 The	most	 frequent	 verbal	 collocates	 of	 the	verb	across	all	COCA	contexts,	however,	 include	 the	negative	 terms	 lose,	miss,	 and	
fall:	 	
	Figure	28:	distribution	of	representative	verbs	occurring	in	the	complement	clause	of	cause.	
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A	weighted	 average	 of	 sentiment	 scores	 for	 the	 collocate	 verb	 does,	 in	 fact,	 skew	negative.	Taking	the	difference	of	the	positive	and	negative	scores	for	each	verb	as	determined	 by	 SentiWordNet	 -	 http://sentiwordnet.isti.cnr.it/index.php,	 and	 see	description	in	Section	1.3	below	–	multiplying	this	by	the	proportional	frequency	of	its	 occurrence	 with	 cause	 and	 summing	 these	 weighted	 sentiment	 scores	 gives	 a	value	 of	 -0.018348624.	 	 Since	 this	 verb	 set	 represents	 frequent	 collocates	 for	 all	causatives,	most	are	associated	with	neither	positive	nor	negative	sentiment,	which	might	explain	why	the	negative	skew	for	 the	verbs	out	of	context	 is	so	slight	even	while	 the	 causative	 sub-events	 indicated	 by	 the	 corpus	 sentences	 in	 context	 for	
cause	are	so	clearly	negative.				 A	comparison	of	the	selectional	biases	of	the	other	periphrastics	for	some	of	the	most	frequent	verb	collocates	of	cause	is	given	in	the	graph	below.		In	this	graph,	collocation	 with	 the	 verb	 is	 given	 a	 percentage	 of	 collocation	 with	 all	 of	 the	periphrastics	 examined	 here.	 	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 78	 examples	 of	 ‘[cause]	me|him|it	to	[lose]’	and	202	occurrences	of	‘{periphrastic}	me|him|it	(to)	[lose]’	for	any	of	 the	eight	verbs	on	the	x-axis,	so	collocation	with	cause	 represents	38.6%	of	the	total	of	lose	with	the	periphrastics	examined	here:	
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	Figure	29:	collocation	of	lose	(black),	miss	(gray),	and	fall	(white)	with	the	periphrastics	as	a	percentage	of	the	total.		These	 data	 seem	 to	 suggest	 that	 let	 is	 preferentially	 selected	 by	 fall	 among	 these	verbs	by	far.		However,	these	numbers	are	skewed	by	the	relative	frequencies	of	the	causatives	 themselves	 and	 let	 is	 by	 far	 the	 most	 frequent	 of	 these	 verbs	 in	 the	periphrastic	frame,	even	more	frequent	than	make.	 	For	a	more	accurate	picture	of	relative	 selectional	 preferences	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 verb,	 these	 data	 must	 be	
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normalized	by	the	frequency	of	the	periphrastic	verb.		Those	data	are	presented	in	the	graph	below:	
	Figure	30:		Frequency,	normalized	by	periphrastic,	for	lose	(black),	miss	(gray),	fall	(white).		These	 data	 show	 that	 fall	 preferentially	 selects	 cause	 first,	 and	 let	 second	 most	among	these	periphrastic	verbs.		This	graph	illustrates	that	cause,	much	more	than	any	other	periphrastic	causative	examined	here,	is	preferentially	selected	for	by	the	negative	verbs	lose,	miss,	and	fall.	
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	 The	 results	 are	 even	 more	 clearly	 suggestive	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 negative	sentiment	 selectional	 bias	 of	 cause	 when	 the	 verb	 collocates	 are	 normalized	 by	frequency.	 	 A	 normalization	 procedure	 of	 this	 type	 is	 necessary	 to	 neutralize	 the	effects	on	the	results	based	on	frequency	of	the	collocate	verb	itself.		In	other	words,	this	 is	a	means	of	controlling	for	effects	of	frequencies	of	the	comparison	class.	 	 In	the	comparison	graph	above,	the	comparison	class	was	the	set	of	periphrastic	verbs,	so	 the	 normalization	 procedure	 neutralized	 the	 effects	 of	 their	 frequency.	 	 Here,	when	looking	at	the	selection	patterns	of	a	single	verb,	cause,	the	comparison	class	is	the	set	of	collocate	verbs,	so	their	frequency	should	be	normalized	in	order	to	get	a	clearer	picture	of	 selection	preferences	 in	 terms	of	 their	meaning.	 	For	example,	the	 adjective	 good	 (476338	 occurrences	 in	 COCA)	 is	 much	 more	 frequent	 than	
apocalyptic	(1239	occurrences	in	COCA)	so	it	 is	not	surprising	that	there	are	more	occurrences	 of	 “[cause]	 good”	 (6)	 than	 “[cause]	 apocalyptic”	 (1).	 	 But	 it	would	 be	erroneous	to	draw	semantic	conclusions	from	this	fact	since	the	difference	is	likely	an	 effect	 of	 the	 differences	 in	 frequency	 for	 the	 adjectives,	 rather	 than	 the	selectional	preferences	of	the	verb.	 	However,	if	we	normalize	by	the	adjective,	the	frequencies	become	6/476338	=	1.259	*	10-5	for	“[cause]	good”	and	1/1239=	8.071	*	 10-4	 for	 “[cause]	 apocalyptic”,	 showing	 the	 latter	 to	 be	 much	 more	 frequent	proportionally.	 	 This	would	 be	 a	 better	measure	 of	 the	 selectional	 preferences	 of	
cause	in	terms	of	the	meaning	of	its	adjectival	collocates.		 In	the	graph	below,	counts	of	verbs	in	the	‘[cause]	NP	to	V’	frame	are	divided	by	the	total	number	of	their	occurrences	in	the	corpus.		As	described	above,	this	is	a	procedure	for	neutralizing	the	effects	of	the	frequency	of	the	collocate	verb	in	order	
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to	 target	 the	 meaning	 biases	 in	 the	 selection	 pattern,	 rather	 than	 examining	 a	selection	pattern	that	might	be	an	artifact	of	the	frequencies	of	the	selected	words	themselves.		The	verb	be	occurs	1,942,849	times	in	the	corpus,	so	the	occurrences	in	the	complement	of	cause	(119	occurrences)	are	0.006125%	of	the	total.	 	There	are	78	occurrences	of	 the	verb	 lose	 in	 the	complement	of	cause,	 and	only	36,208	 total	occurrences	 of	 lose	 in	 the	 corpus,	 so	 the	 occurrences	 in	 the	 complement	 of	 the	periphrastic	represent	0.215%	of	total	occurrences,	as	shown	by	the	leftmost	bar	in	the	chart	below:	
	Figure	31:	distribution	of	verbs	occurring	in	the	complement	clause	of	cause	normalized	by	frequency		
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With	this	normalization,	be	no	longer	dominates	the	selection	preference	ranking	as	a	result	of	its	high	frequency.		Instead	lose	is	ranked	as	the	most	frequent,	as	a	result	of	 its	 high	 frequency	 with	 cause	 relative	 to	 its	 general	 frequency	 in	 the	 corpus.		Under	 this	 normalization,	 lose,	miss,	 and	 fall	 are	 shown	 to	 be	 highly	 favored	 by	
cause.		Example	sentences	include	the	following:	(167)	 a.	 “…his	daughter’s	murder	has	not	caused	him	to	lose	faith	in	God	or	his			 	 works.”		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Atlantic	Magazine,	2015)		 b.	 “…she	continues	to	recover	from	stress	fractures	in	her	legs	that			 	 caused	her	to	miss	almost	half	of	last	season.”	 	 	 		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (WashPost,	2007)		 c.	 “…the	policemen	struck	him	in	the	head	with	a	gun,	causing	him	to	fall			 	 to	the	floor.”	 	 	 	 	 	 (ArabStudies,	2010)				These	sentences	are	all	non-controversially	negative	 from	the	point	of	view	of	 the	writer.				 In	 order	 to	 test	 sentiment	 across	 a	 larger	 corpus,	 the	 data	 below	 were	gathered	via	Google’s	Ngram	Viewer,	which	returns	the	percentage	of	n-grams	(for	“caused	 bad”,	 then,	 the	 percentage	 of	 all	 two-word	 strings)	 in	 a	 half-trillion	word	corpus	based	on	Google	Books.	By	that	measure,	in	published	books	the	verb	occurs	more	 frequently	 with	 the	 clearly	 negative	 adjective	 bad	 than	 the	 clearly	 positive	
good.91	
																																																								91	 Note	 that	 here,	 as	 elsewhere,	 Google	 N-grams	 evaluates	 only	 sequences	 of	 words,	 and	 not	hierarchical	syntactic	structure	reflecting	constituency.		Most	of	the	‘caused	good/bad’	tokens	likely	are	 the	 verb	with	 the	 adjectival	modifier	 of	 some	noun	phrase	 that	 is	 not	 included.	 	One	 example,	from	a	book	published	in	1995,	is	the	sentence	fragment	“six	commonly	prescribed	medications	that	
caused	bad	allergic	reactions	for	me.”	
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	Figure	32:	frequency	of	‘caused	good’	and	‘caused	bad’	in	Google’s	collection	of	published	books	1950-2000.			This	 is	 despite	 the	 relatively	 greater	 frequency	 in	 the	 corpus	 of	 good	 across	contexts:		
	Figure	33:	frequency	of	‘good’	and	‘bad’	in	Google’s	collection	of	published	books	1950-2000.			The	normalized	values	–	for	which	the	bigrams	are	divided	by	the	total	counts	in	the	corpus	 of	good	 and	bad,	 respectively	 –	 illustrate	 significant	 differences	 in	 relative	frequencies.		In	particular,	the	relative	frequency	with	bad	is	around	17	times	higher	than	the	relative	frequency	with	good	in	2000:	
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	Figure	34:	normalized	frequency	of	caused	good	and	caused	bad	–	normalized	by	total	counts	of	good	and	bad,	respectively	–	in	Google’s	collection	of	published	books	1950-2000.		As	shown	in	Figure	34,	cause	occurs	with	bad	proportionally	much	more	than	with	
good,	 which,	 when	 normalized	 by	 the	 frequency	 of	 good,	 is	 negligible.	 	 	 In	comparison,	 other	 causative	 constructions	 more	 or	 less	 reflect	 the	 underlying	frequency	of	the	adjective:92	
	Figure	35:	various	causative	constructions	with	‘good’	and	‘bad’.																																																									92	It	is	worth	noting	that,	when	normalized,	led	to	favors	bad	to	good:	
		This	 is	 interesting	 and	 possibly	 indicative	 of	 a	 sentiment	 bias	 of	 the	 causative	 verb	 lead,	 but	 the	possibility	is	not	examined	further	here.	
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	The	graph	above	shows	 that	other	causative	constructions,	which	are	represented	here	by	 those	headed	by	 resulted	 in,	 led	 to,	 and	brought	about,	 are	more	 frequent	with	good	than	with	bad,	which	is	consistent	with	the	relative	frequency	of	good	and	
bad	in	the	corpus,	and	unlike	the	distribution	of	cause	with	these	adjectives.			 When	directly	 compared	with	made,	 the	 graph	below	 shows	 that	 caused	 is	better	 with	 the	 negative	 adjective	 bad	 independent	 of	 the	 frequency	 of	 the	periphrastic	causative	verb:	
	Figure	36:	Relative	frequency	of	caused	and	made	with	bad,	normalized	by	total	counts	of	caused	and	
made,	respectively.		And,	unsurprisingly	given	 the	 trends	so	 far,	make	 is	much	more	 frequent	with	 the	positive	 adjective	 good	 than	 is	 cause,	 which	 barely	 registers	 in	 the	 corpus	 when	normalized	by	the	frequency	of	the	causative	verb:93	
																																																								93	Note	the	polysemy	with	the	“construct”	sense	of	make:	John	made	good	birdhouses	last	week.		This	felicitous	 possibility	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 grammatical	 tagging	 in	 the	 corpus	 mean	 these	 data	 are	 only	suggestive	as	a	direct	comparison	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs.		More	controlled	investigations	are	described	below.	
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	Figure	37:	Relative	frequency	of	caused	and	made	with	good,	normalized	by	total	counts	of	caused	and	made,	respectively.		These	 trends	 are	 suggestive	 and	 appear	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 very	 strong	 bias	 for	negative	sentiment	collocates	with	the	verb	cause	that	are	explainable	only	in	terms	of	 the	 selectional	 behavior	 of	 that	 particular	 verb,	 rather	 than	 the	 relative	frequencies	 of	 the	 adjectives	 used	 or	 the	 general	 behavior	 of	 causative	constructions.				 These	 data	 invite	 a	 more	 careful	 and	 controlled	 exploration	 of	 sentiment	encoding	 of	 this	 seemingly	 neutral	 and	 sematically	 basic	 –	 even	 near-functional	 –	lexeme	 cause.	 	 Although	 the	 corpus	 data	 seem	 to	 clearly	 demonstrate	 that	 cause	favors	negative	sentiment,	naturally	occurring	sentences	in	such	large	datasets	are	subject	 to	 any	number	of	 variables	 and	potential	 confounds.	 	 To	 verify	 a	negative	sentiment	 bias,	 a	 more	 focused	 exploration	 is	 needed	 for	 a	 single	 uniform	construction	type,	from	which	quantitative	conclusions	can	be	drawn	and	to	which	statistical	 tests	can	be	applied.	 	 	An	attempt	at	such	an	exploration	 is	described	 in	the	following	section.				
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1.3	 Cause	and	Make	Experimental	Findings			 Two	 blocks	 of	 elicitations	 were	 performed	 to	 determine	 the	 potential	sentiment	 bias	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	 cause	 as	 compared	 to	 the	hypothesized	sentiment-neutral	verb	make.		Although	the	second	block	is	the	more	sophisticated	 of	 the	 two	 and	 represents	 a	 correction	 and	 refinement	 of	 the	problemmatic	 first	 block,	 both	 are	 described	 here	 in	 order	 to	 illustrate	 both	 the	rationale	behind	the	approach	and	the	subtlety	of	the	dimensions	of	meaning	for	the	verbs	 examined	 here.	 	 The	 two	 experimental	 results	 also	 provide	 evidence	 for	 a	sense	distinction	that	will	be	discussed	in	section	3.3.			
1.3.1 First Experimental Block 
		 The	first	experimental	block	compared	cause	and	make	in	minimal	frames	in	order	 to	 gauge	 what,	 if	 any,	 evaluative	 meaning	 is	 introduced	 by	 the	 verbs	themselves.		These	frames	were	later	found	to	introduce	sentiment-relevant	biases	that	required	correction,	as	described	in	1.3.2	below.		In	this	section,	this	initial	set	of	experiments	is	described	and	their	results	presented.	
1.3.1.1	 Methodology			 In	order	 to	 isolate	sentiment	 from	context,	 twenty	(20)	native	or	proficient	English	speakers	were	recruited	to	supply	adjectives	 in	a	hypothesized	sentiment-neutral	 frame.	 	 The	 instructions	 were	 as	 follows:	 “Please	 give	 three	 appropriate	(natural	sounding)	adjectives	for	the	position	in	each	of	the	sentences	indicated	by	
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the	 blank,”	 followed	 by	 three	 blanks	 underneath	 each	 of	 the	 following	 sentences,	presented	in	random	order:	John	caused	the	very	___________	event	to	happen.	John	made	the	very	___________	event	happen.		This	produced	sixty	(60)	adjective	tokens	for	each	verb,	with	forty-six	(46)	unique	adjectives	 for	 cause,	 forty-eight	 (48)	 unique	 adjectives	 for	make.	 	 Seventeen	 (17)	adjectives	were	given	for	both	cause	and	make,	resulting	in	a	total	of	seventy-seven	(77)	unique	adjectives	elicited:	
Cause  Make  All Adjectives  
       
bad (3) random annoying 
interesting 
(4) annoying explosive problematic 
banal recent anticipated large anticipated extraordinary random 
beneficial 
same (2) 
 astonishing long astonishing extreme recent 
chaotic scary (2) awesome lovely awesome fluid sad 
crazy serious awkward lucrative awkward fun same 
crucial short bad magical bad futuristic scandalous 
detailed small big positive banal good scary 
disasterous 
(2) somber bland random beneficial grand serious 
dreadful special boring (2) recent big happy short 
exciting (4) strange (2) calm (2) sad bland horrible small 
extraordinary successful convoluted scandalous boring important smooth 
extreme 
surprising 
(2) crazy (2) scary calm improbable somber 
fluid terrible (2) cute smooth chaotic interesting special 
fun (3) troublesome delightful special (2) convoluted intriguing strange 
horrible troubling difficult (2) successful crazy joyous successful 
important unexpected droll surprising crucial large surprising 
improbable unique elegant unlikely cute late terrible 
interesting unlikely exciting (3) unusual delightful long troublesome 
intriguing unusual exclusive 
wonderful 
(2) detailed lovely troubling 
joyous wild explosive  difficult lucrative unexpected 
late  fun  disasterous magical unique 
memorable 
(2)  futuristic  dreadful memorable unlikely 
new  good  droll new unusual 
nice  grand  elegant nice wild 
painful  happy (2)  exciting painful wonderful 
problematic  important(2)  exclusive positive  Figure	38:	Experiment	block	1	elicited	adjectives.	
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	 	 The	 elicited	 adjectives	 were	 then	 presented	 in	 random,	 varying	 order	 to	forty-three	(43)	native	or	near-native	English	speakers,	who	were	asked	to	rate	the	positivity	 or	 negativity	 of	 the	 adjectives	 on	 a	 7-point	 Likert	 scale.	 	 A	 sample	fragment	of	the	questionnaire	is	reproduced	below:			
 
 
Please rate the following adjectives in terms of their negativity or positivity 
by circling a number between 1 and 7; with 1 indicating a very negative 
adjective, 4 indicating a neutral adjective, and 7 indicating a very positive 
adjective. 
          
  NEGATIVE    POSITIVE 
          
interesting  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
calm  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
extraordinary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
chaotic  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
painful  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  	 Figure	39:	Sentiment	Likert	questionnaire	stimulus	sample.			These	 data	 were	 also	 checked	 against	 the	 sentiment	 lexicon	 SentiWordNet	(http://sentiwordnet.isti.cnr.it/index.php),	 a	 semi-supervised	 sentiment	classification	 of	WordNet	 senses.	 	 SentiWordNet	 automatically	 classifies	words	 in	WordNet	synsets	of	well-known	seed	sets	of	positive,	negative,	and	neutral	words	and	assigns	a	score	 for	each	of	 the	 three	paramaters	summing	 to	one	(1)	 for	each	
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word	 based	 on	 averages	 of	 classifications	 (see	 Baccianella	 et	 al.	 2010	 for	description).		To	get	a	single	numerical	value	for	each	of	the	adjectives	for	simplicity	and	 in	order	 to	have	a	direct	 analog	 to	experimentally	obtained	sentiment	 scores,	negative	values	were	subtracted	from	positive	values,	resulting	in	a	range	of	values	[1,-1].	 	The	raw	SentiWordNet	scores,	along	with	all	 raw	experimental	 results,	are	included	in	the	Appendix.		
1.3.1.2	 Data	and	Analysis				 The	 mean	 rating	 for	 adjectives	 given	 for	 the	 cause	 sentences	 was	 more	negative	 than	 those	 given	 for	 the	 make	 sentences	 for	 both	 the	 experimentally	elicited	 sentiment	 rankings	 and	 the	 SentiWordNet-based	 scores,	 but	 only	 for	 the	SentiWordNet	 scores	 was	 the	 difference	 statistically	 significant	 (p	 <	 0.05).	 	 The	difference	between	the	means	of	the	experimentally	elicited	ratings	is	below:	
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		 Figure	40:	Boxplot	for	experimental	sentiment	ratings	of	block	1	elicited	adjectives.			In	Figure	40,	paired	boxplots	 showing	quartiles	of	 sentiment	 ratings	 for	adjectives	given	 in	 the	cause	 and	make	 sentence	 frames	are	given.	 	Mean	sentiment	 rating	 is	indicated	by	the	open	circle	and	the	p-value,	a	measure	of	 the	probability	 that	 the	difference	of	means	is	due	to	chance,	is	given	in	the	lower	right	corner	of	the	figure.		Although	 the	 ratings	 indicate	 that	 cause	 adjectives	 are	 on	 average	more	 negative	
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than	make	sentences,	this	difference	failed	to	reach	a	common	measure	of	statistical	significance,	since	p	>	0.05.		 As	described	above,	 the	adjectives	given	by	 the	experimental	subjects	were	also	 checked	 against	 the	 sentiment	 values	 in	 the	 online	 sentiment	 lexicon,	SentiWordNet	 (http://sentiwordnet.isti.cnr.it/index.php).	 	An	example	of	one	such	sentiment	score,	for	the	adjective	painful,	is	given	in	the	figure	below:		
		 Figure	41:	Example	of	SentiWordNet	sentiment	scores.				As	 mentioned,	 each	 word	 in	 SentiWordNet	 is	 given	 three	 values:	 a	 positive	sentiment	 score	 (p),	 a	 negative	 sentiment	 score	 (n),	 and	 an	 objective	 (neutral)	sentiment	 score	 (o).	 	 In	 order	 to	 obtain	 a	 single	 number	 comparable	 to	 the	experimentally	 obtained	 ratings,	 the	 negative	 score	 was	 subtracted	 from	 the	positive	score	 (p	–	n),	and	 these	numbers	were	collected	 for	all	elicited	adjectives	from	the	cause	and	make	sentences	(see	1.2.2	below	for	discussion	of	correlation	of	the	two	measures	and	see	Appendix	for	all	raw	data).	
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	Figure	42:	Boxplot	for	SentiWordNet	sentiment	ratings	of	block	1	elicited	adjectives.			As	was	described	 for	 figure	 40	 above,	mean	 sentiment	 ranking	 is	 indicated	by	 the	open	circle	and	the	p-value	is	given	in	the	lower	right	corner	of	the	figure.		Unlike	for	the	 experimentally	 obtained	 ratings,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 mean	 of	SentiWordNet	values	for	the	cause	and	make	does	reach	statistical	significance	(p	<	0.05).		However,	this	is	less	robust	than	expected	given	the	clear	difference	observed	
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in	 the	 corpus.	 	 One	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 that	 there	 might	 be	 confounds	 in	 the	sentence	 frames	 themselves.	 	 	 To	 explore	 this	 possibility,	 a	 second	 block	 of	experiments	was	performed.				
1.3.2 Second Experimental Block 
	
	
	 Guided	 by	 a	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 data	were	 being	 skewed	by	 both	 a	 formal	register	bias,	 triggered	by	the	 inclusion	of	 the	word	event	 (see	section	3	below	for	discussion),	 and	 by	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 definite	 article	 the,	 which	 has	 been	independently	 shown	 to	 favor	 neutral	 sentiment	 (Davis	 and	 Potts	 2009),	modifications	 were	 made	 to	 the	 experimental	 materials	 for	 a	 second	 block	 of	adjective	elicitation,	described	in	this	section.		
	
1.3.2.1	 Methodology	
	
		 To	 correct	 for	 suspected	 formal	 register	 and	 neutral	 sentiment	 biases,	 the	sentences	described	 in	 section	1.2.1	 above	were	 altered	 from	 “John	V-ed	 the	 very	_______	event	to	happen”	to	the	following	sentence	frames:	John	caused	a	very	___________	thing	to	happen.	John	made	a	very	___________	thing	happen.		Three	(3)	adjectives	 for	each	verb	were	collected	 from	eighty-three	(83)	native	or	proficient	English	speakers.		This	produced	two	hundred	forty-nine	(249)	adjective	tokens	 for	 each	 verb,	with	 eighty-four	 (84)	 unique	 adjectives	 for	 cause	 and	 sixty-
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nine	(69)	unique	adjectives	 for	make.	 	Thirty-seven	(37)	adjectives	were	given	 for	both	 cause	 and	make,	 resulting	 in	 a	 total	 of	 one	 hundred	 sixteen	 (116)	 unique	adjectives	elicited:	 	
		Figure	43:	Experimental	block	2	elicited	adjectives		
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SentiWordNet-based	 scores	 were	 collected	 for	 these	 adjectives	 and	 solicited	sentiment	 ratings	 from	 the	 previous	 experiment	were,	when	 available,	 applied	 to	the	new	adjective	 sets.	 	The	 scores	 for	 the	adjectives	across	 the	experimental	 and	SentiWordNet	ratings	had	a	correlation	of	0.7574034,	indicating	a	strong	agreement	between	 the	 two	measures.	 	 A	 plot	 of	 the	 two	measures	with	 a	 regression	 line	 is	below:94		
	Figure	44:	elicited	sentiment	ratings	plotted	against	SentiWordNet	scores	with	regression	line.																																																									94	The	linear	relation	between	the	data	is	highly	significant	(p	=	1.568e-15)	and	the	regression	line	has	a	high	explanatory	value	for	the	data	(R2	=	0.5737)	
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		This	chart	replaces	points	representing	experimentally	elicited	scores	(y-axis)	and	SentiWordNet	scores	(x-axis)	for	individual	adjectives	with	the	adjective	itself.		The	extent	to	which	these	data	fall	on	a	straight	line	is	a	measure	of	the	extent	to	which	the	two	methods	of	evaluation	agree.		Although	this	can	be	difficult	to	read	in	places	where	words	overlap	(the	ideal	situation	if	agreement	between	the	two	measures	is	desired,	 with	 resultant	 bunching	 along	 the	 regression	 line),	 it	 is	 a	 useful	visualization	 in	 terms	 of	 locating	 the	words	 for	which	 the	 two	measures	 differ	 in	their	 evaluation.	 	 In	 most	 of	 the	 cases	 for	 which	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 significant	disagreement,	 represented	 by	 deviation	 from	 the	 regression	 line	 (joyous,	magical,	
problematic),	 the	 experimental	 results	 are	 more	 intuitively	 accurate	 than	 the	SentiWordNet	 scores	 (joyous	 and	 magical	 are	 not	 negative,	 problematic	 is	 not	neutral).	 	 One	 major	 exception	 is	 the	 positive	 word	 droll,	 which	 experimental	subjects	rated	as	negative.		A	possible	reason	for	this	is	unfamiliarity	with	the	word	combined	 with	 sound	 symbolic	 associations	 with,	 e.g.	 dull,	 dreadful.	 	 The	significance	of	the	regression	line	(p	=	1.58e-15)	and	the	fact	that	the	majority	of	the	words	lie	on	or	close	to	it,	however,	shows	that	the	two	methods	generally	agreed	in	their	relative	sentiment	ratings	for	these	adjectives.									
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1.3.2.2	 Data	and	Analysis	
	
	 By	both	methods,	adjectives	in	the	cause	sentence	frame	were	more	negative	than	 those	 in	 the	make	 sentence	 frame,	and	 the	difference	was	 found	 to	be	highly	significant:	
		 Figure	45:	Boxplot	for	SentiWordNet	sentiment	ratings	of	block	2	elicited	adjectives		
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	Figure	46:	Boxplot	for	elicited	sentiment	ratings	of	block	2	elicited	adjectives		As	above,	these	charts	give	paired	boxplots	for	the	difference	in	sentiment	scores	for	the	adjectives	with	cause	 and	make,	with	scores	either	obtained	via	SentiWordNet	(figure	45)	or	experimentally	elicited	(figure	46)	 	The	wide	difference	between	 the	boxplots	 for	 cause	 and	 make	 under	 both	 measures	 indicates	 that	 the	 collocate	
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adjectives	 for	 the	 two	 words	 differ	 widely	 in	 their	 associated	 sentiment,	 with	adjectives	 in	 the	 cause	 frame	 significantly	 more	 negative	 than	 those	 in	 the	make	frame	in	both	cases.		 These	 data	 clearly	 demonstrate	 that	 cause,	 rather	 than	 representing	 a	general	 causative	 verb	 as	 has	 been	 previously	 assumed,	 indicates	 negative	sentiment	on	the	part	of	the	speaker	toward	the	described	subevent.		In	addition	to	a	 bare	 event-structural	 component	 of	 meaning,	 then,	 cause	 includes	 a	 kind	 of	meaning	 –	 speaker	 sentiment	 –	 more	 commonly	 associated	 with	 expressives	 or	slurs.	 	 However,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 negative	meaning	 demonstrated	 in	 this	 section	seems	to	differ	in	several	ways	from	that	for	expressives	or	slurs	or	other	words	of	that	kind.	 	An	attempt	 to	discover	and	characterize	 just	what	kind	of	meaning	 the	negative	 sentiment	 that	 is	 associated	with	 cause	 is	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 the	 following	section.	
		
2.	 Negative	 sentiment	 cause	 and	 varieties	 of	 projective	
meaning			 Several	outstanding	questions	regarding	the	sentiment	encoding	described	in	the	previous	section	are	related	to	the	status	of	that	meaning.	 	In	particular,	is	this	meaning	asserted	or	presupposed?		Is	negative	sentiment	entailed	by	the	use	of	this	verb,	implicated	by	its	use,	or	does	it	otherwise	impose	some	limiting	condition	on	its	 felicitous	 utterance?	 	 	 In	 this	 section,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 negative	 sentiment	associated	with	cause	 is	explored	and	shown	to	be	a	variety	of	projecting	content.		
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This	 content	 is	 then	 examined	within	 the	 framework	 of	 Tonhauser	 et	 al.’s	 (2013)	taxonomy	 and	 determined	 to	 fit,	 albeit	 awkwardly,	 in	 the	 set	 they	 call	 “class	 B	inferences”.	 	 It	 is	 then	 claimed	 that	 negative	 sentiment	 is	 not	 entered	 into	 the	common	 ground	 by	 the	 felicitous	 use	 of	 cause,	 with	 consequences	 in	 question	answering	and	redundancy	effects.		
2.1		Projective	content	and	the	Family	of	Sentences				 It	 is	 immediately	 clear	 that	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 associated	 with	periphrastic	cause	as	established	in	the	preceding	section	is	a	projecting	component	of	meaning,	in	that	it	survives	certain	entailment-cancelling	environments:	(168)	 	 John	didn’t	cause	iti	to	happen.		#Iti	was	a	good	thing.	In	 this	 sentence,	 cause	 is	 infelicitous	 with	 a	 good	 thing	 despite	 being	 embedded	under	negation:	the	negative	sentiment	is	not	cancelled	by	negation	and	is	therefore	said	 to	 “project”	 outside	of	 this	 operator,	 or	be	 “inherited”	by	 it.	 	 The	property	of	projection	 has	 historically	 been	 most	 frequently	 studied	 in	 connection	 with	presuppositions	(e.g.	Horn	1972,	Karttunen	1973,	Karttunen	&	Peters	1975).		It	has	been	 well	 established	 by	 these	 researcers	 and	 others	 that,	 simply	 put,	“presuppositions	survive	in	linguistic	contexts	where	entailments	cannot”	(Levinson	1983,	 191).	 	 Entailments,	 for	 example,	 are	 cancelled	 by	 negation,	 while	presuppositions	survive	it:	(169)	 a.	 Fido	is	a	beagle.			 b.	 Fido	isn’t	a	beagle.		 c.	 Fido	is	a	dog.	
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		 d.	 John’s	dog	is	hungry.		 e.	 John’s	dog	isn’t	hungry.		 f.	 John	has	a	dog.		Among	the	sentences	in	(169),	the	following	relationships	hold:	c	follows	from	a,	but	doesn’t	 follow	 from	 b,	 while	 f	 follows	 from	 either	 d	 or	 e.	 	 Fido	 is	 a	 dog	 is	 an	entailment	 of	 Fido	 is	 a	 beagle,	 so	 it	 is	 cancelled	 by	 negation;	 John	 has	 a	 dog	 is	 a	presupposition	 of	 John’s	 dog	 is	 hungry,	 so	 it	 projects	 outside	 of	 negation.	 	 The	possessive	 is	 a	 presupposition	 trigger.	 	 Other	 presupposition	 triggers	 include	definite	descriptions,	which	presuppose	the	existence	of	the	entity,	factive	verbs	like	
realize,	 which	 presuppose	 the	 truth	 of	 their	 complement,	 implicative	 verbs	 like	
forget	 or	manage,	 which	 vary	 in	 their	 presuppostions,	 and	 various	 other	 lexemes	and	constructions	(see	Levinson	1983,	181ff).		 Projection	has	also	been	observed	for	implications	that	are	not	the	result	of	classical	 presupposition	 triggers,	 including	 non-restrictive	 relative	 clauses	(Chierchia	&	McConnell-Ginet	1990,	351).	 	Furthermore,	projection	occurs	in	other	varieties	of	so-called	conventional	 implicature	such	as	epithets	and	appositives,	as	well	as	expressives	(see	Potts	2005):		(170)	 a.	 If	Bill,	a	big	drinker,	is	here,	we’ll	have	fun.		 b.	 If	that	son-of-a-bitch	Bill	left,	he’d	better	not	have	taken	the	flower			 	 arrangement.		 	 	 	 (Simons	2010,	311)		Both	of	these	sentences	contain	something	in	the	if-clause,	which	blocks	entailments	(see	below),	 that	 is	nonetheless	 implicated.	 	 In	 (170a),	 the	proposition	 that	Bill	 is	here	 is	cancelled,	but	 the	proposition	 that	Bill	 is	a	big	drinker	 is	not.	 	Similarly,	 in	(170b),	 that	Bill	 left	does	not	 follow	 from	 the	 sentence,	but	 that	Bill	 is	 a	 son-of-a-bitch	(or	that	the	speaker	doesn’t	like	Bill)	is	not	blocked	by	the	if-clause.		Both	the	
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content	of	the	non-restrictive	relative	clause	and	the	expressive	content	–	however	that	is	to	be	characterized	–	survive	the	embedding.		 As	defined	 in	 (Simons	et	 al.	 2010),	 “An	 implication	projects	 if	 and	only	 if	 it	survives	 as	 an	 utterance	 implication	 when	 the	 expression	 that	 triggers	 the	implication	occurs	under	the	syntactic	scope	of	an	entailment-cancelling	operator”	(Simons	 et	 al.	 2010,	 309).	 	 Using	 the	 (Chierchia	 &	 McConnel-Ginet	 1990,	 28;		Tonhauser	 et	 al.	 2013)	 “Family	 of	 Sentences”	 diagnostic,	 which	 makes	 use	 of	 a	collection	 of	 such	 entailment-cancelling	 operators,	 negative	 sentiment	 seems	 to	survive	 embeddings	 under	 negation,	 questions,	 if-clauses,	 and	 certain	 epistemic	adverbs,	all	of	which	tend	to	cancel	regular	entailments:	(171)	 a.	 John	caused	the	??good/bad	thing	to	happen.		 b.	 John	didn’t	cause	the	??good/bad	thing	to	happen.		 c.	 Did	John	cause	the	??good/bad	thing	to	happen?		 d.	 If	John	caused	the	??good/bad	thing	to	happen,	he	should	be	located.		 e.	 Perhaps	John	caused	the	??good/bad	thing	to	happen.		In	(171a)	the	existence	of	a	good(bad)	thing	is	presupposed,	which	is	triggered	by	the	definite	determiner	the.95		The	tests	in	(171b-e)	demonstrate	that	there	is	a	clash	in	the	“bad	thing”	cases	even	when	non-projective	meaning	is	negated	or	otherwise	unasserted,	which	is	evidence	that	negative	sentiment	from	cause	is	also	projecting	and	 clashing	 with	 the	 speaker	 sentiment	 associated	 with	 the	 presupposed	 “good	thing”	outside	of	the	scope	of	the	presupposition	holes,	negation	etc.		It	is	clear	from	these	data	that	negative	sentiment	associated	with	cause	is	not	an	entailment,	but	is	rather	a	variety	of	projecting	inference.96																																																										95	The	neutral-sentiment	bias	of	the	described	in	the	previous	section	seems	to	be	overridden	here	by	the	appearance	of	the	evaluative	adjectives.	96	And	therefore	not	at-issue	(see,	e.g.	Simons	et	al.	2010).	
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2.2		Tonhauser	et	al.	(2013)	and	kinds	of	projective	content				 As	 mentioned	 above,	 there	 are	 many	 varieties	 of	 projective	 content	 in	addition	 to	standard	presuppositions.	 	The	behavior	of	 these	varieties,	and	 indeed	the	 behavior	 of	 differently	 triggered	 presuppositions,	 is	 not	 uniform.	 	 This	subsection	introduces	the	properties	of	different	projective	content	and	reproduces	a	 taxonomy	of	 their	 types	 as	 developed	 in	Tonhauser	 et	 al.	 (2013),	which	will	 be	used	as	a	framework	for	classifying	negative	sentiment	cause.			
2.2.1 Strong Contextual Felicity 				 One	difference	between	different	 kinds	 of	 projecting	 content	 is	whether	 or	not	 there	 are	 requirements	on	 the	 contexts	 that	 can	 license	 their	use.	 	 If	 contexts	relating	to	some	inference	m	are	defined	as	follows:		(172)	 	 m-positive	and	m-neutral	contexts		 		 	 An	m-positive	context	is	an	utterance	context	that	entails	or	implies		
m.		An	m-neutral	context	is	an	utterance	context	that	entails	or	implies	neither	m	nor	¬m.	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	75)		Then	this	constraint	on	contexts	for	utterances	that	trigger	m	is	given	below:		(173)	 	 Strong	Contextual	Felicity	constraint		 If	utterance	of	trigger	t	of	projective	content	m	is	acceptable	only	in	an	
m-positive	 context,	 then	 t	 imposes	 a	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	constraint	with	respect	to	m.		 	 	 	 	 	 (Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	76)		
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For	example,	it	is	infelicitous	absent	some	context	to	say	the	following:	(174)	 a.	 #I’m	hungry,	too.		 b.	 #She’s	hungry.	Both	 the	 adverb/particle	 too	 and	 the	 use	 of	 a	 pronoun	 have	 conditions	 on	 their	contexts,	the	former	requiring	a	salient	alternative	satisfying	the	prejacent	sentence,	and	the	latter	requiring	some	established	co-referential	individual.		Tonhauser	et	al.	propose	the	following	diagnostic	for	Strong	Contextual	Felicity:		(175)	 	 Diagnostic	for	Strong	Contextual	Felicity			 	 Let	S	be	an	atomic	sentence	that	contains	trigger	t	of	projective		content	m.	I.	 If	uttering	S	is	acceptable	in	an	m-neutral	context,	trigger	t		does	 not	 impose	 a	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	 constraint	 with	respect	to	m.	II.	 If	uttering	S	is	unacceptable	in	an	m-neutral	context	and		acceptable	in	a	minimally	different	m-positive	context,	trigger	t	imposes	a	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	constraint	with	respect	to	
m.	 	 	 	 	 (Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	76)			Based	 on	 these	 criteria,	 the	 sentences	 above	 can	 be	 shown	 to	 have	 a	 Strong	Contextual	felicity	constraint	by	putting	them	in	an	m-positive	context:	(176)	 a.	 Mary’s	hungry.		I’m	hungry,	too.		 b.	 Mary	just	arrived.		She’s	hungry.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 projecting	 inferences	 don’t	 have	 a	 Strong	 Contextual	Felicity	requirement	on	the	utterance	of	their	triggers:	(177)	 a.	 John	the	mechanic	is	working	on	my	car.		 b.	 Mike’s	dog	is	always	yelping.		 c.	 John	knows	that	the	mailman	comes	at	2	PM.	
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	In	the	first	sentence	above,	the	appositive	(whose	content	is	projective)	can	occur	in	neutral	 context,	 as	 can	 the	 possessive	 and	 the	 factive	 know	 in	 sentences	 b	 and	 c.		Since	 no	 context	 at	 all	 is,	 of	 course,	 neutral	 with	 respect	 to	 any	 inference,	 these	triggers	 meet	 the	 requirement	 for	 not	 imposing	 a	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	condition.			
2.2.2 Obligatory Local Effect 		 The	other	criterion	developed	by	Tonhauser	et	al.	is	that	of	Obligatory	Local	effect,	defined	as	follows:		(178)	 	 Obligatory	Local	Effect		 A	projective	content	m	with	trigger	t	has	Obligatory	Local	Effect	if	and	only	if,	when	t	is	syntactically	embedded	in	the	complement	of	a	belief-predicate	B,	m	necessarily	is	part	of	the	content	that	is	targeted	by,	and	within	the	scope	of,	B.		 	 	 	 	 	 (Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	93)		This	 criterion	 serves	 to	 identify	 presuppositions,	 for	 which	 belief	 predicates	 are	traditionally	called	“plugs”	(Karttunen	1973):	(179)	 	 Mary	believes	that	the	tooth-fairy	is	3	feet	tall,	but	of	course	there	is		no	tooth-fairy.		In	this	sentence,	the	existence	of	the	NP	in	the	definite	description	can	be	felicitously	denied	because	 the	existence	presupposition	 is	only	 local	 to	 the	belief	 clause.	 	But	Tonhauser	et	al.	impose	a	stronger	requirement	than	just	that	the	implicature	can	be	interpreted	as	 local	 to	the	belief	clause.	 	They	define	Obligatory	Local	Effect	as	the	
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condition	 that	 the	 implicature	 is	 necessarily	 interpreted	 as	 local.	 	 The	 criteria	developed	for	Obligatory	Local	Effect	is	a	complex	one,	with	several	subdiagnostics:		(180)	 Diagnostic	for	Obligatory	Local	Effect	using	belief-predicates	
	
	 Let	S1	be	an	atomic	sentence	with	trigger	t	of	content	m.	
	
I. Trigger	 t	 imposes	 a	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	 constraint	 with	
respect	 to	m:	 	 Let	 S	 be	 a	 sentence	 where	 S1	 is	 embedded	 under	 a	belief-predicate.	 	 If	 utterance	 of	 S	 is	 acceptable	 when	 the	 utterance	context	entails	m	but	the	bearer	of	the	attitude	is	explicitly	ignorant	of	
m,	then	the	content	m	with	trigger	t	need	not	have	its	effect	locally,	i.e.	does	not	have	Obligatory	Local	Effect.	
II. Trigger	t	doesn’t	 impose	a	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	constraint:		Three	possible	implementations:	1. Let	S2	be	an	atomic	sentence	that	implies	¬m,	and	S	a	sentence	where	 both	 S1	 and	 S2	 are	 conjoined	 under	 the	 same	 belief-predicate.	 	 If	 utterance	 of	S	 is	 acceptable,	 then	 the	 content	m	with	trigger	t	need	not	have	its	effect	locally,	i.e.	does	not	have	Obligatory	Local	Effect.	2. Let	S2	be	an	atomic	sentence	that	implies	¬m.		Embed	S1	under	a	belief-predicate	with	 attitude	holder	A	 to	 form	 the	 complex	sentence	 S’1	 and	 embed	 S2	 under	 the	 same	 belief-predicate	with	the	same	attitude	holder	A	to	form	the	complex	sentence	
S’2.	 	 Let	 S	 be	 a	 conjunction	 of	 S’1	 and	 S’2.	 	 If	 utterance	 of	S	 is	acceptable,	then	the	content	m	with	trigger	t	need	not	have	its	effect	locally,	i.e.	does	not	have	Obligatory	Local	Effect.	3. Let	 S2	 be	 an	 atomic	 sentence	 that	 contains	 both	 trigger	 t	 of	content	m	and	also	implies	¬m.		Let	S	be	a	sentence	where	S2	is	embedded	 under	 a	 belief-predicate.	 	 If	 utterance	 of	 S	 is	acceptable,	then	the	content	m	with	trigger	t	need	not	have	its	effect	locally,	i.e.	does	not	have	Obligatory	Local	Effect.	
III. Trigger	 t	 doesn’t	 impose	 a	 Contextual	 Felicity	 constraint	 with	
respect	 to	m,	 but	 with	 respect	 to	 another	 implication	 n:	 	 This	subdiagnostic	 has	 the	 same	 three	 possible	 implementations	 as	subdiagnostic	 II,	 with	 the	 addition	 that	 the	 context	 in	 which	 S	 is	uttered	entails	that	the	speaker	and	the	bearer	of	the	attitude	know	n.	(Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	93)			Note	that	every	subdiagnostic	above	concludes	with	“If	utterance	of	S	is	acceptable	[…],	 then	 the	content	m	with	 trigger	 t	need	not	have	 its	effect	 locally,	 i.e.	does	not	
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have	 Obligatory	 Local	 Effect”.	 	 These	 diagnostics	 do	 not	 provide	 for	 the	identification	 of	 Obligatory	 Local	 Effect,	 only	 its	 absence,	 hence	 the	 following	sentence,	while	suggestive,	is	not	proof	of	Obligatory	Local	Effect:	(181)	 										#	Mary	believes	that	the	tooth-fairy	is	3	feet	tall	and	that	there	is	no		tooth-fairy.		Similarly	for	the	first	sentence	below:		(182)	 a.							#	Jane	believes	that	Bill	has	stopped	smoking	and	that	he	has	never		been	a	smoker.		 b.	 Jane	believes	that	Bill,	who	is	Sue’s	cousin,	is	Sue’s	brother.		 	 	 	 	 	 (Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	92)		However,	(182b),	which	makes	use	of	the	II.1	subdiagnostic,	demonstrates	that	non-restrictive	 relative	 clauses	 do	 not	 have	 Obligatory	 Local	 Effect	 according	 the	diagnostics	described.			There	 is	 a	 general	 difficulty	 with	 providing	 a	 positive	 diagnostic	 for	Obligatory	 Local	 Effect,	 which	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 word	 obligatory	 and	 the	impossibility	 of	 demonstrating	 necessity,	 rooted	 in	 Hume’s	 skeptical	 critique	 of	induction.	 	 It	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 negative	 evidence	 in	 language	acquisition:	there	is	no	way	to	know	that	the	next	observation	will	not	 falsify	your	generalization.	 	 However,	 the	 notion	 does	 seem	 to	 be	 important	 in	 classifying	triggers,	 and	 there	 are	 some	 that	 have	 inferences	 that	 do	 seem	 to	 be	 obligatorily	local,	or	at	least	more	preferentially	local	than	others,	as	suggested	by	the	placement	of	certain	items	below.		The	problem	of	proving	positive	Obligatory	Local	Effect	will	have	some	consequences	for	the	classification	of	negative	sentiment	cause,	as	will	be	illustrated	in	2.3	below.			
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2.2.3 A taxonomy of projective content 			 Based	 on	 the	 criteria	 of	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	 and	 Obligatory	 Local	Effect,	Tonhauser	et	al.	develop	a	taxonomy	of	projective	content	with	four	classes	of	content,	exhausting	the	logical	possibilities.		The	following	table	is	reproduced	from	(Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	67):	
 Properties of Contents 
Classes Projection 
Strong 
Contextual 
Felicity 
Obligatory 
Local Effect 
A yes yes yes 
B yes no no 
C yes no yes 
D yes yes no Table	10:	Four	classes	of	projective	content	in	English.		Some	examples	of	 triggers	 in	English	for	each	of	 these	classes	 is	given	in	the	table	below	(adapted	from	Tonhauser	et	al.	2013,	103):97		
Class Trigger Content 
Pronoun existence of referent A 
too existence of alternative 
   
Expressive  
Appositive  
NRRC  
that N property attribution 
B 
possessive NP possessive relation 
   
almost polar implication 
know content of complement 
only prejacent implication 
C 
stop prestate holds 
   
too 
salience of established 
alternative 
Focus salience of alternatives 
D 
that N speaker indicates suitable entity Table	11:	Classes	and	triggers	of	some	projective	contents.																																																									97	NRRC	=	non-restrictive	relative	clause.	
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		For	 example,	 the	 possessive	 relation	 triggered	 by	 possessive	 NP	 is	 a	 type	 B	inference,	since	it	has	no	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	requirement	and	does	not	have	an	Obligatory	Local	Effect.	 	The	salience	of	an	established	alternative	 triggered	by	
too	is	a	type	D	inference,	since	it	has	a	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	requirement	but	no	Obligatory	Local	Effect.		Making	use	of	the	diagnostics	above,	this	classification	can	be	demonstrated	by	first	showing	the	(in)felicity	of	the	triggers	in	contexts	that	are	neutral	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 inferences.	 	 The	 following	 sentences	 are	 to	 be	interpreted	as	being	uttered	in	a	context	in	which	it	is	not	established	that	Mike	has	a	dog	or	that	there	is	some	salient	person	that	can	dance	well,	respectively:	(183)	 a.	 Mike’s	dog	is	totes	adorbs.		 b.							#	Mary	can	dance	well,	too.		Based	on	these	judgments,	since	the	possessive	NP	has	no	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	requirement	but	too	does,	subdiagnostic	I	for	Obligatory	Local	Effect	should	be	used	for	 the	 second	 sentence,	 and	 some	 variant	 of	 subdiagnostic	 II	 for	 the	 first.	 	 Here,	subdiagnostic	 II.2	 is	 used,	 which	 requires	 the	 trigger	 and	 the	 negation	 of	 the	inference	 to	be	conjoined	and	embedded	under	 the	belief	 clause	and	both	 to	have	the	same	attitude	holder:	(184)	 a.	 Jane	sure	loves	dogs	she	runs	into	in	the	street	but	she	doesn’t	pay		much	attention	to	their	owners	even	if	she	knows	them.		She	believes	that	Mike’s	dog	is	totes	adorbs	and	that	Mike	doesn’t	have	a	dog.			 b.	 John	probably	never	thinks	about	the	famous	Russian	ballet	dancer		Vaslav	 Nijinsky	 anymore,	 but	 I	 remember	 him	 writing	 a	 glowing	report	 on	 him	 in	 high	 school.	 	 Last	 week	 he	 was	 talking	 about	 his	girlfriend	Mary.		He	believes	that	Mary	can	dance	well,	too.		
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The	 felicity	 of	 these	 sentences	 demonstrates	 that	 neither	 inference	 trigger	 has	Obligatory	Local	Effect,	thereby	justifying	the	classification	of	the	projective	content	they	trigger	as	class	B	and	D	inferences,	respectively.		Note	that	in	(184b),	John	must	be	aware	of	the	existence	of	other	good	dancers,	since	the	existence	of	alternatives	is	a	class	A	inference	and	has	Obligatory	Local	Effect,	but	other	good	dancers	need	not	be	salient	for	him,	which	is	the	class	D	inference	triggered	by	too.			
2.3		Classifying	negative	sentiment	cause				 As	noted	in	2.1	above,	the	negative	sentiment	inference	associated	with	cause	is	 a	 clear	 case	 of	 projecting	 content,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 Family	 of	 Sentences	diagnostic	 applied	 there.	 	 It	 is	 also	 immediately	 apparent	 that	 negative	 sentiment	periphrastic	 cause	 lacks	 a	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	 constraint	 (Tonhauser	 et	 al.	2013,	 75	 and	 see	 above)	 in	 that	 the	 verb	with	 the	 associated	 inference	 does	 not	require	a	specific	context	for	felicitous	use.		For	example,	one	can	imagine	a	person	walking	 into	 a	 room	without	 prelude	 and	 declaring	 I	 wish	 I	 knew	who	 caused	my	
morning	to	go	the	way	it	has	with	clearly	 inferred	negative	speaker	sentiment	as	a	result.	 	The	 lack	of	a	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	contraint	 imposed	by	cause	on	 the	negative	sentiment	implication	is	also	demonstrated	by	the	fact	that	inferences	were	evidently	 made	 from	 the	 minimal	 context	 experimental	 sentence	 frames	 as	indicated	by	adjective	selection	in	the	elicitation	experiments	discussed	above.	
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	 Furthermore,	 unlike	 presuppositions,	 the	 sentiment	 also	 seems	 to	 survive	plugs	 such	 as	 belief-clause	 embeddings,	 but	 this	 judgment	 is	 less	 obvious	 and	 is	perhaps	more	controversial.		To	my	intuition,	the	following	judgments	hold:	(185)	 a.	 Bill	believed	that	John’s	cat	was	hungry,	but	John	doesn’t	have	a	cat.		 b.						??	Bill	believed	that	John	caused	it	to	happen,	but	I	enjoyed	it.			It	is	likely	that	the	effect	–	the	negative	sentiment	inference	triggered	by	cause	–		is	sometimes	 or	 even	 typically	 interpreted	 locally	 to	 belief-type	 predicates,	 or	 that	non-local	 readings	 can	 be	 somewhat	 strange	 out	 of	 context,	 as	 indicated	 by	 the	marginal	felicity	of	the	sentence	below:	(186)	 ??Bill	believed	that	John	caused	it	to	happen	and	that	it	was	wonderful.	However,	there	is	some	evidence	that	the	local	effect	is	not	actually	obligatory	and	can	sometimes	be	solely	associated	with	the	speaker:	(187)	 I	can’t	believe	Bill’s	automatic	sycophantic	approval	of	everything	John	does.		When	he	saw	the	ridiculous	way	the	office	was	decorated	in	 John’s	area,	he	mistakenly	believed	that	John	had	caused	it	to	look	that	way	and	that	it	was,	therefore,	a	wonderful	thing.		Indeed,	 the	 way	 the	 diagnostic	 criteria	 are	 set	 up,	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 felicitous	sentence	 of	 this	 type	 indicates	 that	 the	 effect	 need	 not	 be	 local.	 	 In	 particular,	 a	sentence	 like	 that	 below	nearly	 exemplifies	 the	diagnostic	 criterion	of	 type	 II.2	 in	(180)	above,	for	a	trigger	without	a	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	constraint:			(188)	That	idiot	columnist	believes	that	it	was	greed	and	corruption	that	caused			 our	businessi	to	failj	and	that	it	was	a	good	thing	iti	didj.		The	felicity	of	this	sentence	is	suggestive	with	respect	to	the	Local	Effect	of	cause.		A	more	accurate	diagnostic,	though,	needs	to	be	more	precise	about	the	statement	of	the	negated	inference.		Good	and	bad	do	not	represent	the	negation	of	one	another,	but	 are	 scalar	 adjectives	 representing	 polar	 opposites	 on	 some	 “goodness”	 scale.		
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Likewise	for	negative	and	positive	sentiment.		The	negation	of	negative	sentiment	is	not	 positive	 sentiment,	 but	 the	 lack	 of	 negative	 sentiment.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 some	causative	events	 can	have	mixed	 results,	 some	positive	and	some	negative,	makes	this	 distinction	 crucial.	 	 An	 appropriate	 application	 of	 subdiagnostic	 II.2	 for	Obligatory	 Local	 Effect	 needs	 to	 embed	 cause	 and	 the	 negation	 of	 its	 negative	sentiment	 inference	 –	 lack	 of	 negative	 sentiment	 –	 	 under	 the	 belief-predicate	together,	with	a	single	attitude	holder:	(189)	 I	keep	telling	Zach	to	stop	changing	his	thesis,	but	he	can’t	stop	tinkering	and		seems	 not	 to	 have	 a	 problem	with	 that.	 	 He	 also	 doesn’t	 perceive	 his	 own	primary	role	in	the	endless	revising.		Zach	believes	that	David’s	presence	on	his	committee	causes	him	to	change	his	thesis	and	that	there’s	nothing	wrong	with	him	changing	it.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 									(David	Beaver,	p.c.)		In	 this	 sentence,	 m	 is	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 inference	 with	 respect	 to	 Zach	changing	 his	 thesis,	 t	 is	 the	 verb	 cause,	 S1	 is	 “David’s	 presence	 on	 the	 committee	causes	(or	makes)	Zach	change	his	thesis”	and	S2	is	“there’s	nothing	wrong	with	Zach	changing	his	 thesis”.	 	S2,	of	course,	entails	¬m,	 the	 lack	of	negative	sentiment	with	respect	 to	 the	 result	 (Zach	 changing	 his	 thesis).	 	 The	 felicity	 of	 this	 sentence	suggests	 that	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 inference	 need	 not	 be	 local	 (to	 the	 belief-predicate),	i.e.	that	cause	does	not	impose	an	Obligatory	Local	Effect	on	the	negative	sentiment	inference.		If	these	are	accurate	judgments	for	English,	then	the	negative	sentiment	associated	with	cause	lacks	either	a	Strong	Contextual	Felicity	constraint	or	 an	 Obligatory	 Local	 Effect,	 which	 places	 this	 particular	 variety	 of	 inferential	meaning	 inamongst	 Tonhauser	 et	 al.’s	 Class	 B	 projective	 content	 along	 with	
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expressives,	 appositives,	 and	 non-restrictive	 relative	 clauses	 (see	 above	 and	Tonhauser	et	al.	2013	pg.	103,	Table	2).98				 The	felicity	of	example	(189)	does	not	in	itself	rule	out	the	possibility	that	the	verb	cause	in	that	example	lacks	projective	content	altogether	(register	effects	make	this	possible,	 see	 section	3.3	below).	 	To	 rule	out	 that	possibility,	we	can	contrast	(189)	with	an	example	in	which	the	speaker	lacks	negative	sentiment	as	well:		(190)	 I	keep	telling	Zach	to	change	his	thesis	as	much	as	he	thinks	appropriate,	and	he	keeps	tinkering	and	seems	not	to	have	a	problem	with	that	either.		He	also	doesn’t	 perceive	 his	 own	 primary	 role	 in	 the	 endless	 revising.	 	 ??Zach	believes	 that	 David’s	 presence	 on	 his	 committee	 causes	 him	 to	 change	 his	thesis	and	that	there’s	nothing	wrong	with	him	changing	it.		My	 intuitions	 about	 the	 felicity	 of	 the	 final	 sentence	 above	 are	 unstable	 in	 this	context,	although	it	seems	odd.		If	it	is	felicitous	for	some	speakers,	then	this	test	for	Obligatory	Local	Effect	 is	 not	determinative	 for	non-categorical	meaning	biases	 of	the	type	examined	here.		Sentences	of	the	type	in	(190)	get	worse	for	me	when	the	attitudes	toward	the	caused	subevent	are	explicitly	and	unambiguously	positive	for	both	 speaker	 and	believer.	 	 In	 any	 case,	 strict	 application	of	 the	diagnostic	 places	negative	 sentiment	 as	 a	 Class	 B	 projective	 inference	 of	 cause	 and	 it	 is	 that	categorization	that	is	assumed	here.	
																																																								98	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 there	 is	 a	 real	 obligatory	 local	 effect	 with	 this	 verb,	 however,	 since	 these	examples	are	so	baroque,	and	 that	 therefore	 the	associated	negative	sentiment	really	belongs	with	the	Class	C	projective	content,	along	with	the	content	of	X	in	expressions	like	stop	X	and	know	X.		This	might	in	some	ways	be	a	natural	fit	in	the	sense	that	the	projective	content	associated	with	cause	is	also	a	condition	on	its	clausal	complement	(Steve	Wechsler,	p.c.).		However	there,	too,	it	is	an	uneasy	match	 since	 the	 Class	 C	 projections	 all	 involve	 canonically	 truth-conditional	 content,	 unlike	sentiment	or	the	projections	associated	with	expressives,	for	example.		In	any	case,	problems	similar	to	those	discussed	for	Class	B	content	below	obtain	for	Class	C	content:		Q:	Has	John	ever	smoked?		A:	
He	stopped	smoking	last	year.		(implication:	Yes,	he	has	smoked.).	
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	 The	negative	sentiment	associated	with	cause	differs	in	some	ways	from	the	other	 examples	 of	 Class	 B	 projective	 content,	 however.	 	 Unlike	 expressives,	 slurs,	some	 appositives,	 and	 other	 bearers	 of	 sentiment	 such	 as	 (non-projecting)	 lexical	encoders	of	 sentiment,	 for	example,	 the	negative	sentiment	does	not	seem	to	be	a	part	of	the	(intentionally)	expressed	content	of	cause.	 	 In	particular,	the	evaluative	implicatures	that	are	generated	cannot	be	used	as	the	answer	to	a	question:		(191)	 a.	 Q:		How	do	you	feel	about	Bill?		 	 A:		That	bastard	works	in	my	office.										(implication:	I	don’t	like	Bill)			 b.	 Q:		Do	you	like	the	cereal?		 	 A:		It’s	soggy.	 	 	 						(implication:	No,	I	don’t	like	the	cereal)			 c.	 Q:		What	do	you	think	of	the	results?		 	 A:#John	caused	them/#they	were	caused.		However,	infelicity	in	answers	is	not	uncommon	for	projection	triggers	(see	Simons	et	al.	2010):		(192)	 a.	 Q:		Are	there	any	boys	in	your	class?		 	 A:#I	(don’t)	like	the	boys	in	my	class.			 b.	 Q:		What’s	the	weather	like?		 	 A:#Bob	realizes	/	doesn’t	realize	that	it’s	raining.		In	 (192a),	 an	 inference	of	 existence	 is	 triggered	by	 the	definite	determiner	and	 in	(192b)	an	inference	is	triggered	by	the	factive	realize	that	its	complement	holds,	but	neither	 triggers	 are	 felicitious	 as	 answers	 to	 questions	 asking	 about	 that	information.		Indeed,	some	other	class	B	inferences	are	similarly	bad	as	answers:			(193)	 Q:	 Is	John	a	doctor?		 A:	 a.	 #John	the	doctor	is	always	professional.		 	 b.	 #John,	who	is	a	doctor,	is	always	professional.		
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Non-restrictive	 relative	 clauses	 (NRRCs)	 and	 non-expressive	 appositives,	 then,	cannot	 be	 used	 as	 answers	 to	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 they	 hold.	 	 However,	 the	felicity	of	(191a)	suggest	that	answerhood	does	not	necessarily	require	that	content	be	at-issue	and	declarative,	but	 in	some	way	(intentionally)	expressed,	or	perhaps	that	 its	 expression	 itself	 be	 made	 somehow	 at-issue,	 and	 the	 infelicity	 of	 cause	predicates	as	answers	suggests	that	negative	sentiment	is	not	part	of	the	expressed	meaning	 of	 cause,	 but	 is	 rather	 an	 evaluative	 harmony	 condition	 or	 some	 other	limiting	condition	of	use,	as	suggested	above.		 The	 answerhood	 criterion	 seems	 to	 distinguish	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 of	
cause	from	the	content	of	expressives.99		Cause	does	seem	to	meet	some	of	the	other	criteria	of	conventional	implicatues,	however.100		As	seen	by	the	Family	of	Sentences	diagnostic	above,	 it	 is	scopally	inert	(to	use	a	different	term	for	“projection”).	 	 It	 is	also	assertorically	inert	(Horn	2002,	Potts	2007):	(194)	 A:	 John	caused	it	to	happen.		 B:	 No,	I	disagree.		(Bill	caused	it	/	#It	was	a	good	thing).	Unlike	 conventional	 implicatures	 such	 as	 appositives,	 however,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 that	the	negative	sentiment	associated	with	cause	gives	rise	to	redundancy	effects:	(195)	 a.	 Lance	Armstrong,	the	cyclist,	battled	cancer.		#He	is	(also)	a	cyclist.		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Potts	2007,	7)		 b.	 John	caused	it	to	happen.		It	was	a	bad	thing.																																																									99	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that,	like	expressives,	the	negative	sentiment	associated	with	cause	is	primarily	 speaker-oriented.	 	 I	 take	 speaker-orientation	 to	 be	 a	 feature	 of	 all	 expressive	 meaning,	despite	the	possibility	for	perspective-shifting	(see,	e.g.	Harris	&	Potts	2009).	 	In	fact,	I	suspect	that	the	famous	analysis	of	oops	suggesting	it	is	non-speaker-oriented	(Kaplan	1997)	is	an	error	based	on	an	empathetic	reading	resulting	from	one	such	possible	perspective	shift	for	expressives.	100	In	fact,	the	felicity	of	expressives	as	answers	to	questions	might	be	a	challenge	to	their	status	as	conventional	 implicatures:	 “attempts	 to	 answer	 questions	 using	 presuppositions	 or	 conventional	implicature	are	typically	infelicitous”	(Simons	et	al.	2010,	319).	
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Explicit	repetition	of	the	content	in	the	NRRC	in	(195a)	is	infelicitous,	which	is	not	the	case	for	negative	sentiment	cause.			There	are	some	exceptions	to	this	tendency	among	other	putative	conventional	 implicatures,	though,	so	this	behavior	does	not	in	itself	distinguish	cause:	(196)	 	 Bill	 is	always	 fucking	 late.	 	 I	don’t	 like	{him/it}	/	 I	 feel	very	strongly	about	it.		Like	 the	 negative	 sentiment	 inference	 of	 cause,	 explicit	 repetition	 of	 expressive	content	is	not	perceived	as	redundant.				 Both	 answerhood	 and	 redundancy	 seem	 to	 arise	 due	 to	 the	 placement	 of	some	information	 into	the	common	ground101	 in	one	way	or	another,	but	negative	sentiment	cause	allows	neither,	unlike	other	class	B	inferences,	which	allow	one	or	both.	 	 It	 is	 consequently	 a	 somewhat	 awkward	 fit	 among	 the	 other	 varieties	 of	projective	 content	 discussed	 in	 the	 literature.	 	 The	 lack	 of	 clear	 diagnostics	independent	 of	 those	 suggested	 here	 that	 can	 distinguish	 meaning	 that	 is	intentionally	 expressed	 or	 asserted	 from	 the	 more	 covert,	 unintentional	 variety	associated	with	cause	leaves	its	status	somewhat	indeterminate.		In	particular,	there	may	 be	 other	 diagnostics	 beyond	 answerhood	 and	 redundancy	 for	 intentionally	expressed	 meaning	 that	 cause	 meets.	 	 Nevertheless,	 it	 seems	 based	 on	 the	judgments	above	 that	negative	 sentiment	 inference	 triggered	by	cause	 is	 a	 class	B	inference,	 but	 is	 a	 somewhat	 uneasy	 class	 B	 inference	 due	 to	 an	 apparent	 lack	 of	update,	 either	 declarative	 or	 expressive,	 of	 the	 common	 ground	 or	 discourse	context,	 and	 that	 despite	 the	 similarity	 of	 its	 content	 to	 expressives,	 the	 negative																																																									101	 “The	 common	ground	of	 a	 conversation	 at	 a	 particular	 time	 is	 the	 set	 of	 propositions	 that	 the	participants	 in	 that	 conversation	 at	 that	 time	 mutually	 assume	 to	 be	 taken	 for	 granted	 and	 not	subject	to	(further)	discussion”	(von	Fintel,	2000,	and	see	inter	alia).	
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sentiment	associated	with	the	use	of	cause	 is	not	 intentionally	expressed	meaning.		In	other	words,	the	felicitous	use	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verb	cause	does	not	“give”	information	about	negative	sentiment,	but	rather	“gives	off”	that	information	(see	e.g	Goffman	1959	for	an	elaboration	of	this	distinction).		 A	summary	of	the	properties	of	cause	as	compared	to	some	other	projective	content	 triggers	 and	 entailments	 are	 given	 in	 the	 table	 below,102	 where	 SCF	 is	“Strong	Contextual	Felicity”	and	OLE	is	“Obligatory	Local	Effect”.		The	indeterminate	status	of	know/stop-type	predicates	as	answers	is	due	to	the	intuition	that	some	are	acceptable	in	that	role	and	others	not:		(197)	 a.	 Q:	 Has	John	ever	smoked?		 	 A:	 He	(just)	stopped	smoking	last	month.			 b.	 Q:	 Is	John	a	doctor?		 	 A:	 #Mary	knows	that	he’s	a	doctor.			The	outstanding	redundancy	 judgments	(as	 indicated	by	the	second	sentence	tags,	assuming	 accommodation	of	 the	 first	 sentence),	 combined	with	 Strong	Contextual	Felicity	judgments	(the	first	sentence	tags,	assuming	no	context),	are	as	follows:				(198)	 a.	 John	stopped	smoking	last	month	/	Mary	knows	that	John			 	 used	to	smoke.		#John	used	to	smoke.		 b.							#	He’s	always	barking.		#I	have	a	dog.		 c.							#	Katherine	is	a	sword-swallower	too.		#Nathan	is	a	sword-swallower.				
																																																								102	Note	 that	 the	 status	of	cause	with	 respect	 to	Obligatory	Local	Effect	 is	perhaps	a	 controversial	judgment,	 as	 described	 above,	 depending	on	whether	 the	 emphasis	 of	 this	 criterion	 is	 taken	 to	 be	“local”	 or	 “obligatory”,	 but	 the	 diagnostics	 above	 suggest	 that	 negative	 sentiment	 as	 triggered	 by	
cause	need	not	be	local,	which	is	the	motivation	for	the	classification	here.	
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 Projection SCF OLE Question answer Redundancy 
cause sentiment ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 
Expressives ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✖ 
NRRCs ✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
know/stop ✔ ✖ ✔ % ✔ 
pronoun existence ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ 
too alternative ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ 
entailment ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ ✔ 	Table	12:	Cause	in	an	expanded	taxonomy	of	projective	content.		Note	 the	 non-overlapping	 feature	 row-values	 in	 Table	 12.	 	 If	 felicitous	 question-answering	 and	 redundancy	 are	 taken	 to	 be	 additional	 parameters	 for	 projective	content,	it	can	be	seen	that	negative	sentiment	cause	doesn’t	quite	fit	anywhere.		
3.	 	 Register						
		Several	of	the	periphrastic	causative	verbs	examined	here	differ	with	respect	to	formality	in	context	of	use.		This	kind	of	variation	is	something	that	speakers	of	a	language	 often	 have	 very	 clear	 intuitions	 about,	 even	 if	 they	 have	 difficulty	characterizing	 it.	 	 An	English	 speaker	 knows,	 for	 example,	 that	 a	 different	 type	 of	speech	is	called	for	when	making	a	professional	presentation	to	a	group	of	strangers	than	when	making	plans	for	dinner	with	a	loved	one.		Similarly,	a	text	message	to	a	friend	obeys	different	rules	than	an	email	or	letter	to	an	employer.		The	aggregate	of	these	differences	is	what	will	be	referred	to	here	as	“register”.		 In	the	sociolinguistic	tradition,	‘register’	sometimes	refers	to	a	more	general	phenomenon	that	might	be	more	intuitively	described	as	‘style,’	and,	in	fact,	the	two	terms	 are	 often	 interchangeable	 in	 the	 literature	 (see	 Gregory	 1967,	 194	 for	 a	
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discussion	 of	 the	 terminological	 confusion).	 	 The	 relevant	 scale	 for	 the	 present	purposes	is	that	of	formality,	which	interacts	with	both	the	field	of	discourse	and	the	mode	 of	 communication,	 among	 potentially	 other	 criteria,	 to	 make	 up	 the	 larger	phenomenon	 of	 linguistic	 style.	 	 This	 “formal”	 versus	 “informal”	 distinction	 is	sometimes	 called	 ‘tenor’	 by	 sociolinguists.	 	 Formality	 is	 also	 a	 feature	of	 so-called	“social	 deixis”	 (see	 Levinson	 1983,	 89),	 in	 which	 there	 is	 a	 prestige	 differential	between	 speakers,	 which	 influences	 the	 selection	 of	 T/V	 pronouns	 in	 Romance	languages	 (see	 Levinson	 1983,	 128ff),	 and	 it	 often	 arises	 from	 the	 presence	 of	diglossic	variants,	as	was	the	case	for	a	common	encoding	strategy	for	formality	in	English,	that	of	word	origin	(see	discussion	below,	and	footnote	107).	The	question	of	what	constitutes	register	 intuitions,	as	well	as	 that	of	what	kinds	of	linguistic	cues	track	formality,	is	not	yet	clearly	understood.		It	is	typically	defined	 in	 terms	of	 its	effects	 regarding	appropriateness	and	uniformity,	 e.g.	 “It	 is	generally	inappropriate	to	mix	registers,	to	use	them	in	the	wrong	contexts,	just	as	it	is	 inappropriate	 to	wear	 tennis	 shoes	with	 a	 ball	 gown	or	 to	wear	 a	 ball	 gown	 to	your	linguistics	class”	(Chierchia	&	McConnell-Ginet	1990,	51).	 	Despite	its	relative	ineffability,	 register	 distinctions	 seem	 to	 underlie	 different	 lexical	 realizations	 of	semantic	minimal	pairs	throughout	the	English	lexicon.		In	this	section,	register	as	a	component	 of	 meaning	 that	 can	 distinguish	 near-synonyms	 is	 motivated	 by	 the	behavior	of	the	change-of-state	verbs	get	and	become.	 	This	method	is	extended	to	the	enabling	periphrastic	 causatives	 let	 and	allow	 and	 then	used	 to	 characterize	a	distinction	 between	 two	 senses	 of	 cause,	 thus	 accounting	 for	 the	 apparent	
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exceptions	to	negative	sentiment	encoding	for	cause	and	motivating	the	exchange	of	
thing	for	event	in	the	elicitation	sentence	frames	described	in	section	1.2.			
3.1	 	 Get	and	Become			 The	 verbs	 get	 and	 become	 seem,	 at	 first	 blush,	 to	 encode	 little	 beyond	 an	inchoative	 change	 of	 state.	 	 Even	 on	 a	 strictly	 intuitive	 level,	 however,	 the	 verbs	differentially	 favor	 arguments	 based	 not	 necessarily	 on	 the	 state	 being	 described,	but	the	choice	of	word	used	to	describe	the	state:	(199)	 a.	 	 John	got	wasted		 b.	 										??John	became	wasted		 c.	 	 John	became	intoxicated		 d.	 											?John	got	intoxicated		(200)	 a.	 	 John	got	mad		 b.	 	 John	became	angry/?mad		In	 (199)	 and	 (200),	 the	 degree	 of	 felicity	 appears	 to	 correspond	 to	 the	 degree	 to	which	the	registers	evoked	by	the	verb	and	adjective	correspond.103		 Get	appears	to	favor	words	that	signal	an	informal	register,	while	become	is	reserved	 for	 more	 formal	 speech.	 	 When	 these	 verbs	 occur	 with	 adjectives	 that	evoke	 the	 opposite	 pole	 of	 the	 formality	 scale,	 various	 degrees	 of	 register	 clash	result.		Figure	47	illustrates	this	phenomenon	by	means	of	Google’s	n-gram	viewer:	
																																																								103	Another	 feature	 for	which	get	 and	become	 differ	 is	 that	of	 agent	volition.	 	Get,	 but	not	become,	suggests	 that	 the	 change	 of	 state	 was	 an	 intentional	 –	 or	 at	 least	 cooperative	 –	 one	 for	 certain	sentences	containing	animate	subjects.		This	difference	is	illustrated	by	the	sentence	John	got	married	when	compared	 to	 the	much	 less	 likely	and	pragmatically	unusual	 John	became	married.	 	How	and	whether	volition	and	register	interact,	however,	is	unclear	to	me.			
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Fig. 47: register clash and meaning divergence – top: got sick vs. got ill; bottom: became ill vs. became 
sick.		The	top	graph	illustrates	that	get	preferentially	selects	for	the	informal	register	sick	while	the	bottom	shows	that	become	preferentially	selects	the	formal	 ill.	 	Although	the	judgments	about	register	for	sick	and	 ill	are	themselves	based	on	intuition	and	are	 therefore	 as	 of	 yet	 only	 suggestive,104	 if	 these	 adjectives	 do	 differ	 in	 terms	 of	formality,	the	graphs	in	figure	47	suggest	a	divergence	over	time	in	acceptability	for	these	verbs	and	register	clashing	adjectives,	with	get	sick	becoming	more	frequent	even	as	become	sick	is	stable.		One	possible	explanation	for	these	data	is	in	terms	of	
																																																								104	Although	the	judgement	that	sick	is	informal	and	ill	is	formal	is	asserted	by	a	lexicographer	here:	http://learnersdictionary.com/qa/sick-and-ill.	
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evolving	 lexical	 pragmatics	 (see,	 e.g.,	 Wilson	 &	 Carston	 2007),	 with	 a	 historical	lexical	 narrowing	 as	 linguistic	 register	 becomes	 an	 increasingly	 grammatically	relevant	aspect	of	meaning	for	the	two	verbs	and	they	semantically	drift	apart	along	that	dimension:	
	Figure	48:	Ngram	frequencies	for	become/get	sick/ill.	The	 graph	 above	 shows	 the	 data	 for	 get/become	 sick/ill	 over	 a	 longer	 timescale,	demonstrating	increasing	divergence	over	the	last	two	centuries.	Frequency	data	 for	 a	 larger	 group	of	 arguments	drawn	 from	 the	Corpus	of	Contemporary	American	English	are	consistent	with	a	general	 register	distinction,	beyond	 these	 verbs’	 behavior	 with	 sick	 and	 ill.	 	 For	 example,	 while	 become	 is	common	with	 Latinate	words	 like	 clear,	 apparent,	 and	 available,	 get	 occurs	more	often	with	 Germanic	words	 like	better,	 ready,	 and	worse.	 	 This	 Latinate-Germanic	distinction	 has	 indeed	 been	 elsewhere	 proposed	 as	 a	 marker	 of	 register	differentiation	(see,	e.g.	Bar-Ilan	&	Berman	2007,	inter	alia),	a	result	of	the	diglossia	between	 the	 Old	 English	 speaking	 lower	 class	 and	 French	 speaking	 ruling	 class	subsequent	 to	 the	 Norman	 Invasion.	 	 The	 selectional	 preferences	 are	 mostly	consistent	with	respect	to	this	distinction	(see	description	of	method	in	section	1):	
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Fig. 49: Collocation frequencies for become (black) and get (white). 
 
 
 
When separated by adjective word origin, difference between the preferential selection 
behavor or the two verb emerges: 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Collocation frequencies for become (black) and get (white), by collocate word origin. 
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Except for aware and better, all of the most common complements of become are of 
Latin origin, while except for close, used, and involved, all common collocates of get are 
Germanic.  Become and get both have Germanic origins, so it is unlikely that their 
difference is due to some register-independent preference of German words for other 
German words and Latinate words for Latinate words (see the following section for a 
fuller discussion of this claim). 
 
3.2	 	 Let	and	Allow	 	
		
Let	and	allow	are	neither	as	clearly	semantically	basic	as	get	and	become,	nor	are	their	collocation	results	as	straightforward.		It	is	clear	that	let	and	allow	are	not	light	causative	verbs	 in	 the	same	sense	of	cause	 and	make,	 for	example,	 in	 light	of	their	 special	 status	 as	 enabling	 causatives.	 	 One	 important	 difference	 previously	mentioned	is	that,	for	let	and	allow	the	“caused”	subevent	is	cancelable.		As	detailed	in	chapter	3,	 let	and	allow	also	encode	a	kind	of	facilitation,	or	removal	of	obstacle	that	potentially	places	the	subject	of	 these	verbs	at	a	greater	remove	 in	the	causal	chain,	as	discussed	for	 the	water-draining	example	 in	chapter	3.	 	These	verbs,	 like	
get	and	become,	seem	to	bias	their	arguments	in	terms	of	register.		 Again,	 this	 claim	 relies	 on	 intuitions	 about	 the	 register	 difference	 between	possible	arguments,	which	is	without	independent	support.		However,	the	Latinate	–	Germanic	distinction	is	maintained	for	enter	and	come	in,105	so	if	that	distinction	is	
																																																								105	According	to	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary,	enter	is	from	the	French	‘entrer,’	while	come	was	Old	English	‘cuman’	from	a	common	German	strong	verb.	
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indeed	 a	 tracker	 of	 formality	 and	 enter	 is	 associated	with	 a	more	 formal	 register	than	come	in,	Google’s	N-gram	viewer	shows	some	suggestive	trends:		
	
	
	Fig.	51:	let/allow	come	in/enter	collocation,	normalized	by	let	and	allow,	respectively.		
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The	top	graph	shows	that	let	him	come	in	is	more	frequent	than	allow	him	to	come	in	independent	 of	 the	 relative	 frequencies	 of	 let	 and	 allow,	 the	middle	 graph	 shows	that	the	verbs	with	enter	have	very	similar	normalized	frequencies,	and	the	bottom	graph	 illustrates	 that	 the	difference	with	 “come	 in”	 for	 the	 two	verbs	 is	 relatively	stable	over	the	last	two	centuries.			One	possible	 alternative	explanation	 for	 these	data	 is	 that	Germanic	words	tend	to	co-occur	with	Germanic	words	in	English,	and	Latinate	words	with	Latinate	words,	independent	of	any	supervening	parameter	like	register.		Although	this	does	not	explain	the	data	in	the	previous	section,	since	get	and	become	are	both	Germanic	as	mentioned	there,	it	is	true	that	let	is	a	Germanic	word	and	allow	is	Latinate.		This	suggestion	 is	 suspect	 since	 a	 similar	 phenomenon	 doesn’t	 exist	 for	 words	 with	different	 origins.	 	 For	 example,	 it’s	 not	 the	 case	 that	 an	 Arabic	 word	 like	 alcohol	typically	 occurs	 with	 other	 Arabic	 words	 like	 algebra.	 	 Most	 speakers	 are	 totally	unaware	of	word	origins,	and	there	would	seem	to	be	no	reason	for	words	with	the	same	 provenance	 to	 co-occur	 absent	 some	 independent	 cognitively	 significant	correlation.		Indeed,	there	are	formal	Germanic	words	in	English	that,	since	formal,	tend	to	co-occur	with	Latinate	words	(become,	described	in	the	previous	section,	is	one	 such	 example),	 and	 vice	 versa.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 formal	 father,	 which	 is	 in	competition	with	 the	 informal	dad,	 is	 of	 Germanic	 origin.	 	 However,	 in	 the	 COCA,	when	high	frequency	adjectives	like	good,	late,	real,	and	great	are	removed,	the	most	common	preceding	adjectives	of	 father	 are	 founding,	biological,	holy,	heavenly,	 and	
putative.	 	 Except	 for	 holy	 and	 heavenly,	 these	 are	 all	 Latinate.	 	 Furthermore	 the	phrases	holy	father	and	heavenly	father	are	idiomatic,	frozen,	and	–	to	my	intuitions	
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–	 formal	expressions.	 	Other	 formal	Germanic	words	 include	woe,	chide,	delve,	and	
swift.	 	 Conversely,	 there	 are	 informal	words	with	 Latinate	 origins,	which	 seem	 to	most	 frequently	co-occur	with	Germanic	words.	 	 It	 is	difficult	 to	 find	an	obviously	informal	 Latinate	 noun,	 but	 the	 adjective	 adorable	 is	 a	 clear	 example.	 	 The	most	common	nouns	 following	adorable	 in	 the	COCA	are	child(ren),	baby,	kids,	 face,	 and	
creature.	 	 Of	 these,	 all	 except	 for	 face	 and	 creature	 are	 Germanic,	 and	 neither	 of	these	strike	me	as	formal,	the	latter	giving	rise	to	the	clearly	informal	critter,	after	all.		And	it	is	difficult	to	imagine	an	informal	alternative	to	face106	–	it	seems	to	have	supplanted	its	Germanic	equivalent.		Interestingly,	children	does	seem	to	be	a	more	formal	variant	of	the	informal	kids,	which	is	also	highly	common	with	adorable,	but	they	are	both	of	Germanic	origin	and	there	are	informal	variants	of	children	in	some	English	 dialects.	 	 Other	 clearly	 informal	 Latinate	 adjectives	 include	 goofy,	 dicey,	
excellent,	and	rad.		Based	on	these	considerations,	it	seems	to	truly	be	the	case	that	formal	 register	 discourse	 environments	 favor	 formal	 lexical	 items,	 and	 informal	environments	informal,	which	in	English	correlates	with	word	origin.107		 One	possible	explanation	for	the	trends	illustrated	in	Figure	51	is	that,	while	
let	 is	 not	 incompatible	 with	 formal	 register,	 allow	 is	 infelicitous	 in	 an	 informal	context.	 	 This	 may	 be	 a	 stable	 state	 in	 itself	 or	 it	 may	 perhaps	 represent	 some	
																																																								106	Bloomfield	(1933/1984)	identifies	in	English	the	“foreign-learned	forms	–	a	class	of	forms	with	a	separate	style	of	pattern	and	derivation”	 (Bloomfield	1984,	153)	and	notes	 that	 these	are	 typically	Latin-French	derived.		He	notes,	for	example,	that	chair	is	Latin-French	in	origin,	however,	but	does	not	belong	to	the	 foreign-learned	class.	 	 It	seems	clear	that	 this	class	 is	roughly	the	 formal	register	class	discussed	here,	which	correlates	with	word	origin	but	admits	exceptions.	107	 This	 phenomenon	 is,	 in	 fact,	 well	 understood.	 	 Following	 the	 Norman	 Conquest,	 there	 was	 a	unique	 period	 of	 diglossia	 in	 England,	 with	 a	 French-speaking	 ruling	 class	 and	 a	 (Germanic)	 Old	English	speaking	underclass.		In	the	transition	from	Old	to	Middle	English,	in	which	a	flood	of	French	(Latinate)	 words	 entered	 the	 English	 language,	 this	 prestige	 difference	 manifested	 as	 a	 register	difference	in	Middle	English	and	beyond.		See	Bar-Ilan	&	Berman	(2007),	inter	alia,	for	a	summary.	
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preliminary	stage	of	a	divergent	 semantic	drift.	 	 In	either	case	allow	 emerges	as	a	lexically	 narrowed	 expression	 of	 the	 general	 let-type	 enabling	 causative	 with	 the	added	semantic	feature	of	formal	register.		This	difference,	in	conjunction	with	that	between	get	 and	become,	 suggests	 that	 formality	 is	at	 least	 in	some	cases	 lexically	differentiated	 in	 the	 English	 verbal	 lexicon	 even	 for	 otherwise	 very	 basic	 event-structural	 verbs,	 and	 that	 it	 consequently	 represents	 a	 further	 element	 of	 word	meaning	not	represented	in	current	decompositional	analyses	of	lexical	semantics.		
3.3	 Cause1	and	Cause2	 			 The	 parameter	 of	 register,	 and	 the	 evidence	 that	 it	 is	 sometimes	 lexically	encoded,	 provides	 further	 insight	 into	 the	 behavior	 of	 cause	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	corpora	and	experiments	described	in	this	chapter.		In	particular,	I	claim	that	there	are	 two	senses	of	cause:	 one	 formal	 register	 and	 sentiment-neutral,	 and	 the	other	unmarked	 for	 register	 with	 negative	 sentiment.	 	 Traditional	 zeugma	 tests	 for	polysemy	are	difficult	to	apply	in	this	case	due	to	the	general	difficulty	of	a	sentence-local	 register	 shift,	 so	 the	 argument	 is	 somewhat	 indirect.	 	 	Nevertheless,	 there	 is	clear	evidence	that	the	two	parameters	of	sentiment	and	register	correlate	for	cause	in	a	way	suggestive	of	a	sense	distinction.	Before	 examining	 the	 data	 for	 cause,	 however,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	sentiment	 and	 register	 do	 not	 correlate	 in	 general.	 	 This	 can	 be	 demonstrated	 by	comparing	the	sentiment	ratings	for	all	Germanic	and	Latinate	adjectives	collected	
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for	 the	 experiments	 described	 above.108	 	 The	 average	 SentiWordNet	 rating	 for	Germanic	adjectives	was	-0.025723404 and	for	Latinate	adjectives	it	was	only	very	slightly	 lower	 at -0.045657407.  A	 quartile	 boxplot	 demonstrates	 a	 remarkable	similar	distribution:	
	Figure	52:	Boxplot	for	SentiWordNet	ratings	of	Germanic	and	Latinate	adjectives.		This	 chart	 shows	no	significant	difference	between	 the	sentiment	of	 the	Germanic	adjectives	and	the	Latinate	adjectives	in	these	data.	 	In	fact,	the	Latinate	adjectives	
																																																								108	 All	 word	 origin	 data	 comes	 from	 the	 Oxford	 English	 Dictionary.	 	 See	 Appendix	 for	 all	 word	origins.	
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skew	slightly	more	negative	than	the	Germanic,	which	is	the	opposite	of	what	would	be	expected	 if	 the	sentiment	results	here	were	epiphenomenal	of	register	or	word	origin.	 	A	one-way	analysis	of	variance	gives	a	p-value	of	0.8195,	 indicating	a	82%	probability	 that	 Germanic	 and	 Latinate	 adjectives	 come	 from	 the	 same	 sentiment	population.	 	 The	 average	 elicited	 sentiment	 rating	 for	 Germanic	 adjectives	 was	
4.095203877, and	 for	 Latinate	 adjectives	 it	 was 4.124991069.  These,	 too,	 were	distributed	very	similarly:		
	Figure	53:	Boxplot	for	elicited	sentiment	ratings	of	Germanic	and	Latinate	adjectives.		
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The	 analysis	 of	 variance	 for	 these	data	 gives	 a	 p-value	 of	 0.943,	 indicating	 a	 94%	probability	 that	 Germanic	 and	 Latinate	 adjectives	 come	 from	 the	 same	 sentiment	population.		It	is	clear	that	word	origin	and	sentiment	do	not	correlate	in	these	data.		 The	two	experimental	blocks	of	causes,	which	are	repeated	below,	however,	do	differ	significantly	in	terms	of	the	word	origins	of	the	adjectives	elicited.		Block	1:	 		 John	caused	the	very	___________	event	to	happen.	John	made	the	very	___________	event	happen.		Block	2:	 	 John	caused	a	very	___________	thing	to	happen.	John	made	a	very	___________	thing	happen.		 	The	 first	 block	 elicited	 18	 Germanic	 adjectives	 and	 42	 Latinate	 adjectives	 for	 the	
cause	 sentence	 frame,	 while	 the	 second	 block	 elicited	 129	 Germanic	 and	 118	Latinate	 adjectives.	 	 A	 Fisher’s	 Exact	 Test	 for	 count	 data	 indicates	 a	 p-value	 of	0.001445,	indicating	a	very	significant	difference	between	the	two	blocks	in	terms	of	origins.	 The	mean	 SentiWordNet	 score	 for	 the	Germanic	 adjectives	 in	 block	 1	 is	 -0.2222222,	 the	mean	for	block	one	Latinate	adjectives	 is	 -0.05059524,	 the	block	2	Germanic	mean	 is	 -0.2170543,	 and	 the	 block	 2	 Latinate	mean	 is	 -0.1493644.	 	 No	pairwise	comparison	of	means	for	these	groups	reaches	significance,	with	only	the	Latin	block	1	and	German	block	2	differences	coming	close	at	p	=	0.08292.109		Note,	however,	that	the	sentiment	variance	for	cause	between	the	two	blocks	seems	to	be	associated	with	the	sentiment	variance	of	the	Latinate	adjectives	between	the	blocks	in	addition	to	the	greater	proportion	of	negative	Germanic	adjectives	in	the	second	
																																																								109	Note	that	these	values	are	more	negative	than	the	means	given	above,	preceding	figure	52.		Those	numbers	included	the	less	negative	adjectives	elicited	in	the	make	frame,	while	these	data	only	concern	the	cause	frame.	
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block.	 	 	A	mosaic	plot	illustrates	the	diferent	proportions	of	Germanic	and	Latinate	adjectives:		
	Figure	54:	Mosaic	plot	for	word	origins	of	adjectives	elicited	for	the	two	experimental	blocks	of	cause.		Here,	 the	 block	 areas	 are	 proportional	 to	 the	 counts.	 	 The	 first	 block	 column	 is	narrower	 than	 the	 second	due	 to	 the	 larger	 sample	 size	 in	 the	 second	block.	 	The	relevant	difference	here,	though,	is	the	relative	width	of	the	rows,	representing	the	word	origin	distribution	of	the	elicited	adjectives.		This	plot	shows	the	obvious	bias	for	Latinate	adjectives	of	cause	in	the	first	experimental	block,	for	which	sentiment	
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was	found	not	to	be	significantly	negative.		In	terms	of	percentages,	the	visualization	is	the	same	as	the	mosaic	plot,	modulo	the	potentially	distracting	width	of	the	bars:	
	Figure	55:	Percentages	for	word	origins	of	adjectives	elicited	for	the	two	experimental	blocks	of	
cause.			As	 these	 graphs	make	 clear,	 the	 elicited	 adjectives	 in	 the	 first	 experimental	 block	tend	 to	 be	 Latinate,	 while	 those	 elited	 in	 the	 second	 block	 are	 roughly	 equally	distributed	between	Germanic	and	Latinate	origin.	
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	 Note	that	there	is	a	more	common	sense	of	event	 than	the	one	that	is	being	assumed	 here.	 	 Although	 here	 it	 is	 being	 assumed	 that	 event	 is	 being	 used	 in	 the	academic/scientific	(and	thus	formal	register)	sense,	as	an	occurrence	of	some	kind,	a	colloquial	sense	of	event	might	be	paraphrased	as	“gathering”,	“show”,	or	“party”	(John	Beavers,	p.c.),	which	is	not	associated	with	formal	register.		However,	this	type	of	 “event”	 is	 independengly	 infelicitous	 in	 the	 elicitation	 frames,	 regardless	 of	sentiment:	(201)	 ??Bill	caused/made	a	really	shitty	wedding	(to)	happen.		 	 	 	 	 	 							 	 	 (John	Beavers,	p.c.)		Because	of	this,	the	existence	of	a	more	common	sense	of	event	does	not	present	a	logical	 problem	 for	 the	 analysis	 presented	 here.	 	 As	 long	 as	 the	 formal,	 scientific	sense	is	favored,	due	to	the	independent	infelicity	of	the	non-formal	sense,	for	both	
cause	and	make,	and	the	presence	of	 the	 formal	sense	seems	to	block	the	negative	sentiment	of	cause,	 the	argument	about	register	bias	goes	 through.	 	Note	also	 that	the	 existence	 of	 a	 formal	 academic/scientific	 sense	 of	 cause	 was	 independently	identified	in	the	corpus	sentences,	so	the	putatively	register-marked	variant	of	cause	without	sentiment	is	not	just	unmarked	for	register,	with	an	interpretation	coerced	by	 the	 presence	 of	 event.	 	 Rather,	 the	 infelicity	 of	 the	more	 colloqual	event	 in	 the	elicitation	 frame	 is	 biasing	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 academic/scientific	variant,	which	is	 in	turn	biasing	in	favor	of	the	selection	of	the	academic/scientific	variant	of	cause,	which,	since	unmarked	for	sentiment,	is	resulting	in	no	significant	negative	sentiment	in	the	first	experimental	block	and,	since	the	academic/scientific	register	 is	a	 formal	one,	 this	 is	 in	 turn	biasing	 in	 favor	of	 the	selection	of	Latinate	adjectives,	as	demonstrated,	which	track	formality	in	English.	
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	 The	 experimentally	 elicited	 sentiment	 scores	 for	 the	 two	 cause	 sentence	frames,110	 John	 caused	 the	 very	 ________	 event	 to	 happen	 and	 John	 caused	 a	 very	
__________	thing	to	happen,	are	also	significantly	different:111	
	Figure	56:	sentiment	ratings	for	adjectives	in	the	first	and	second	block	of	cause.		This	paired	boxplot	with	means	show	that	the	mean	sentiment	score	for	the	second	block	of	elicited	adjectives	 for	cause	 is	significantly	more	negative	than	that	of	 the																																																									110	The	SentiWordNet	ratings,	although	also	on	average	more	negative	for	the	second	block,	failed	to	reach	significance	when	directly	compared	to	cause	adjectives	in	the	first	block.	111		There	is	one	potential	confound	in	the	logical	space,	which	is	that	definite	vs.	indefinite	articles	correlate	with	 formal	 vs.	 informal	 register.	 	 I	 don’t	 know	 of	 any	 research	 that	 has	 addressed	 that	question,	and	it	can’t	be	ruled	out	as	a	possibility.		The	question	is	left	to	future	research.	
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first	block	(p	<	0.05).		These	data	indicate	that,	while	word	origin	and	sentiment	are	not	 correllated	 in	 general,	 the	 block	 with	 the	 significantly	 higher	 proportion	 of	Latinate	 adjectives,	 which	 corresponds	 to	 formal	 register	 as	 noted	 above,	 has	neutral	 sentiment,	 while	 the	 register-neutral	 cause	 with	 proportionally	 more	Germanic	 adjectives	 is	 associated	with	 negative	 sentiment.	 	 This	 interpretation	 of	the	 data	 predicts	 that	 cause	 would	 be	 better	 with	 formal	 (Latinate)	 positive	collocates,	 since	 the	 formal	 variant	 is	 unmarked	 for	 sentiment,	 than	 informal	(Germanic)	positive	collocates,	since	 the	variant	compatible	with	 informal	register	(since	unmarked)	is	marked	for	negative	sentiment.		Indeed,	cause	is	better	with	the	formal	positive	than	with	good,	which	is	felicitous	in	informal	contexts:		
	Figure	57:	N-gram	frequencies	for	caused	positive	vs.	caused	good,	normalized	by	positive	and	good,	respectively.		These	 data	 suggest	 that,	 independent	 of	 word	 frequency,	 cause	 favors	 formal	positive-sentiment	 adjectives	 to	 non-formal	 positive-sentiment	 adjectives,	 since	informality	 and	positive	 sentiment	 together	 are	 incompatible	with	 either	 sense	 of	
cause.	
	 209	
	
4.	 Summary			 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 English	 periphrastic	 causative	 verb	
cause	 has	 at	 least	 two	 senses.	 	 One	 sense	 is	 a	 sentiment-neutral	 formal	 register	lexeme,	and	it	occurs	most	felicitously	in	scientific	or	academic	discourse,	while	the	other	more	common	sense	is	unmarked	for	register,	but	encodes	negative	speaker	sentiment.		These	results	are	summarized	in	the	table	below:		
 Register Sentiment 
cause1 (unmarked) negative 
cause2 formal (scientific/academic) (unmarked) 	Table	13:	Two	senses	of	English	cause.		Regarding	the	negative	sentiment	inference	triggered	by	the	primary	sense	of	cause,	I	have	demonstrated	that	this	inference	is	projective	content	that	is	not	defeated	in	entailment-cancelling	 environments	 such	 as	 negation	 and	 other	 members	 of	 the	Family	of	Sentences	diagnostic.	 	Using	the	framework	of	Tonhauser	et	al.	(2013),	 I	have	 argued	 that	 negative	 sentiment	 associated	with	 cause	 is	 a	 class	 B	 projective	inference,	 which	 are	 those	 inferences	 without	 either	 Strong	 Contextual	 Felicity	constraints	or	Obligatory	Local	Effect.						
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Inference Trigger Projection SCF OLE Answer Redundancy 
       
Negative 
speaker 
sentiment 
Periphrastic 
cause 
✔ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ 	Table	14:	Summary	of	negative	sentiment	cause	properties.		As	 the	 table	 above	 illustrates,	 I	 have	 further	 argued	 that	 the	 infelicity	 of	 a	 cause	sentence	 as	 answer	 to	 a	 question	 and	 its	 lack	 of	 redundancy	 effects	 complicate	 a	comfortable	 fit	 among	 the	 other	 salient	 type	 B	 inferences,	 which	 has	 led	 to	 the	suggestion	 that	 negative	 speaker	 sentiment	 is	 not	 intentionally	 expressed	 by	 a	speaker	using	periphrastic	cause,	but	 is	rather	a	different	species	of	use-condition.
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Chapter	5:			 Conclusion				 This	 thesis	 represents	 the	 fruits	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 identify	 and	 isolate	 the	evaluative	and	affective	components	of	meaning	of	a	theoretically	 interesting	class	of	verbs	in	English.		The	approach	involved	corpus	analysis	as	well	as	experimental	elicitation	 and	 judgment	 tasks.	 	 In	 this	 study,	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 provide	 a	 unified	account	 of	 the	 meaning	 variation	 among	 the	 periphrastic	 verbs	 for	 directive	causation	in	English,	and	to	propose	an	explanation	for	the	selection	restrictions	of	the	verb	cause	based	on	speaker	sentiment.		 In	 chapter	 3,	 differences	 in	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 periphrastic	 causatives	 in	situations	of	directive	causation	were	examined	in	light	of	existing	approaches.		The	force-theoretic	 approach	 due	 to	 Talmy	 (1988,	 2000)	 is,	 at	 its	 root,	 only	metaphorically	applicable	to	directive	causation,	while	Wierzbicka’s	(1988)	Natural	Semantic	 Metalanguage	 analysis	 is	 lexically	 idiosyncratic,	 missing	 generalizations	about	 the	verbs’	uses.	 	 Instead	a	parameter	of	meaning	called	here	 “inclination”	 is	proposed,	 which	 is	 a	 measure	 of	 an	 individual’s	 preference	 with	 respect	 to	performing,	 or	 not	 performing,	 some	 action.	 	 This	 was	 argued	 to	 account	 for	 the	verbs’	selectional	and	inferential	behavior	in	a	systematic	way.		 In	chapter	4,	characterizations	of	 the	periphrastic	causative	verb	cause	as	a	general	 expression	 of	 causation	 were	 challenged	 in	 light	 of	 the	 apparently	
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expressive	(or	other	similar)	sensitivity	of	the	verb	to	speaker	sentiment.		In	corpus	sentences,	cause	was	found	to	almost	exclusively	occur	 in	unambiguously	negative	contexts,	with	the	exception	of	a	smaller	set	of	usages	that	all	appeared	to	occur	in	academic	or	 scientific	 contexts.	 	By	means	of	 collocation	elicitation	and	controlled	native	 speaker	 judgment	 tasks,	 colloquial	 cause	 was	 found	 to	 select	 for	 negative	sentiment	 adjectives	 to	 a	 statistically	 highly	 significant	degree.	 	 By	 comparing	 the	origins	of	adjectives	of	cause	 in	 informal	contexts	 to	 those	 in	contexts	with	 formal	register	 words,	 cause	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 polysemous,	 with	 a	 negative	 sentiment	primary	sense	and	a	formal	register	secondary	sense.		 To	summarize,	 the	primary	sense	of	cause	 is	argued	here	 to	be	sensitive	 to	the	evaluative	stance	of	the	speaker	toward	the	caused	subevent.		The	periphrastics	
force	and	let	are	argued	to	be	sensitive	to	the	causee’s	evaluative	stance	toward	the	caused	subevent.		Get	encodes	that	the	causee’s	evaluative	stance	toward	the	caused	subevent	has	changed	over	the	course	of	the	causing	event,	and	have	signals	that	the	evaluative	stance	of	the	causee	toward	the	caused	subevent	is	irrelevant	due	to	an	authority	 differential.	 	 Directive	make	 is	 claimed	 to	 be	 a	 general	 effectuating	 (not	inclined)	directive	causative		 The	relative	values	for	distinctions	that	are	together	sufficient	to	distinguish	the	main	periphrastic	causatives	is	given	in	the	table	below.		Here,	✖	means	negative	sentiment,	 resistant,	 or	 negative	 value	 for	 a	 feature,	✔ means	 inclined	 or	 positive	value	 for	 a	 feature,	✖!✔	means	a	 transition	 from	resistant	 to	 inclined,	"	means	unmarked	for	inclination,	or	non-evaluative:		
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 Evaluative Stance 
 speaker causee 
obligatorily directive enabling 
cause ✖  ✖  
let/allow  ✔ ✖ ✔ 
force  ✖ ✖ ✖ 
get  ✖!✔ ✖ ✖ 
have  " ✔ ✖ 
make112   ✖ ✖ 	 Figure	58:	Distinguishing	features	of	select	periphrastic	causatives.			 These	differences	can	also	be	expressed	 in	 terms	of	a	 feature	hierarchy.	 	 In	the	tree	diagram	below,	features	are	inherited	from	dominating	nodes,	so	if	a	lexical	item	 occurs	 in	 a	 non-terminal	 node	 (make	 is	 the	 only	 example	 here),	 it	 is	 a	hypernym	of	any	lexeme	or	lexemes	it	dominates.		S-∅	and	r-∅	means	that	the	node	is	unmarked	for	sentiment	and	register,	respectively.		A	consequence	of	this	is	that	sisters	 of	∅	 nodes	 differ	 only	 from	 the	 lexemes	 that	 are	 dominated	 by	∅	 by	 the	feature	indicated,	as	well	as	any	features	intermediary	between	∅	and	the	terminal	nodes:	 sisters	 to	∅	 are	 general	with	 respect	 to	 the	 set	 of	words	 they	 c-command	except	 for	 the	 feature	 they	 are	 marked	 for.	 	 Thus	 cause1	 and	 cause2	 are	 general	indirect	causative	verbs,	except	for	negative	speaker	sentiment	and	formal	register,	respectively.113	
																																																								112	 Note	 that	make	 can	 express	 inclined	 causation	 when	 it	 takes	 a	 small-clause	 complement:	 She	
makes	 me	 happy.	 	 Although	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 ‘{periphrastic}	 NP	 (to)	 V’	 frame,	 this	possibility	with	small	clauses	is	the	reason	for	the	lack	of	a	mark	in	the	“causee”	column.	113	The	tree	only	makes	explicit	those	distinctions	developed	in	this	thesis.		In	that	way,	sets	of	words	in	a	terminal	node	represent	essentially	an	unexpanded	node,	with	further	distinctions	to	be	made.		For	 a	 hypothesized	 architecture	 with	 expanded	 nodes	 for	 manipulative	 causation	 as	 well	 as	 the	inclusion	of	drive,	see	the	Appendix.	
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	 To	 take	 an	 example	 illustrating	 feature	 inheritance	 in	 this	model,	 the	 verb	
allow	is	a	formal,	inclined,	(directive),	(indirect)	causative	verb.		The	parenthesized	features	are	redundant	here,	which	is	the	result	of	the	fact	that	higher	node	values	are	 often	 constrained	 by	 the	 values	 for	 lower	 nodes	 –	 there	 is	 no	 inclined	manipulative	 causative,	 for	 example.	 	 This	 is	 similar	 to	 the	way	 that	 grammatical	inheritance	hierarchies	work	–	 there	are	no	auxiliary	nouns	or	definite	adverbs	 in	English.	This	feature	geometry	makes	some	predictions.		As	mentioned	above,	feature	incompatibility	 is	 expressed	 by	 marked	 sister	 nodes.	 	 Otherwise	 there	 is	 no	incompatibility	 between	 features.	 	 So,	 an	 adverse	 transinclined-patient	 causative	event	can	be	expressed	with	cause(1),	since	the	event	is	adversative	and	the	verb	is	not-incompatible	with	transinclination,	or	get,	since	the	causee	is	transinclined	and	the	verb	 is	not-incompatible	with	adverse	events,	but	not	allow,	 since	 that	verb	 is	inclined,	which	 is	 incompatible	with	effectuating	verbs,	a	node	 that	dominates	 the	transinclined	verb.	 	This	prediction	seems	 to	be	correct:	 if	 a	person	X	convinces	a	person	Y	to	commit	a	crime,	then	the	descriptions	X	caused	Y	to	commit	a	crime	and	
X	got	Y	to	commit	a	crime	are	both	 felicitous,	but	X	allowed	Y	to	commit	a	crime	 is	not,	at	least	as	a	description	of	the	entire	causing	event.	Since,	 as	mentioned	 above,	 lexemes	 are	 hyponyms	 of	 lexemes	 in	 ancestral	nodes,	 this	 geometry	 also	 predicts	 that	 anything	 expressed	 using	 have,	 get,	 or	
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force114	can	alternatively	be	expressed	with	make.		That	prediction,	too,	seems	to	be	correct.		These	events	can	also	be	expressed,	as	suggested,	by	c-commanding	nodes	with	features	that	don’t	clash	with	the	event	being	described.		So	events	expressed	with	have,	get,	or	force	that	the	speaker	has	a	negative	sentiment	toward,	can	also	be	expressed	with	cause,	which	also	seems	to	get	the	facts	of	English	right.115		 There	are	a	number	of	outstanding	questions	surrounding	the	nature	of	the	sentiment	 encoding	 of	 periphrastic	 cause.	 	 One	 possibility	 is	 that	 expressive-like	meaning,	 and	 in	 particular	 sentiment,	 is	 a	 dimension	 of	 meaning	 that	 exists	alongside	truth-conditional	semantics	in	the	lexicon	(Potts	2006)	and	is	likely	to	be	found	in	all	kinds	of	words	in	English	and	other	languages,	including	light	verbs	and	functional	categories.		I	happen	to	think	that	is	probably	the	case.		However,	there	is	some	 suggestive	 evidence	 from	 other	 languages	 regarding	 the	 association	 of	causative	constructions,	 in	particular,	with	negative	sentiment.	 	 It	 is	worth	looking	briefly	 at	 constructions	 in	 Japanese	 and	 Russian	 to	 get	 some	 idea	 of	 the	phenomenon.		 In	 Japanese,	 there	 is	 a	 particular	 usage	 of	 the	 causative	morpheme	–(s)ase	that	occurs	on	verbs	expressing	negative	sentiment.	 	These	constructions	are	often	call	“adversity	causatives”	(e.g.	Pylkkanen	2002,	Harley	1996):																																																											114	 This	 is	 the	 prediction	made	 for	 directive	 causation.	 	 No	 explicit	 predictions	 are	made	 for	 the	subclassfication	of	 the	manipulative	usages	of	 these	words,	although	 I	suspect	 it	 is	similar	 (see	 the	Appendix).	115	Another,	potentially	more	controversial	prediction	that	this	structure	makes	is	that,	for	example	
letting	someone	die	 in	English	entails	causing	 them	to	die	 if	 the	death	 is	a	negative	thing	(note	that	this	use	of	 let	 is	clearly	not	a	directive	causative).	 	This	seems	to	be	true	 in	my	dialect	(and	ethical	code),	but	it	a	contested	issue	in	philosophical	ethics	(see,	e.g.	Steinbock	&	Norcross	1994).	
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(202)	 Taroo-ga				musuko-o	sin-ase-ta.		 Taro-NOM		son-ACC						die-CAUSE-PAST	(i) ‘Taro	caused	his	son	to	die’	(ii) ‘Taro’s	son	died	on	him’	(the	adversity	causative)	(Pylkkanen	2002,	81)		Note	 that	 on	 the	 adversity	 reading,	 glossed	 here	with	 an	 English	malefactive,	 the	event	 is	 interpreted	 as	 negative,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 obviously	 causative	 despite	 the	presence	of	an	otherwise	causative	morphology.		However,	Pylkkanen	(2002)	claims	that	“the	construction	does,	 in	fact,	have	a	causative	meaning	and	[…]	its	causative	meaning	 is	 exactly	 of	 the	 kind	 predicted	 to	 exist	 by	 the	 bieventive	 analysis	 of	causatives”	 (Pylkkanen	 2002,	 81).	 	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 adversity	 causative	construction	looks	a	lot	like	an	English	periphrastic	causative.		 Part	 of	 the	 evidence	 that	 the	 adversity	 causative	 truly	 is	 causative	 comes	from	its	ability	to	occur	with	ni-yotte,	which	is	a	by-phrase	naming	a	causative	event.		This	differentiates	the	adversity	causative	from	the	related	adversity	passive:	
 (203)	 a.	 Adversity	causative	+	by-phrase	naming	a	causative	event:		 	 Taroo-ga						sensoo-ni-yotte	musuko-o	sin-ase-ta		 	 Taroo-NOM		war-BY																	son-ACC				die-CAUSE-PAST		 	 ‘Taro’s	son	was	caused	to	die	on	him	by	the	war’			 b.	 Adversity	passive	+	by-phrase	naming	a	causative	event:		 											*	Taroo-ga						sensoo-ni-yotte	musuko-ni	sin-are-ta		 	 Taroo-NOM		war-BY																	son-DAT				die-PASS-PAST		 	 Intended:	‘Taro’s	son	died	on	him	by	the	war’		Note	 that	 the	 English	 gloss	 of	 (203b)	 is	 also	 ungrammatical,	 suggesting	 that	 the	English	malefactive	applies	to	changes	of	states	and	not	causatives	(??John’s	son	was	
killed	 on	 him	 (by	 the	war)).	 	 Note	 that,	 although	 the	 Japanese	 adversity	 causative	looks	 like	 an	 indirect	 (English	 periphrastic-style)	 causative	 event,	 it	 lacks	 an	
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expressed	 causer.	 	 In	 fact,	 the	 expression	 of	 a	 causer,	 even	 in	 an	 oblique,	 in	 an	adversity	causative	results	in	ungrammaticality:	(204)	 Adversity	causative	+	by-phrase	naming	an	agent:												*	Taroo-ga						Hanako-ni-yotte	musuko-	o	sin-ase-ta	Taroo-NOM		Hanako-BY												son-ACC							die-CAUSE-PAST	Intended:	‘Taro’s	son	was	caused	to	die	on	him	by	Hanako.’		So,	Japanese	is	an	example	of	a	language	that	employs	causative	constructions	in	the	expression	 of	 negative	 sentiment.	 	 There	 is	 also	 precedent	 in	 a	 language	 of	 co-occurrence	 of	 causative	 meaning	 and	 negative	 sentiment	 in	 a	 specialized	construction	that	does	not	contain	any	morphological	indicator	of	causation.		 Russian	 is	 a	 language	 that,	 like	 English,	 has	 several	 periphrastic	 causative	verbs:		(205)	 Mysl’-∅																			o			smert-i												zastavljaj-et							zadumyva-t’-sja.		 Thought-SG.NOM		of	death-SG.LOC				make-PRS.3SG					think.of-INF-REFL		 ‘The	thought	of	death	makes	us	think.’		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Letuchiy	2012,	pg.	35)		But	 these	 are	 not	 clearly	 associated	 with	 speaker	 sentiment.	 	 However,	 a	construction	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 “adversity	 impersonals”	 do	 seem	 to	 express	negative	speaker	sentiment	and,	as	with	English	and	Japanese,	these	constructions	also	 convey	causative	meaning,	 although,	 as	was	 the	 case	 for	 Japanese,	 that	 is	not	initially	obvious.	Active	Russian	declarative	 sentences	 typically	 include	a	verb	 that	 agrees	 in	person,	gender,	and	number	with	a	nominative	subject: (206)	 Veter											otkry-l														dver'.	wind.NOM		open-PAST.M				door.ACC	‘The	wind	opened	the	door.’		
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However,	there	is	a	specialized	construction	for	expressing	adverse	events	without	volitional	agents	(Babby	1994,	Liskova	2011).	 	These	non-agreeing	nominativeless	constructions	have	the	theme	NP	argument	marked	with	accusative	case:	
	(207)	 Dorog-u				razvezlo.	road-ACC		carry-around[-AGR]	‘The	road	became	muddy/unpassable	(from	rain).’		(208)	 Ego							stoʃnilo	he.ACC			became-nauseated[-AGR]	‘He	vomited.’		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Liskova	2011,	1)		These	constructions	are	not	passives	since,	like	the	Japanese	analogs,	the	addition	of	an	 oblique	 agent	 (but	 not	 an	 inanimate	 causer	 argument)	 results	 in	ungrammatically:		(209)	 a.	 Dver'																						byl-a				raspaxnut-a		vetr-om/devochk-oj.	Door.NOM.F.SG						was-F		swung-open		wind-INST/girl-INST	‘The	door	was	swung	open	by	the	wind/by	the	girl.’	 	Passive			 b.	 Dver'								raspaxnulo																vetr-om/*	devochk-oj.	door.ACC	swing-open[-AGR]	wind-INST/girl-INST	‘The	door	was	swung	opened	by	the	wind/by	the	girl.’		 AI		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (Babby	1994,	35)			These	constructions	are	also	not	anticausatives,	for	which	there	is	an	oblique	causer	and	a	verb	marked	with	the	versatile	–sja:	(210)	 a.	 Stavn-ja																				raspaxnu-l-a-s'																		ot						vetr-a.	shutter-NOM.F.SG					swing-open-PAST.F.SJA						from	wind-GEN	‘The	shutter	swung	open	from	wind.’	 	Anticausative		 b.	 Stavn-ju								raspaxnulo		 						vetr-om.	shutter-ACC		swing-open[-AGR]		wind-INST	‘The	shutter	swung	open	by	the	wind.’	 Adversity	Impersonal		
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Instead,	as	suggested	by	the	gloss	in	(210b),	the	adversity	impersonal	is	commonly	analyzed	(by,	e.g.	Lavine	2010,	Liskova	2011,	 inter	alia)	as	underlyingly	causative.		Some	of	the	evidence	for	this	claim	includes	the	fact	that,	for	intransitive	verbs,	for	which	 there	would	be	no	 causer	argument	 to	 suppress,	 adversity	 impersonals	 are	impossible.	 	 Additionally,	 if	 an	 adversity	 impersonal	 is	 combined	with	 an	 explicit	denial	 that	 the	event	was	caused,	 the	result	 is	contradiction	(Liskova	2011,	9).	 	Of	course,	 like	 Japanese,	 Russian	 adversity	 constructions	 differ	 from	 the	 English	periphrastic	causative	cause	in	disallowing	an	agentive	causer	argument	(cp.	English	
John	caused	the	tragedy	to	occur).116		 Why,	then,	should	the	linguistic	expression	of	causation	be	intertwined	with	negative	sentiment?		The	data	itself	do	not	provide	an	answer	to	this	question,	but	there	 is	 some	 suggestive	 research	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 causation	 and	affective	 states	 in	 the	 psychological	 literature	 –	 especially	 the	 sub-field	 of	Attribution	 Theory,	which	 explores	 how	 people	 attribute	 causes	 to	 outcomes	 and	the	 consequences	 of	 those	 attributions.	 	 In	 particular,	 there	 are	 consistent	 and	robust	findings	that	causal	attribution	is	often	a	means	of	emotional	regulation	and	that	 there	 are	 strong	 affective	 consequences	 of	 those	 attributions	 (see	 Sweeton	&	Deerose	2010;	Weiner	1980,	1985,	2010).		Interestingly	in	light	of	the	non-agentive	Japanese	and	Russian	constructions,	causation	and	the	experience	of	lack	of	control	have	particularly	 strong	affective	 consequences	 and	often	 the	 search	 for	 causes	 is	motivated	by	a	desire	for	mastery	and	control	(Weiner	1974).																																																									116	The	adversity	 contructions	 in	Russian	and	 Japanese	also	do	not	obviously	 consistently	express	speaker	 sentiment.	 	 In	 Japanese,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 negative	 event	 is	 negative	 for	 the	 causer-marked	argument,	and	in	Russian	the	correct	analysis	and	range	of	meaning	for	these	constructions	is	still	unclear.		These	questions	are	not	pursued	here.	
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	 In	the	case	of	agentive	causation,	it	seems	that	the	desire	to	assign	blame	is	a	central	driver	in	causal	attribution	(Alicke	2010).		In	general	it	seems	that	negative	events,	in	particular,	motivate	the	search	for	causes	in	order	to	prevent	them	from	occurring	or	occurring	again,	but	also	in	order	to	make	moral	judgments,	especially	negative	ones.	 	 Philosophical	 approaches	 to	 causation	as	 a	 concept,	 too,	 recognize	the	importance	of	blame:		 The	 concept	 of	 causation	 has	 […]	 a	 role	 in	 a	 family	 of	 important	practices.		Perhaps	the	crucial	one	is	the	assignment	of	responsibility.		When	it	 is	established	that	a	person	is	causally	responsible	for	some	event,	they	are	often	subject	to	praise,	blame,	and	sanction.		[…]	[W]e	might	 insist	 that	 there	 can	 be	 a	 non-causal	 basis	 for	 moral	responsibility.	 	 But	 there	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 pressure	 in	 the	 other	direction.	 	It	becomes	more	unproblematic	to	hold	you	responsible	if	we	treat	your	act	as	a	cause.	 	 (Godfrey-Smith	2009,	336)		 			 There	 are	 other	 unanswered	 questions	 concerning	 the	 phenomena	addressed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 of	 course,	 in	addition	 to	 those	mentioned	 throughout	 the	discussion.		Some	of	the	most	salient	include:		 (A) Is	the	negative	sentiment	always	associated	with	the	caused	subevent	or	 can	 it	 be	 shifted	 to	 the	 causer:	 That	 idiot	 at	 the	 bar’s	 obnoxious	
behavior	at	least	caused	the	crowd	to	dissipate?117		 (B) How	 do	 we	 handle	 an	 apparent	 non-scientific	 and	 not-obviously-negative	 restricted	 class	 of	 utterances	 involving	NP	 complements	 of	
cause	 denoting	 disturbances?	 	 For	 example,	 the	 VPs	 caused	 a	
disturbance/scene/stir…	 and	 other	 expressions	 of	 reaction:	 caused	 a	
ripple	of	 surprise	 in	 the	 crowd.	 	 Is	 this	 an	exceptional	 class	of	 idiom-like	collocations?	 	 Is	 it	 similar	 to	 the	pseudo-idiomatic118	drive-crazy	and	 its	 set	of	 synonyms	 (drove	him	out	of	his	mind)?	 	 Is	 it	 actually	a	case	of	negative	sentiment	at	some	level?																																																									117	This	example	due	to	David	Beaver	(p.c.).	118	 Perhaps	 not	 actually	 idiomatic	 since	 synonyms	 do	 not	 usually	 participate	 in	 idiomatic	 phrase	substitutions	while	maintaining	the	idiomatic	meaning:	#The	feline	is	out	of	the	sack.	
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	 (C) How	 general	 is	 make?	 	 Is	 it	 actually	 polysemous	 as	 claimed	 by	Wierzbicka	 and	 others?	 	 Why	 are	 sentences	 with	 complements	containing	the	verb	die	so	bad?:119	#she	made	him	die.120		Is	this	just	a	blocking	effect	 from	the	 lexical	kill,	perhaps	 in	combination	with	 the	pragmatic	 principle	 of	 Maximize	 Presuppositions	 (Heim	 1991)	 and	the	 generalization	 that	 death	 is	 negative	 –	 favoring	 cause?	 	 If	 so,	 is	
make	felicitous	in	some	specific	context	where	the	particular	death	is	positive	for	the	speaker	and	the	causation	indirect.		Or	is	this	a	lacuna	in	a	set	of	senses,	of	which	there	might	be	more?121			I	have	speculated	on	parts	of	question	(C)	in	the	previous	chapters	and	I	suspect	(B)	to	 be	 basically	 a	 case	 of	 a	 family	 of	 idiom-like	 strong	 collocations	 formed	 on	 the	basis	of	analogy.		In	the	case	of	(A),	my	intuitions	are	unstable,	and	it	seems	best	to	leave	the	question	to	future	–	ideally	experimental	–	research.		 But	perhaps	some	discussion	of	some	of	the	questions	raised	in	chapter	2,	in	light	of	the	subsequent	discussion,	is	appropriate.		The	title	of	a	recent	paper	on	the	linguistic	expression	of	causation	(Copley	&	Wolff	2013)	tells	us	that	“[t]heories	of	causation	 should	 inform	 linguistic	 theory	 and	 vice	 versa”.	 	 The	 lack	 of	 a	philosophical	 consensus	 on	 causation	 makes	 the	 former	 somewhat	 difficult	 here,	beyond	what	 has	 been	 done	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 but	 to	 conclude,	 perhaps	 I	could	begin	to	take	up	the	latter	challenge	with	some	data-driven	speculation.	Can	 the	 findings	 about	 the	 periphrastic	 causatives	 say	 anything	 about	theories	 of	 causation?	 	 In	 general,	 do	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 language	 of	 causation	 have																																																									119	The	exception	to	this	 is	 in	the	case	of	avatar	death.	 	 If,	 for	example,	someone	is	playing	a	video	game	and	is	distracted,	resulting	in	the	death	of	the	character,	you	made	me	die	is	perfectly	felicitous.	120	Luckily	for	the	feature	hierarchy	analysis	of	the	meaning	of	make,	however,	none	of	the	proposed	hyponyms	seem	to	like	this	verb	either:		??She	forced	him	to	die,	??She	got	him	to	die,	??She	had	him	
die.	121	 Furthermore,	 what	 significance	 should	 be	 placed	 on	 the	 he	 made	 me	 do	 it	 disavowal	 of	responsibility	(which,	crucially,	does	not	disavow	volition,	 just	responsibility,	somehow).	 	Does	this	just	mean	“I	did	it,	but	I	didn’t	want	to”	in	line	with	a	general	resistant	directive	causative?		There	are	many	questions	surrounding	make.	
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anything	 to	 say	 about	 theories	 of	 causation?	 	 These	 data	 do	 not	 directly	 prove	anything	about	causation,	of	course.		They	concern	only	a	single	language	and	only	a	subset	 of	 causative	 constructions	 in	 that	 language.	 	 However,	 might	 they	 suggest	anything	about	what	the	theory	of	causation	ought	to	look	like?		I	think	they	do.122		In	particular,	I	think	they	argue	in	favor	of	some	mixture	of	Anti-Reductionism	and	Causal	Pluralism,	with	a	healthy	dose	of	Humean	Skepticism	thrown	in.	More	 specifically,	 I	 think	 the	 facts	 of	 acquisition	 of	 the	 causal	 concept,	combined	 with	 the	 nature	 of	 argument	 structure,	 argue	 for	 some	 kind	 of	 Anti-Reductionism.	 	 It	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 grammatical	 dependency	 on	 the	causal	concept.		Many	linguists	hold	that	some	notion	of	causation	(or,	equivalently,	force)	 is	 the	 answer	 to	 problems	 encountered	 in	 event	 theory	 and	 argument	realization	 (see	e.g.,	 Copley	&	Harley	2012).	 	 If	 language	 is	 innate	 (an	unresolved,	but	 not	 improbable	 “if”),	 then	 some	 notion	 of	 causation	 is	 probably	 also	 innate.		Furthermore,	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 children	 have	 a	 primitive	 Piaget-style	“push/pull”	 notion	 of	 causation	 preverbally.	 	 It	 is	 likely	 that	 some	 notion	 of	causation	 of	 this	 sort	 (or	 something	 more	 abstract	 and	 emotion-centered)	 is	 a	cognitive	 primitive,	 irreducible	 to	 non-causative	 components.	 	 This,	 of	 course,	speaks	only	to	the	epistemology	of	causation,	but	the	concerns	of	 the	skeptics,	 the	Eliminativists,	 the	 Logical	 Positivists,	 modern	 physics,	 and	 perhaps	 even	 the	findings	discussed	here	(see	below)	suggest	that	epistemology	might	indeed	be	the	domain	of	causation.	
																																																								122	Note,	 too,	 that	 at	 least	 one	 prominent	 and	 influential	 theory	 of	 causation	 (Anscombe	 1971)	 is	based	fundamentally	on	the	differences	in	the	lexical	versus	periphrastic	expressions	of	causation	in	English.	
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	 However,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 conceptual	 cognitive	 primitive	 does	 not	 entail	that	causation	is	univocal.	 	Perhaps	a	number	of	causal	concepts	are	generated	via	different	 analogies	 with	 the	 primitive	 concept,	 resulting	 in	 a	 set	 of	 family	resemblances.	 	 The	 myriad	 causal	 expressions	 and	 the	 seeming	 impossibility	 of	unproblematic	generalization	suggest	some	variety	of	Causal	Pluralism.	 	As	shown	here,	there	is	no	general	causative	verb	in	English.123		Perhaps	that	is	because	there	is	no	 general	 concept.	 	 The	non-overlapping	 expressions	of	 causation	 in	English	 –	direct	 and	 indirect,	 with	 adverse	 subtype,	 manipulative	 and	 directive,	 with	inclinational	subtypes	–	might	be	a	reflection	of	the	plurality	of	the	causal	concepts.	Finally,	I	believe	that	the	data	call	for	some	Humean	skepticism	in	light	of	the	pervasive	affective	and	evaluative	associations	with	causative	constructions	(as	well	as	 the	 near-invisibility	 of	 the	 former	 to	 reflection).	 	 These	might	 suggest	 that	 the	unitary	 concept	 of	 causation	 is	 being	 projected	 on	 experiences	 by	 people,	 rather	than	being	neutrally	observed.124		Perhaps	the	emotional	and	affective	associations	with	 causation	 both	 in	 and	 out	 of	 the	 linguistic	 domain,	 and	 its	 role	 in	 human	motivation,	 suggest	 that	 it	 is	 primarily	 (if	 not	 wholly)	 a	 psychological	 construct,	vindicating	Hume.		This	can	be	true	even	if	the	idea	that	causation	is	a	real	relation	existing	between	things	in	the	world	and	outside	of	our	conception	of	it	is	a	“default	position”	as	John	Searle	puts	it,	a	“taken-for-granted	presupposition	[that	is]	part	of	…	 the	 Background	 of	 our	 thought	 and	 language”	 (Searle	 1998	 pg.	 10).	 	 This,	 of	course,	is	not	to	deny	that	there	exist	mind-independent	objects	and	phenomena	in																																																									123	Recall	that	make		is	infelicitous	in	sentences	describing	an	enabling	causative	event.	124	Of	course,	non-objective	doesn’t	mean	the	concept	can	simply	be	discarded.		Causation	seems	to	be	a	part	of	the	background	cognitive	operating	system	–	it	might	be	impossible	to	have	any	coherent	conception	of	experience,	especially	of	time,	without	the	concept	of	cause.	
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the	 world,	 that	 is	 not	 in	 question,	 but	 only	 to	 leave	 open	 the	 question	 whether	causation	as	we	understand	it	is	one	such	phenomenon.	Of	 course,	 all	 that	would	be	 required	 is	 an	 exceptionless,	 truth-conditional,	non-disjunctive	account	of	causation	to	prove	these	speculations	totally	wrong.		
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Appendix			
1.	 Corpus	Data	
	The	table	below	displays	the	total	counts	in	the	Corpus	of	Contemporary	English	 (COCA)	 for	 the	 representative	 lemmatized	 verbs	 examined	 here	 in	respective	 periphrastic	 causative	 collocation	 frames	 (i.e.	 “[cause]	 me|him|it	 to	[be]”).	 	 Frequency-ordered	 bargraphs	 for	 the	 natural	 logarithms	 of	 these	 counts	(plus	 1	 for	 all	 counts,	 to	 avoid	 −∞	 logarithmic	 values)	 follow.	 	 (e.g.	 ln(119+1)	 =	4.78749).	
	
	 Figure	60:	Counts	for	periphrastic	collocate	verb	in	CAUSE	NP	(to)	V	frame.		
Cause Make Force Get Allow Set Let Have
Be 119 87 43 40 431 0 1751 148
Take 17 183 88 37 112 0 1222 63
Work 1 1317 15 84 75 9 126 29
Seem 0 1062 0 0 1 0 3 7
Know 0 45 0 1 10 0 2235 2
Stay 2 74 16 20 60 0 300 29
Lose 78 87 3 5 4 0 20 5
Do 17 486 76 100 217 4 894 150
Talk 1 46 7 80 13 0 630 8
Happen 20 913 3 1 76 0 338 60
See 5 182 11 19 124 1 1661 13
Let 4 15 3 15 8 0 201 5
Miss 50 46 35 1 2 0 7 3
Leave 11 74 51 25 30 0 128 15
Stop 16 322 36 74 14 0 252 9
Ask 6 34 7 2 18 0 7000 6
Look 21 2517 36 25 26 0 202 40
Come 8 248 15 48 59 2 558 216
Fall 32 76 1 4 6 0 264 20
Make 12 29 44 20 112 0 689 33
Feel 27 4919 4 3 19 0 67 10
Tell 1 43 6 31 15 0 3486 30
Get 16 102 17 13 105 1 2510 28
Try 2 23 4 9 6 0 532 12
Think 28 1267 13 14 18 0 333 3
Go 20 547 44 85 112 3 4989 195
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Figure	61:	Bar	graphs	for	log	of	collocate	verb	counts	(+1)		
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	 	The	table	below	displays	collocate	count	values	normalized	by	the	total	number	of	verb	collocates	in	the	COCA	for	the	respective	periphrastic	causative.		For	example,	1853	verbs	occurred	in	the	“[cause]	me|him|it	to	[*v*]”	frame;	119/1853	=	0.06422.		Frequency-ordered	bargraphs	of	these	values	follow.		 		
		Figure	62:	Verb	collocates	normalized	by	total	number	of	verb	collocates	for	each	causative.			
Cause Make Force Get Allow Set Let Have
Be 0.06422 0.00388 0.02121 0.01918 0.06755 0.00000 0.03712 0.01582
Take 0.00917 0.00816 0.04341 0.01774 0.01755 0.00000 0.02591 0.00674
Work 0.00054 0.05873 0.00740 0.04027 0.01176 0.08411 0.00267 0.00310
Seem 0.00000 0.04736 0.00000 0.00000 0.00016 0.00000 0.00006 0.00075
Know 0.00000 0.00201 0.00000 0.00048 0.00157 0.00000 0.04738 0.00021
Stay 0.00108 0.00330 0.00789 0.00959 0.00940 0.00000 0.00636 0.00310
Lose 0.04209 0.00388 0.00148 0.00240 0.00063 0.00000 0.00042 0.00053
Do 0.00917 0.02167 0.03749 0.04794 0.03401 0.03738 0.01895 0.01604
Talk 0.00054 0.00205 0.00345 0.03835 0.00204 0.00000 0.01336 0.00086
Happen 0.01079 0.04071 0.00148 0.00048 0.01191 0.00000 0.00717 0.00641
See 0.00270 0.00812 0.00543 0.00911 0.01944 0.00935 0.03521 0.00139
Let 0.00216 0.00067 0.00148 0.00719 0.00125 0.00000 0.00426 0.00053
Miss 0.02698 0.00205 0.01727 0.00048 0.00031 0.00000 0.00015 0.00032
Leave 0.00594 0.00330 0.02516 0.01198 0.00470 0.00000 0.00271 0.00160
Stop 0.00863 0.01436 0.01776 0.03547 0.00219 0.00000 0.00534 0.00096
Ask 0.00324 0.00152 0.00345 0.00096 0.00282 0.00000 0.14840 0.00064
Look 0.01133 0.11224 0.01776 0.01198 0.00408 0.00000 0.00428 0.00428
Come 0.00432 0.01106 0.00740 0.02301 0.00925 0.01869 0.01183 0.02309
Fall 0.01727 0.00339 0.00049 0.00192 0.00094 0.00000 0.00560 0.00214
Make 0.00648 0.00129 0.02171 0.00959 0.01755 0.00000 0.01461 0.00353
Feel 0.01457 0.21935 0.00197 0.00144 0.00298 0.00000 0.00142 0.00107
Tell 0.00054 0.00192 0.00296 0.01486 0.00235 0.00000 0.07390 0.00321
Get 0.00863 0.00455 0.00839 0.00623 0.01646 0.00935 0.05321 0.00299
Try 0.00108 0.00103 0.00197 0.00431 0.00094 0.00000 0.01128 0.00128
Think 0.01511 0.05650 0.00641 0.00671 0.00282 0.00000 0.00706 0.00032
Go 0.01079 0.02439 0.02171 0.04075 0.01755 0.02804 0.10577 0.02085
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Figure	63:	Bar	graphs	for	verb	collocates	normalized	by	total	number	of	verb	collocates	for	each	causative.			
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	The	 final	 table	displays	values	 for	 the	counts	of	each	 lemmatized	collocate	verb	 in	respective	periphrastic	 frames	normalized	by	 the	 total	occurrence	of	 the	collocate	verb	in	the	COCA.		For	example,	there	are	1942849	occurrences	of	some	form	of	be	in	the	COCA;	119/1942849	=	0.00006125.		Frequency	ordered	bargraphs	for	these	values	follow.			
		Figure	64:	Verb	collocates	for	each	causative	normalized	the	total	count	of	the	collocate	in	the	corpus.	
Cause Make Force Get Allow Set Let Have
Be 0.00006 0.00004 0.00002 0.00002 0.00022 0.00000 0.00090 0.00008
Take 0.00006 0.00060 0.00029 0.00012 0.00037 0.00000 0.00401 0.00021
Work 0.00000 0.00400 0.00005 0.00026 0.00023 0.00003 0.00038 0.00009
Seem 0.00000 0.01645 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00005 0.00011
Know 0.00000 0.00007 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00341 0.00000
Stay 0.00003 0.00105 0.00023 0.00028 0.00085 0.00000 0.00424 0.00041
Lose 0.00215 0.00240 0.00008 0.00014 0.00011 0.00000 0.00055 0.00014
Do 0.00001 0.00035 0.00005 0.00007 0.00016 0.00000 0.00065 0.00011
Talk 0.00001 0.00336 0.00051 0.00584 0.00095 0.00000 0.04601 0.00058
Happen 0.00035 0.01597 0.00005 0.00002 0.00133 0.00000 0.00591 0.00105
See 0.00001 0.00041 0.00002 0.00004 0.00028 0.00000 0.00377 0.00003
Let 0.00002 0.00006 0.00001 0.00006 0.00003 0.00000 0.00087 0.00002
Miss 0.00138 0.00127 0.00096 0.00003 0.00006 0.00000 0.00019 0.00008
Leave 0.00014 0.00096 0.00066 0.00032 0.00039 0.00000 0.00166 0.00019
Stop 0.00020 0.00412 0.00046 0.00095 0.00018 0.00000 0.00323 0.00012
Ask 0.00006 0.00036 0.00007 0.00002 0.00019 0.00000 0.07322 0.00006
Look 0.00008 0.00968 0.00014 0.00010 0.00010 0.00000 0.00078 0.00015
Come 0.00003 0.00087 0.00005 0.00017 0.00021 0.00001 0.00196 0.00076
Fall 0.00052 0.00124 0.00002 0.00007 0.00010 0.00000 0.00429 0.00033
Make 0.00003 0.00008 0.00012 0.00005 0.00030 0.00000 0.00184 0.00009
Feel 0.00019 0.03467 0.00003 0.00002 0.00013 0.00000 0.00047 0.00007
Tell 0.00001 0.00025 0.00003 0.00018 0.00009 0.00000 0.02001 0.00017
Get 0.00003 0.00019 0.00003 0.00002 0.00020 0.00000 0.00473 0.00005
Try 0.00002 0.00022 0.00004 0.00009 0.00006 0.00000 0.00512 0.00012
Think 0.00005 0.00217 0.00002 0.00002 0.00003 0.00000 0.00057 0.00001
Go 0.00005 0.00139 0.00011 0.00022 0.00029 0.00001 0.01272 0.00050
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Figure	65:	Bar-graphs	for	verb	collocates	normalized	the	total	count	of	the	collocate	in	the	corpus.	
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			Based	 on	 the	 collocate	 verb	 frequency	 vectors,	 correlations	 of	 the	 various	periphrastic	 causative	 verbs	 are	 given	 below.	 	 A	 clustering	 graph	 based	 on	 these	correlations,	 and	 a	 clustering	 graph	 including	 only	 the	 effectuating	 causatives	(excluding	let	and	allow),	follow:					
	Figure	66:	Correlation	between	causatives	based	on	collocate	verb	frequencies.					
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		 	Figure	67:	Clustering	of	causatives	based	on	correlation.	
	
											
C
au
se
M
ak
e
Le
t
A
llo
w
H
av
e
Fo
rc
e
G
et
D
riv
e
S
et
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
hclust (*, "complete")
dist(cor(t(corpus), method = "spearman"))
H
ei
gh
t
	 234	
			
		 Figure	68:	Clustering	of	effectuating	causatives	based	on	correlation.	
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	 Figure	69:	eagerly	and	grudgingly	corpus	counts	and	inclinational	scores.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
eagerly grudgingly weight Let score Get score Force score
Be 314 36 0.7942857 0.0294847 0.0152308 0.0168497
Take 34 7 0.6585366 0.0170602 0.0116807 0.0285896
Work 9 0 1.0000000 0.0026712 0.0402685 0.0074001
Seem 2 1 0.3333333 0.0000212 0.0000000 0.0000000
Know 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Stay 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Lose 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Do 6 8 -0.1428571 -0.0027075 -0.0068484 -0.0053563
Talk 17 0 1.0000000 0.0133559 0.0383509 0.0034534
Happen 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
See 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Let 0 4. -1.0000000 -0.0042612 -0.0071908 -0.0014800
Miss 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Leave 1 3 -0.5000000 -0.0013568 -0.0059923 -0.0125802
Stop 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Ask 50 2 0.9230769 0.1369841 0.0008850 0.0031877
Look 67 0 1.0000000 0.0042824 0.0119847 0.0177602
Come 10 11 -0.0476190 -0.0005633 -0.0010957 -0.0003524
Fall 1 2 -0.3333333 -0.0018656 -0.0006392 -0.0001644
Make 6 5 0.0909091 0.0013279 0.0008716 0.0019734
Feel 0 0 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Tell 5 2 0.4285714 0.0316727 0.0063690 0.0012686
Get 2 2 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000 0.0000000
Try 13 0 1.0000000 0.0112784 0.0043145 0.0019734
Think 2 1 0.3333333 0.0023532 0.0022371 0.0021378
Go 11 8 0.1578947 0.0167000 0.0064339 0.0034274
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2.	 Experimental	Data	
	
	 In	 Figure	 70	 below,	 all	 experimentally	 elicited	 sentiment	 rankings	 for	adjectives	 that	 were	 provided	 in	 the	 cause	 frame	 of	 the	 first	 experimental	 block	(“John	cased	the	very	_________	event	to	happen”)	are	given,	followed	by	a	larger	view	of	 a	 sample	 of	 these	 scores	 in	 Figure	 71.	 	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 summary	 of	 the	statistics	of	these	results,	including	sentiment	boxplots	for	all	elicited	adjectives.		In	Figure	73,	the	scores	for	all	adjectives	in	the	make	frame	are	given	(“John	made	the	very	 ___________	 event	happen”),	 followed	by	 a	 sample	 of	 these	 scores	 in	 Figure	 74.		This,	too,	is	followed	by	a	summary	of	the	statistics	and	boxplots.		Elicited	sentiment	scores	 for	all	overlapping	adjectives	(adjectives	provided	 in	any	of	 the	elicitations,	for	 either	 of	 the	 causative	 verbs)	 are	 taken	 from	 these	 ratings.	 	 Paired	 quartile	boxplots	 comparing	 the	mean	 sentiment	 ratings	 for	cause	 and	make	 from	 the	 two	experimental	blocks	are	given	in	the	body	chapters	of	the	thesis.	In	Figure	76	SentiWordNet	positive	and	negative	sentiment	scores	and	their	difference	 are	 presented.	 	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	 boxplot	 for	 these	 values	 showing	extrema,	quartiles,	and	mean.		 	
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	 Figure	71:	Larger	view	of	sample	of	“cause”	frame	sentiment	ratings.			
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
bad 3 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
banal 4 1 4 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 1 3 2 3
beneficial 4 7 6 6 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 5 7 5 5 5 7 7 7 6 6 7
chaotic 2 1 2 4 2 2 6 1 3 1 2 2 2 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 2
crazy 3 1 3 2 4 4 5 4 7 5 3 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2
crucial 2 1 2 3 5 4 2 2 2 6 6 5 4 6 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 4
detailed 6 7 4 7 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 6 6 1
disasterous 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
dreadful 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1
exciting 6 7 6 7 5 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 6
extraordinary 6 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 7 5 7 7 7 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 6 7 6 6 7 7
extreme 4 7 4 4 6 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 1 5
fluid 4 7 6 5 4 5 5 4 6 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 6 6 4 4 7 5 6
fun 5 7 5 5 5 6 6 7 6 7 5 7 5 7 6 7 5 7 6 5 5 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7
horrible 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
important 4 1 6 4 4 7 6 4 6 7 5 7 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 6 4 4 7 1 4
improbable 3 1 4 2 3 3 2 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 2 1 5
interesting 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 4 6 5 6 5 4 5 6 4 7 5 7 6
intriguing 5 7 4 6 6 6 5 6 7 6 5 6 6 5 6 5 5 4 4 6 5 5 4 6 6 7
joyous 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 5 7 7 6 5 7 7 7 6 1 7 7
late 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 4 2 4 2 3 4 2 3 3 1 3
memorable 6 7 7 5 6 4 6 7 5 7 5 4 5 6 5 4 5 7 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 7 5
new 4 7 6 5 6 5 6 5 4 6 6 7 6 4 6 5 6 4 4 4 5 4 7 4 4 4 6 7 7
nice 3 7 6 6 5 7 7 5 6 7 5 7 5 6 5 6 6 5 6 6 4 7 5 7 7
painful 2 1 2 1 2 4 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
problematic 4 1 1 3 2 3 4 3 3 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 2 1 1
random 4 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 1 5
recent 4 4 5 5 6 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
same 4 4 4 3 5 5 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4
scary 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
serious 5 1 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 6 4
short 4 1 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 3 4 4
small 4 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 1 4 4
somber 4 1 1 6 3 2 4 3 5 4 4 2 4 5 2 5 1 3 2 3 1 4
special 6 7 5 5 5 6 5 6 7 6 4 6 5 6 5 4 7 4 6 4 7 6 6 5
strange 3 1 2 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
successful 6 7 7 6 6 7 5 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
surprising 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 4 5 4 7 4
terrible 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
troublesome 2 1 1 3 3 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 3 6 2 3 2 1 2 1 2
troubling 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 1 3 2 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 1
unexpected 4 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 5 4 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
unique 3 7 6 6 5 6 5 5 7 7 5 7 6 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 6 7 7 7
unlikely 3 1 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 1
unusual 3 1 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 5 4 3 5 5 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
wild 6 7 4 3 6 5 6 7 4 2 3 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 3
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		 Figure	72:	Boxplots	for	sentiment	ratings	for	adjectives	elicited	with	cause	sentence	frame.	
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	 Figure	74:	Larger	view	of	sample	of	“make”	frame	sentiment	ratings.						
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
annoying 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 2 3 2 4 2 1 1 3 1
anticipated 4 4 5 5 5 4 6 4 5 3 4 4 6 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 6 5 7 5 5 4
astonishing 3 7 7 5 7 5 6 7 7 7 7 4 6 7 4 5 5 3 4 7 7 6 5 5 7 5 6 7 5
awesome 5 7 6 5 6 7 7 7 6 6 7 7 6 7 7 5 6 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
awkward 4 1 3 3 4 1 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 4 3 4 2 4 2 2 2 3 4 3 2 4 1 2
bad 3 1 1 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 3 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
big 4 7 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 6 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 7 4
bland 7 1 2 3 1 3 4 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 1 2 3
boring 3 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 3 1 3 2
calm 4 7 4 5 4 4 7 7 5 5 6 5 4 5 3 6 4 4 4 5 5 4 6 6 5 5 4 4 6 6
convoluted 3 1 4 3 1 3 2 1 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 1
crazy 3 1 3 2 4 4 5 4 7 5 3 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 2
cute 5 7 6 5 6 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 6 7 5 4 5 6 7
delightful 5 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 6 7 6 6 7 7 5 6 5 5 7 7 7 7 7 7
di cult 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 3 4 5 2 3 3 3 1 1
droll 3 1 3 3 1 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 4 2
elegant 6 7 6 7 5 6 5 7 6 6 7 6 5 7 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 4 7 6 5
exciting 6 7 6 5 7 6 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 6
exclusive 4 7 4 7 5 2 4 4 6 3 6 5 4 7 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 6 3 3
explosive 5 4 4 4 4 6 5 1 1 4 1 6 2 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 2 4 4 1 1 4
fun 5 7 5 5 5 6 6 7 6 7 5 7 5 7 6 7 5 7 6 5 5 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7
futuristic 6 7 4 4 5 6 4 5 6 5 4 5 4 6 5 4 4 5 5 6 5 5 6 4 5 5 7 4
good 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 5 5 7 6 5 5 6 6 7 7
grand 5 7 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 7 5 6 7 5 6 7 7
happy 5 7 7 7 5 6 7 7 6 6 6 5 7 7 5 5 7 7 6 6 5 7 7
important 4 1 6 4 4 7 6 4 6 7 5 7 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 6 4 4 7 1 4
interesting 5 7 7 7 7 6 6 7 6 4 6 5 6 5 4 5 6 4 7 5 7 6
large 4 7 4 5 4 6 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 7 3
long 4 7 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 5 4 4 1 3 4
lovely 4 7 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 5 7 7 5 6 6 4 6 7 4 7 7 7 6
lucrative 4 7 3 5 6 4 6 6 4 6 7 3 4 6 5 4 7 4 7 5 5
magical 3 7 5 6 7 7 6 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 5 7 4 7 6 6 5 6 7 6 5 5 7 7 6 6
positive 6 7 7 6 5 7 7 7 6 7 5 7 7 6 5 7 7 5 5 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
random 4 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 1 5
recent 4 4 5 5 6 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
sad 3 1 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 1
scandalous 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 5 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 4
scary 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 1 3 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
smooth 5 7 4 6 5 5 7 4 6 5 5 5 6 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 6 5 4 5 6
special 6 7 5 5 5 6 5 6 7 6 4 6 5 6 5 4 7 4 6 4 7 6 6 5
successful 6 7 7 6 6 7 5 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
surprising 6 6 6 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 4 5 4 7 4
unlikely 3 1 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 1
unusual 3 1 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 5 4 3 5 5 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 2
wonderful 6 7 7 6 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 7 7 7 5 7 6 7
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		Figure	75:	Boxplots	for	sentiment	ratings	for	adjectives	elicited	with	make	sentence	frame.	
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Positive Score Negative Score Pos - Neg
abnormal 0.000 0.750 -0.750
absurd 0.375 0.000 0.375
adventurous 0.625 0.250 0.375
amazing 0.500 0.250 0.250
annoying 0.000 0.500 -0.500
awe-inspiring 0.875 0.125 0.750
awesome 0.875 0.125 0.750
awful 0.000 0.875 -0.875
awkward 0.000 0.750 -0.750
bad 0.000 0.625 -0.625
beautiful 0.750 0.000 0.750
big 0.250 0.125 0.125
bitter 0.000 0.500 -0.500
bizarre 0.000 0.250 -0.250
boring 0.000 0.250 -0.250
catastrophic 0.000 0.750 -0.750
consequential 0.125 0.000 0.125
convenient 0.625 0.250 0.375
cool 0.375 0.000 0.375
crazy 0.000 0.500 -0.500
creative 0.000 0.000 0.000
curious 0.125 0.375 -0.250
dangerous 0.000 0.750 -0.750
delightful 0.750 0.000 0.750
destructive 0.000 0.625 -0.625
detrimental 0.000 0.750 -0.750
disastrous 0.000 0.750 -0.750
disturbing 0.000 0.875 -0.875
dramatic 0.500 0.000 0.500
dumb 0.000 0.250 -0.250
exciting 0.375 0.000 0.375
exotic 0.000 0.000 0.000
explosive 0.250 0.500 -0.250
extraordinary 0.625 0.000 0.625
extravagant 0.125 0.375 -0.250
extreme 0.000 0.250 -0.250
fantastic 0.375 0.000 0.375
fascinating 0.500 0.000 0.500
fortuitous 0.250 0.375 -0.125
fortunate 0.750 0.000 0.750
frightening 0.000 0.625 -0.625
fun 0.375 0.000 0.375
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Positive Score Negative Score Pos - Neg
funny 0.500 0.000 0.500
generous 0.000 0.000 0.000
good 0.750 0.000 0.750
great 0.750 0.000 0.750
happy 0.875 0.000 0.875
hateful 0.333 0.667 -0.334
heinous 0.222 0.778 -0.556
helpful 0.250 0.000 0.250
horrible 0.000 0.625 -0.625
huge 0.000 0.125 -0.125
hurtful 0.000 0.500 -0.500
important 0.875 0.000 0.875
incredible 0.000 0.000 0.000
influential 0.125 0.000 0.125
innocent 0.625 0.250 0.375
inspiring 0.500 0.000 0.500
interesting 0.375 0.000 0.375
intriguing 0.500 0.000 0.500
kind 0.625 0.000 0.625
lame 0.125 0.375 -0.250
large 0.250 0.125 0.125
loud 0.375 0.125 0.250
lovely 0.625 0.000 0.625
meaningful 0.125 0.000 0.125
mischeivous 0.000 0.250 -0.250
natural 0.250 0.000 0.250
negative 0.000 0.875 -0.875
nice 0.875 0.000 0.875
normal 0.000 0.500 -0.500
novel 0.375 0.125 0.250
obnoxious 0.000 0.625 -0.625
odd 0.375 0.000 0.375
optimistic 0.500 0.250 0.250
outrageous 0.000 0.875 -0.875
peculiar 0.125 0.375 -0.250
perplexing 0.125 0.125 0.000
pleasant 0.625 0.125 0.500
popular 0.125 0.000 0.125
positive 0.625 0.000 0.625
rare 0.250 0.000 0.250
reasonable 0.500 0.000 0.500
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		 Figure	76:	SentiWordNet	positive	and	negative	sentiment	scores,	and	their	difference.		
Positive Score Negative Score Pos - Neg
remarkable 0.250 0.250 0.000
ridiculous 0.000 0.625 -0.625
sad 0.125 0.750 -0.625
scary 0.000 0.750 -0.750
serious 0.125 0.000 0.125
shocking 0.375 0.125 0.250
significant 0.375 0.000 0.375
silly 0.000 0.375 -0.375
simple 0.125 0.375 -0.250
small 0.000 0.375 -0.375
special 0.000 0.000 0.000
spontaneous 0.250 0.000 0.250
strange 0.375 0.125 0.250
stressful 0.000 0.625 -0.625
substantial 0.000 0.000 0.000
surprising 0.000 0.625 -0.625
terrible 0.000 0.625 -0.625
terrifying 0.000 0.625 -0.625
tragic 0.000 0.625 -0.625
troubling 0.000 0.875 -0.875
ugly 0.000 0.375 -0.375
unexpected 0.125 0.375 -0.250
unfortunate 0.000 0.875 -0.875
unkind 0.500 0.375 0.125
unnatural 0.000 0.750 -0.750
unnecessary 0.250 0.250 0.000
unpleasing 0.500 0.250 0.250
unthinkable 0.000 0.625 -0.625
unusual 0.125 0.625 -0.500
upsetting 0.000 0.750 -0.750
weird 0.000 0.750 -0.750
wild 0.250 0.250 0.000
wonderful 0.750 0.000 0.750
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	Figure	77:	Box	plot	for	single	(positive-negative)	SentiWordNet	score,	with	mean.																													
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Block 1:  Block 2:          
            
bad G absurd L big G happy G small G weird G 
bad G amazing G big G happy G special L weird G 
bad G amazing G big G horrible L spontaneous L weird G 
banal L annoying L big G horrible L strange L weird G 
beneficial L 
awe-
inspiring G bizarre L horrible L strange L weird G 
chaotic L awesome G catastrophic  horrible L strange L weird G 
crazy G awesome G cool G horrible L strange L wild G 
crucial L awful G cool G horrible L strange L wonderful G 
detailed L awful G crazy G huge L strange L wonderful G 
disasterous L awful G crazy G important L strange L   
disasterous L awful G dangerous L influential L strange L   
dreadful G awful G dangerous L influential L strange L   
exciting L awkward G delightful L innocent L strange L   
exciting L bad G destructive L interesting L strange L   
exciting L bad G detrimental L interesting L strange L   
exciting L bad G detrimental L interesting L strange L   
extraordinary L bad G detrimental L interesting L stressful    
extreme L bad G disasterous L interesting L surprising L   
fluid L bad G disastrous L interesting L surprising L   
fun G bad G disturbing L interesting L surprising L   
fun G bad G dramatic L interesting L surprising L   
fun G bad G exciting L interesting L surprising L   
horrible L bad G exciting L interesting L surprising L   
important L bad G exciting L intriguing L surprising L   
improbable L bad G exciting L lame G terrible L   
interesting L bad G exciting L loud G terrible L   
intriguing L bad G exciting L loud G terrible L   
joyous L bad G exciting L meaningful G terrible L   
late G bad G exciting L negative L terrible L   
memorable L bad G exciting L normal L terrible L   
memorable L bad G explosive L novel L terrible L   
new G bad G extreme L odd G terrifying L   
nice L bad G fantastic L odd G tragic L   
painful L bad G fascinating L odd G troubling L   
problematic L bad G fortuitous L odd G troubling L   
random L bad G fortunate L odd G troubling L   
recent L bad G frightening G optimistic L ugly G   
same G bad G frightening G outrageous L unexpected L   
same G bad G frightening G peculiar L unexpected L   
scary G bad G fun G peculiar L unexpected L   
scary G bad G funny G pleasant L unexpected L   
serious L bad G funny G popular L unexpected L   
short G bad G good G reasonable L unexpected L   
small G bad G good G remarkable L unexpected L   
somber L bad G good G sad G unexpected L   
special L bad G good G sad G unfortunate L   
strange L bad G good G sad G unfortunate L   
strange L bad G good G sad G unfortunate L   
successful L bad G good G sad G unfortunate L   
surprising L bad G good G scary G unfortunate L   
surprising L bad G good G scary G unkind G   
terrible L bad G good G scary G unnatural L   
terrible L bad G good G scary G unnecessary L   
troublesome L bad G good G scary G unpleasing L   
troubling L bad G good G scary G unthinkable G   
unexpected L bad G good G scary G unusual L   
unique L bad G good G serious L unusual L   
unlikely G bad G great G shocking G unusual L   
unusual L bad G great G silly G upsetting G   
wild G beautiful L happy G simple L weird G   	Figure	78:	Word	origins	of	elicited	adjectives	via	OED.		L	=	Latinate,	G	=	Germanic.	
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3.	 Expanded	Feature	Hierarchy				 The	feature	hierarchy	that	follows	is	an	expanded	version	of	that	given	in	the	conclusion.		In	Figure	79,	the	node	for	the	manipulative	causatives	is	elaborated	in	a	hypothesized	analogy	with	that	of	the	directive	causatives.	 	It	is	suggested	that	the	verb	drive	 is	 a	 non-physical	 effectuating	manipulative	 verb	 and	 is	 given	 the	 label	“psychological”	 in	 line	with	 its	restriction	to	human	causees	as	subjects	 in	the	[NP	to-VP]	 non-finite	 complement	 clause	 pattern125	 and	 its	 selectional	 behavior	 as	discussed	in	Chapter	3.	
																																																								125	Thanks	to	Steve	Wechsler	for	pointing	out	this	restriction	on	complements	of	drive.	
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